*Originally posted by Sparc *
**This might seem like a hijack at first, but bare with me and I might be able to make relevant point to the OP at the end.
Which is as you admit conjecture, but it is also conjecture on fallacious grounds.
Not quite. As Bismarck unites Germany in 1871 in the aftermath of the war with France, Russia supports Bismarck. In the years leading up to 1871 Prussia and thereby Otto as part of the ‘Deutsche Bund’ has been walking on a tightrope between Russia and Austria that now gets increasingly unstable.
By 1875 France has rearmed and war threatens again. Much to Bismarck’s dismay England and Russia intervenes on France’s side. Bismarck reacts with deep indignation, even personal anger against Chancellor Gortschakoff and Prime Minister Disraeli. Deadlocked ‘with all the bayonets of Europe facing the center, where Germany happens to be’ as Bismarck put it he sets out on a new delicate path of appeasement of France and her newfound friends.
At his summer retreat in Bad Kissingen in 1877 he formulates the plan that will eventually lead to first the coalitions that enter WWI and then to the war itself. His plan is mainly aimed at isolating France, disabling any major coalitions, and avoiding a war on the European continent at all costs. As we know in retrospect it didn’t work. lokij is kind of right in as much that it could have worked if Bismarck wouldn’t have been ousted from power in 1890, but we will never know that.
The Russo-Turkish war that breaks out later that year affords him full possibility to start acting on these plans. At the Berlin Conference of 1878 he manages to sow together something that looks like at least the beginning of a viable solution. He avoids war with France and gives Russia room to maneuver in the East, negotiates land for Austria-Hungary, while affording England assurance that Russia will not gain a too strong foothold in the Mediterranean. However, Russia is not satisfied and a strong anti-German coalition forms amongst parts of the Russian leadership.
In 1879 he feels forced to enter into coalition with Austria-Hungary. Suddenly Germany finds itself on the opposite side of Russia, and forget not that it was Russia that originally gave Bismarck the support to separate from the Austro-Hungarians. With somewhat of a magical tour de force he manages to turn Russia into an unwilling ally in this game through the triple entente agreement of 1881. Behind the back of Austria he signs a reassurance treaty with Russia that more or less negates both the previous coalitions. Here’s the rub with the whole thing; his reassurance agreement is merely an artificial way to appease Russia. As long as Bismarck stays in power he manages to keep the resulting, but delicate balance alive. When he disappears from power it all collapses and exactly what he wanted to avoid at all costs happens, an alliance between France and Russia.
Now the German-Austrian Coalition and the Franco-Russian Entente has a very sad side effect. Russia was no real enemy of Germany, but opposed to Austria-Hungary while France was at odds with Germany but not Austria-Hungary. Through the two coalitions Russia is now suddenly opposed to Germany and France to Austria-Hungary and by extension the mutual agreements of protection between England and France creates exactly the grand anti-German front that Bismarck wanted to avoid, which as we know will be the state in which Europe goes to war in 1914.
Hence one must conclude that the conflict with Russia has deeper roots than just this last bit which of course is what brings on full opposition, but still remains only the consequence of many years of brewing disagreement.That was without a doubt the German ground for support to Lenin, but one should also note that the unnatural alliance with France and the subsequent war against Germany sowed much dissent in Russia, which played a part in paving the way for rebellion.Well they did more than that. They interrupted the peace negotiations with Trotsky and renewed hostilities with Russia to eventually gain the conditions they demanded in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. To definitely say that this would have led to continued conflict is however somewhat contentious. Russia later used the defeat of the Central Powers to declare Brest-Litovsk null and void. Would they have done that if the Central Powers had come out of the war standing on their feet? The land that Russia ceded was largely, to not say completely populated by non-Russian speaking peoples. The domestic situation in Russia was shaky at best by the end of the war, too shaky for an external conflict. Independent of that it might be they wouldn’t have needed to fight Germany for that, which I’ll get back to later on. Let’s first look at what is going on inside Germany at the same time.Not so certain. Bismarck championed social reform in Germany. He also allowed the Socialists existence, albeit a curtailed freedom in order to avoid a new revolution.
With his defeat in 1890 there was a swing back to conservatism. The Socialists evolved at this time from their revolutionary base and became a mainstream movement. However, in 1914 the SPD were still locked out from power and strongly curtailed in their freedoms. That year, albeit under strong internal strife the Social Democrats ended up supporting the war effort and thereby gained a certain freedom and legitimacy and much needed support in the Reichstag.
In 1916, with the war ground to a halt with staggering loss of life and rampant financial and social costs the ‘Kriegzieldebate’ or ‘War Goal Debate’ breaks out splitting German politics down the middle with a right wing advocating a full on war to more or less bring Europe under the heel, and the left wing advocating a war that ensures Germany a peace with guaranteed borders as of 1914. During this debate the Social Democrats under Ebbert muster so much support that by the end of the war they are the largest single party in Germany. A party supportive of the International and saw the Russian revolution as a part of it, hence there was a future ally in Lenin. Lenin and Trotsky on their side had already stated the desire to expand the International to the West, hence there were mutual interests at hand.
The right wing spearheaded by Hindenburg and Ludendorff strengthened by emergency rule held the floor in the ‘Kriegszieldebate’ though, and the war continued. Had the left wing won this debate and managed to halt the dogs of war it is not unreasonable to speculate that the end of war would have seen a Germany emerge that was not only ready to tolerate the Soviets, but ready to ally with them. As I shall get back to, this is relevant both to the relationship to Russia as well as to the OP. Methinks lokij is mixing up Germany and Austria-Hungary a little. Look at what I have written up to here. Russia’s conflict in the East was with Austria-Hungary. The German conflict was an extension of the alliances that formed as a result of the politics of Bismarck and his successors, not German interests in the East. It is a frequent misconception that Germany had a long standing interest in lands under Russian dominion that stems out of Hitler making a big deal out of contested lands like Sudeten, you might want to consider that these were located in Austria-Hungary at the time. Let’s also remember that Brest-Litovsk was negotiated by the Austro-Hungarians with Germany supporting as an ally.Pray… Why?!? This reads like something out of ‘The Handbook on Why We Must Destroy the Hun’ or ‘The Kaiser and His Evil Plans for World Dominion’. A somewhat dated position, don’t you think? There is little in the years between 1871 and 1914 to support that Germany would have liked to engage in such politics. I think most of what I have brought up so far speaks against it as a matter of fact. It’s easy to forget that Germany before 1932 was a budding nation that pioneered democracy and social reform in Europe. The Kaiser had very littler power, if any. As a matter of fact he was rather a harmless fruit-cake sort of guy that mostly cared about his score of Pekingese dogs and what plumes to were in his hat to the Opera on Friday. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were Imperialists, without a doubt, but even they would have been appalled at the idea of a non-constitutional monarchy. More importantly, as I have already said the Socialist movement was strong, very strong as we came to see in the November Revolution of 18 and during the Weimar Republic. It’s just a pity that history had another route in plan for Germany and Europe.
**Conclusions/b]
As I think that I have shown Germany stood at a fork in the road in late 1917 with Russia safely tucked away under Lenin, hence Austria-Hungary’s needs in the East secured, and a western front at stalemate. The US had just entered the war and it would have been until 1919 before a significant impact from the US involvement could be felt tactically. Meanwhile the naval blockade in Skagerak is hurting Germany badly.
Still the prospect of a single front and the elusive carrot of colonial power to be gained and a stable boarder to France in the West spurs Hindenburg and Ludendorff to press on in the belief that they can achieve victory before the US can bring it’s crushing manpower to any effect.
First the Western Offensive of 1918 fails. Then the Allies launch their September Offensive and press back the Central Powers, but not decisively. Ludendorff still immediately capitulates and hands power over to the opposition.
Why? Was it the US presence or was the war lost anyway?
I say yes to both. The war would have been lost anyway, but Ludendorff didn’t see it. With the prospect of the US entering fully into the war in the next year he conceded that the Left Wing was correct and did the only reasonable thing. He acted too late though and the price the world paid for his mistake was a peace that paved the way for another war.
Had the US not been in the war it is of course impossible to say what would have happened. There is however an interesting possibility that opens up when you see it from the German Left Wing’s perspective. The Western Offensive still would have failed. The September Offensive might not have happened, but if it did it probably would have led to at the worst another stalemate and more likely a more modest Allied victory (the Allies didn’t intend it as a final offensive in the first place, but were gearing up for a final offensive in 1919). Had the September offensive happened, it probably still would have been enough to push the political balance inside Germany to the Left Wing’s advantage. However, the peace to then be negotiated would not have carried the prospect of crushing defeat in 1919 and would have been negotiated between parties that still stood at each others necks along the Marne, each with a non-involved potential ally carrying huge reserves of manpower and natural resources.
The world would have looked very different indeed.
Sparc **