Last night I had a high decibel, semi-drunken argument with a friend about America in the First World War. The bone of contention was whether or not America’s entry into the war on the side of the Allies was crucial to victory. He claimed it wasn’t. I claimed it was. I’m not going to present any of our arguments here, 'cuz I want to hear it straight from the mouths of Dopers. So here goes: Would the Allies have lost the First World War without the United States?
Yes.
Up-tight, Outta-sight and in the Groove!
I read a couple books about WW1, but don’t remember that much.
However, from what I gathered, it came to this. The Us entry did mean a bit in altering the outcome of the war. Simply put, IIRC, Both sides were getting pretty worn(because both sides were pretty evenly matched) out by around 1917. Both the Allies and the Germany/Austria-Hungary bloc had spent years pissing away men and resources into the huge meat grinder that the war was, usally with little or no permenant gain. The allies had begun developing tech. that could win the war (IE, the tank), but didn’t know how to properly use it. I remember something about both sides begining to have problem with manpower and resource shortages (though I might be mistaken). It had already taken it’s toll on the Russians, very likely sparking the Russian Revolution and pulling Russia out of the war. I also got the impression that morale wasn’t particulary high for anyone, since it’s not easy to look forward to the end when the war has already dragged on with no clear change or progress for 3 years as it was.
In 1917, the US joined the war and brought fresh resources and manpower. American soldiers were likely more optimistic then their war-weary counterparts, though probably inexperenced. Their presence probably helped morale, if nothing else. IIRC, the allies actually started making some progress in the war after this happened.
The impression I got was, If the US hadn’t joined the allies in 1917, the war probably would have ended with a stalemate, with both sides eventually coming to the negotating table when they both realized neither could achieve any sort of victory in the traditional sense, even if they bled their armies dry to attempt it.
The terms of whatever treaty they agreed to would have been more equitable then those of the versallies treaty (which scapegoated germany for the war). However, I don’t know if this would have been enough to prevent WW2 from eventually happening, or just give both sides something to be bitter about.
As it happened, the US did enter the war, and, IIRC,it became clear to germany after a while that they couldn’t win, and it was better to give up. Their resources and manpower was already strenched, while the US was just beginning to put theirs into play.
So another question, perhaps for another thread would be: How would history have been changed if the US had not entered WW1?
My impression is that the U.S. entry into the war tipped the table in favor of a Western Europen victory that may well have been lost otherwise. as it was that close. The resulting Versailles Treaty kind of automatically delivered to us WWII, Hitler notwithstanding.
I believe that the US entry was crucial to the Allies winning. Up to that point, it was more or less a stalemate. But around the time the US began to make its presence felt was around the same time that German troops came down from the Eastern front to bolster the ranks of the Western front. This increase in manpower may have pushed the favor to the Germans, or at least offset the tech advantage that the Allies got from the British tanks. American presence helped to offset the increased German presence.
US participation gave the Western Allies a lot of fresh manpower that wasn’t jaded by nearly 4 years of living in a muddy trench and fighting over the same patch of ground. So as has been said, it doubtless tipped the scale.
On an earlier thread someone wrote that our tactical methods were new and greatly superior to those of the British and French. The description of the Second Battle of the Marne on this site doesn’t bear that out. In fact this battle, and others, was fought under overall French command. Pershings insistance on US command has been misinterpreted. The British and French wanted US soldiers to be direct replacements, as individuals, into their units. Pershing said, “No, our Army will operate as US Army units.” However, those units, each one under American commanders, were ususally part of a larger operation under overall control of French or British commanders.
US materiel contribution was small. We used French artillery, French and British airplanes. Most of our rifles were British Lee-Enfields, although they might have been of US manufacture. I guess maybe we used our own transport vehicles but I think we got the horses locally.
I disagree that the Allies were about to lose (if that is what you mean by Western Europe) Germany was pretty much tapped out and would not have been able to keep up any sustainable offensice. Their last was a desperate hail Mary attempt to gain land and possibly be in a better term for Armistice would have had the same result whether the US was there or not. If anything there may have still been an Armistice. It would have been a draw.
With the US entry into the war the Allies had more meat for the slaughterhouse and therefore the Allies could dictate the terms of the Armistice. Germany knew they were going to lose having less men left to sacrifice so had to abide by those terms.
Endorse the views above that in the bloody, muddly slugfest that WWI had become, the introduction of US troops (an more particularly their sheer numbers) broke a stalemate that could have gone either way, or to a peace pact confirming the German territorial gains.
Of course, the sting in the tail here was the introduction of theSpanish Flu pandemic to the European theatre.
The war could not have ended in a stalemate as such. Both sides had borrowed huges sums of money, using as collateral the presumed “reparations” to be taken out of the hide of the vanquished. If a stalemated peace were arranged, all of the participants would have been bankrupt.
Ghoulish side note on civility: the British gunmaker Vickers used a device in thier machine gun pattered on a German patent. Vickers scrupulously put royalty payments into an escrow account and delivered the money to the Maxim machine gun company shortly after the Armistice.
As soon as America entered the war, with her huge wealth of natural resources and manpower, Germany was doomed. A week a month a year…a foregone conclusion.
Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August is an astonishing work of history, which I have read at least 5 times, and heartily recommend to anyone wishing to learn more about WW1.
I thought that the Germans, fearing that the US had tipped the balance, gambled opon an a last offensive to win the war before the US really got going. The offensive failed so they surrended.
From what I’ve read on WWI, which is a subject that particularly interests me, I think America’s entry into the war was vital to the allied cause. Russia was out of the equation in early 1918, well before the US had any real impact, freeing Germany to focus on the western front and they still occupied a large portion of France. All Germany had to do was fight on the defensive which is something that the technology of the time favored and that the Germans did very very well. If I remember correctly casualty figures for Germany on the western front had fallen to a figure substantially less than the birthrate and number of 18 year old inductees coming of age each year which meant they weren’t being ‘bled dry’. France and Britain on the other hand had to maintain the offensive, which in WWI was extremely costly in lives and material. Also important to consider was the psychological impact of the years of grueling trench warfare, America’s entry into the war was a heavy blow to German moral but a god send to the allies. I think it’s no stretch to imagine that had the USA stayed neutral, Germany would have emerged from the war without anything approaching the Treaty of Versailles and probably with some major territorial concessions. World War II would not have happened, although I think future German/Russian conflict would have been inevitable.
How were the tanks an advantage?
It’s true that both sides were worn out, but didn’t the Russian loss give a morale boost to German troops? They knew they were no longer fighting a two front war and suddenly their offense towards France could double. I got the impression that the French were ready to accept defeat before the U.S. stepped in with a fresh force.
There’s little doubt the war would have dragged on longer without America. As mentioned earlier, the 1918 German offensive, which was so costly to the Germans (and demoralizing, when troops saw the amounts of food and other material stocked in rear areas) represented a push to win the war before America’s presence could be felt.
In the long run (without the U.S. in the war) Germany, under severe strain from the naval blockade, might well have cracked first. In that event, peace terms would likely have been more favorable to it* (remember that the German homeland suffered little war damage and that population dynamics heavily favored the Germans over the French. I can’t imagine the threat of an Allied invasion of Germany succeeding without the backup of U.S. muscle).
I don’t recall hearing that either side had the wisdom and technology to use massed tanks to great effect.
*as the concept of “ruinous” reparations and penalties forced upon the Germans as part of the peace settlement forms a favorite whipping boy for those theorizing about the reasons for Hitler’s rise to power, here’s food for thought - the Americans and British wound up loaning half again as much money as was demanded from the Germans in reparations.
Despite what many think of the French today. There is little evidence that they were ready to accept defeat. It is a misinterpretation because they ceased to engage in the useless offensives.
After the mutinies in 1917 by French troops the general Staff agreed to stop their policy of uselessly throwing French troops into the path of German machine guns. This picked up morale and made sure that France could continue the War but more in a defensive mode, until a real opportunity arose.
Well the problem as I see it is this, Germany already occupied a goodly portion of France and had settled into the defensive. If France had also, pressured by mutiny, settled into a defensive posture you cease to have a war really… just a huge armed unofficial border with artillery potshots. France HAD to drive Germany from it’s soil or break their will to hold it. True the maritime blockade was taking it’s toll on the civillian population but Germany was far from general starvation. No, France had to maintain the offensive to win the war and without America wading in their prospects for anything other than stalemate were grim.
Re the main question of the OP I’ll just say that beyond the resource effect that many have touched upon already, I think it’s worth to emphasize the psychological effect that the US entry had on both sides. As David Simmons put it the US represented fresh manpower and provided a source for rested and spirited manpower more than anything else. The war would probably have gone the same way anyway eventually, but at a much more dire cost for Europe and the world. Germany was starting to suffer deeply on the home front, much worse than England and France that had colonies and financial support from the US to lean back on to some degree for food supplies and natural resources. Germany’s failed u-boot campaign to put England under blockade and England’s successful blockade of Skagerak worsened that situation. Then again, that’s speculation of the highest degree, fact remains that the US did join and as woolly notes with that event the Spanish flu tagged along which of course struck indiscriminately at both sides, but definitely contributed to the end of war.
Other matters
Someone posited that the tank helped win the war early in the thread. That’s doubtful at best. They were however of some important tactical use and probably speeded up the armistice somewhat.
Tanks were deployed with effect ranging from useless to disastrous between 1915 and 1917.
The most noteworthy setback would be at the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917 when the muddy battlefield swallowed the tanks, they literally sank through the ground and had no effect except spreading confusion along the British line of attack.
The first real success with an armored attack came later that year on November 20th with a small offensive against the Hindenburg Line at Cambrai. The tanks broke through the German line temporarily and paved way for military history. Wise from the mistakes with mud and lack of follow through in the breach the Allies successfully used tanks at Villiers Bretoneux, Le Hamel and Amiens between April and July of 1918. When the final assault was launched in September 1918 tanks were a central part of the tactics and served both to break through the lines as well as ‘safely’ guide troops through the territory being overrun.
The tank didn’t win the war as earlier said, but it sure saved some lives (at least on the allied side) and speeded up victory somewhat.
I know this is a central part of Tuchman’s case, one that she has received some criticism for. Although this was probably in the mind of the warring parties it is oversimplification to say that it was the main reason for continued war. Many other things stood to be lost, not least of all pride. One should also always keep in mind that when the war broke out it was seen as the war to end all wars, hence ‘The Great War’. As the fronts stagnated and the trench war dragged into stalemate the view became that the only way to achieve this goal and to secure peace at the back end was a complete defeat of the opposing side. As the number of casualties grew to staggering proportions it was felt that the price to do that had already been paid. This feeling eventually paved way for the oppressive reparations demanded at Versailles as it was seen as a legitimate way to crush Germany’s capacity to make war ever again.
Sort of, but not really. The Allied offensive of September 1918 is really what did it, but even after that the German line command was willing to go on fighting. When Ludendorff threw in the towel in November it came as a surprise to a large part of the rest of the German high command, who were preparing for yet another prolonged winter defensive. Let’s remember that the German lines had been breached and pushed back, but they were still standing outside German territory as the armistice came. Ludendorff wanted to avoid a war on German soil at all costs and hoped that the peace to be achieved would thereby be more favorable, as it turned out the peace was a disaster for Germany in any case.
Was it? Why and in what way? As far as I know it was rather the opposite and there was much hope to Lenin as an ally, especially amongst the socialist majority in Germany, but I’d love to hear a differing view. If you’re thinking of what Hitler later did it had naught to do with WWI. The German Russian conflict in WWI goes back to relationships between Tsarist Russia, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Bismarck’s Germany. The Russian revolution put at least a temporary end to the main relationships that fueled that conflict and without Hitler it is unlikely they would have been reinstated, but maybe I’m misinformed. Please expand.
Interesting as a point, but needs some qualification. It is correct that the financial reparations in payments that Germany was penalized with did little damage. What had real detrimental effect was the blockade on natural resources and the limitations on industry with ensuing inflation. It was so bad that in April 1923 one Dollar was worth 20.000 Marks, by the end of that year you paid 4.2 billion Marks for the dollar. Then the French occupation of the Ruhr did its part to inflame the situation, to not speak of the actual effect it had on the economy. Yet this didn’t bring Hitler to power. What finally did it was the repeated incapacity of the coalitions of the Weimar Republic to deal with these problems and the absolute chaos that ensued when the Great Depression hit a staggering, but recuperating economy which of course broke down once again. Yet this is an awfully simplified argument. Hitler’s rise to power must be analyzed as part of a long and very complicated series of events starting already in 1856 or at least in 1871. The immediate events that brought him to power are to be found after WWI, but I agree that even those are vastly oversimplified by saying that it was the war reparations that did it, although they did contribute.
Sparc
Re the main question of the OP I’ll just say that beyond the resource effect that many have touched upon already, I think it’s worth to emphasize the psychological effect that the US entry had on both sides. As David Simmons put it the US represented fresh manpower and provided a source for rested and spirited manpower more than anything else. The war would probably have gone the same way anyway eventually, but at a much more dire cost for Europe and the world. Germany was starting to suffer deeply on the home front, much worse than England and France that had colonies and financial support from the US to lean back on to some degree for food supplies and natural resources. Germany’s failed u-boot campaign to put England under blockade and England’s successful blockade of Skagerak worsened that situation. Then again, that’s speculation of the highest degree, fact remains that the US did join and as woolly notes with that event the Spanish flu tagged along which of course struck indiscriminately at both sides, but definitely contributed to the end of war.
Other matters
Someone posited that the tank helped win the war early in the thread. That’s doubtful at best. They were however of some important tactical use and probably speeded up the armistice somewhat.
Tanks were deployed with effect ranging from useless to disastrous between 1915 and 1917.
The most noteworthy setback would be at the Third Battle of Ypres in 1917 when the muddy battlefield swallowed the tanks, they literally sank through the ground and had no effect except spreading confusion along the British line of attack.
The first real success with an armored attack came later that year on November 20th with a small offensive against the Hindenburg Line at Cambrai. The tanks broke through the German line temporarily and paved way for military history. Wise from the mistakes with mud and lack of follow through in the breach the Allies successfully used tanks at Villiers Bretoneux, Le Hamel and Amiens between April and July of 1918. When the final assault was launched in September 1918 tanks were a central part of the tactics and served both to break through the lines as well as ‘safely’ guide troops through the territory being overrun.
The tank didn’t win the war as earlier said, but it sure saved some lives (at least on the allied side) and speeded up victory somewhat.
I know this is a central part of Tuchman’s case, one that she has received some criticism for. Although this was probably in the mind of the warring parties it is oversimplification to say that it was the main reason for continued war. Many other things stood to be lost, not least of all pride. One should also always keep in mind that when the war broke out it was seen as the war to end all wars, hence ‘The Great War’. As the fronts stagnated and the trench war dragged into stalemate the view became that the only way to achieve this goal and to secure peace at the back end was a complete defeat of the opposing side. As the number of casualties grew to staggering proportions it was felt that the price to do that had already been paid. This feeling eventually paved way for the oppressive reparations demanded at Versailles as it was seen as a legitimate way to crush Germany’s capacity to make war ever again.
Sort of, but not really. The Allied offensive of September 1918 is really what did it, but even after that the German line command was willing to go on fighting. When Ludendorff threw in the towel in November it came as a surprise to a large part of the rest of the German high command, who were preparing for yet another prolonged winter defensive. Let’s remember that the German lines had been breached and pushed back, but they were still standing outside German territory as the armistice came. Ludendorff wanted to avoid a war on German soil at all costs and hoped that the peace to be achieved would thereby be more favorable, as it turned out the peace was a disaster for Germany in any case.
Was it? Why and in what way? As far as I know it was rather the opposite and there was much hope to Lenin as an ally, especially amongst the socialist majority in Germany, but I’d love to hear a differing view. If you’re thinking of what Hitler later did it had naught to do with WWI. The German Russian conflict in WWI goes back to relationships between Tsarist Russia, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Bismarck’s Germany. The Russian revolution put at least a temporary end to the main relationships that fueled that conflict and without Hitler it is unlikely they would have been reinstated, but maybe I’m misinformed. Please expand.
Interesting as a point, but needs some qualification. It is correct that the financial reparations in payments that Germany was penalized with did little damage. What had real detrimental effect was the blockade on natural resources and the limitations on industry with ensuing inflation. It was so bad that in April 1923 one Dollar was worth 20.000 Marks, by the end of that year you paid 4.2 billion Marks for the dollar. Then the French occupation of the Ruhr did its part to inflame the situation, to not speak of the actual effect it had on the economy. Yet this didn’t bring Hitler to power. What finally did it was the repeated incapacity of the coalitions of the Weimar Republic to deal with these problems and the absolute chaos that ensued when the Great Depression hit a staggering, but recuperating economy which of course broke down once again. Yet this is an awfully simplified argument. Hitler’s rise to power must be analyzed as part of a long and very complicated series of events starting already in 1856 or at least in 1871. The immediate events that brought him to power are to be found after WWI, but I agree that even those are vastly oversimplified by saying that it was the war reparations that did it, although they did contribute.
Sparc
I hate when that happens. Any mod that drops by; feel freew to delete one of those. Thx in advance.
Oh, I just have trouble believing that a triumphant Germany would tolerate a pan-slavic Soviet Union with Lenin at the helm for very long. If I remember correctly Bismark enjoyed decent relations with Tsarist Russia, it was only after his death that it deteriorated and Russia made it’s pact with France. Lenin was sent to Russia for one reason and one reason only, to disrupt the Russian war effort and eliminate the eastern front for Germany and it worked. They also took advantage of the delicate new government to squeeze territory out of Russia, something that would surely be resented later. I seriously doubt that an intact post war Germany would regard the Bolsheviks as anything but a threat and rival for spheres of influence among the various eastern European satellite states. I believe that Germany would have various means to undermine the Soviet government resulting in a conflict where Germany would attempt to restore Russia’s monarchy, possibly putting another relative of Wilhelm on the throne. Whether that would have succeeded is questionable, but this is all conjecture anyway.
This might seem like a hijack at first, but bare with me and I might be able to make relevant point to the OP at the end.
Which is as you admit conjecture, but it is also conjecture on fallacious grounds.
Not quite. As Bismarck unites Germany in 1871 in the aftermath of the war with France, Russia supports Bismarck. In the years leading up to 1871 Prussia and thereby Otto as part of the ‘Deutsche Bund’ has been walking on a tightrope between Russia and Austria that now gets increasingly unstable.
By 1875 France has rearmed and war threatens again. Much to Bismarck’s dismay England and Russia intervenes on France’s side. Bismarck reacts with deep indignation, even personal anger against Chancellor Gortschakoff and Prime Minister Disraeli. Deadlocked ‘with all the bayonets of Europe facing the center, where Germany happens to be’ as Bismarck put it he sets out on a new delicate path of appeasement of France and her newfound friends.
At his summer retreat in Bad Kissingen in 1877 he formulates the plan that will eventually lead to first the coalitions that enter WWI and then to the war itself. His plan is mainly aimed at isolating France, disabling any major coalitions, and avoiding a war on the European continent at all costs. As we know in retrospect it didn’t work. lokij is kind of right in as much that it could have worked if Bismarck wouldn’t have been ousted from power in 1890, but we will never know that.
The Russo-Turkish war that breaks out later that year affords him full possibility to start acting on these plans. At the Berlin Conference of 1878 he manages to sow together something that looks like at least the beginning of a viable solution. He avoids war with France and gives Russia room to maneuver in the East, negotiates land for Austria-Hungary, while affording England assurance that Russia will not gain a too strong foothold in the Mediterranean. However, Russia is not satisfied and a strong anti-German coalition forms amongst parts of the Russian leadership.
In 1879 he feels forced to enter into coalition with Austria-Hungary. Suddenly Germany finds itself on the opposite side of Russia, and forget not that it was Russia that originally gave Bismarck the support to separate from the Austro-Hungarians. With somewhat of a magical tour de force he manages to turn Russia into an unwilling ally in this game through the triple entente agreement of 1881. Behind the back of Austria he signs a reassurance treaty with Russia that more or less negates both the previous coalitions. Here’s the rub with the whole thing; his reassurance agreement is merely an artificial way to appease Russia. As long as Bismarck stays in power he manages to keep the resulting, but delicate balance alive. When he disappears from power it all collapses and exactly what he wanted to avoid at all costs happens, an alliance between France and Russia.
Now the German-Austrian Coalition and the Franco-Russian Entente has a very sad side effect. Russia was no real enemy of Germany, but opposed to Austria-Hungary while France was at odds with Germany but not Austria-Hungary. Through the two coalitions Russia is now suddenly opposed to Germany and France to Austria-Hungary and by extension the mutual agreements of protection between England and France creates exactly the grand anti-German front that Bismarck wanted to avoid, which as we know will be the state in which Europe goes to war in 1914.
Hence one must conclude that the conflict with Russia has deeper roots than just this last bit which of course is what brings on full opposition, but still remains only the consequence of many years of brewing disagreement.
That was without a doubt the German ground for support to Lenin, but one should also note that the unnatural alliance with France and the subsequent war against Germany sowed much dissent in Russia, which played a part in paving the way for rebellion.
Well they did more than that. They interrupted the peace negotiations with Trotsky and renewed hostilities with Russia to eventually gain the conditions they demanded in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. To definitely say that this would have led to continued conflict is however somewhat contentious. Russia later used the defeat of the Central Powers to declare Brest-Litovsk null and void. Would they have done that if the Central Powers had come out of the war standing on their feet? The land that Russia ceded was largely, to not say completely populated by non-Russian speaking peoples. The domestic situation in Russia was shaky at best by the end of the war, too shaky for an external conflict. Independent of that it might be they wouldn’t have needed to fight Germany for that, which I’ll get back to later on. Let’s first look at what is going on inside Germany at the same time.
Not so certain. Bismarck championed social reform in Germany. He also allowed the Socialists existence, albeit a curtailed freedom in order to avoid a new revolution.
With his defeat in 1890 there was a swing back to conservatism. The Socialists evolved at this time from their revolutionary base and became a mainstream movement. However, in 1914 the SPD were still locked out from power and strongly curtailed in their freedoms. That year, albeit under strong internal strife the Social Democrats ended up supporting the war effort and thereby gained a certain freedom and legitimacy and much needed support in the Reichstag.
In 1916, with the war ground to a halt with staggering loss of life and rampant financial and social costs the ‘Kriegzieldebate’ or ‘War Goal Debate’ breaks out splitting German politics down the middle with a right wing advocating a full on war to more or less bring Europe under the heel, and the left wing advocating a war that ensures Germany a peace with guaranteed borders as of 1914. During this debate the Social Democrats under Ebbert muster so much support that by the end of the war they are the largest single party in Germany. A party supportive of the International and saw the Russian revolution as a part of it, hence there was a future ally in Lenin. Lenin and Trotsky on their side had already stated the desire to expand the International to the West, hence there were mutual interests at hand.
The right wing spearheaded by Hindenburg and Ludendorff strengthened by emergency rule held the floor in the ‘Kriegszieldebate’ though, and the war continued. Had the left wing won this debate and managed to halt the dogs of war it is not unreasonable to speculate that the end of war would have seen a Germany emerge that was not only ready to tolerate the Soviets, but ready to ally with them. As I shall get back to, this is relevant both to the relationship to Russia as well as to the OP.
Methinks lokij is mixing up Germany and Austria-Hungary a little. Look at what I have written up to here. Russia’s conflict in the East was with Austria-Hungary. The German conflict was an extension of the alliances that formed as a result of the politics of Bismarck and his successors, not German interests in the East. It is a frequent misconception that Germany had a long standing interest in lands under Russian dominion that stems out of Hitler making a big deal out of contested lands like Sudeten, you might want to consider that these were located in Austria-Hungary at the time. Let’s also remember that Brest-Litovsk was negotiated by the Austro-Hungarians with Germany supporting as an ally.
Pray… Why?!? This reads like something out of ‘The Handbook on Why We Must Destroy the Hun’ or ‘The Kaiser and His Evil Plans for World Dominion’. A somewhat dated position, don’t you think? There is little in the years between 1871 and 1914 to support that Germany would have liked to engage in such politics. I think most of what I have brought up so far speaks against it as a matter of fact. It’s easy to forget that Germany before 1932 was a budding nation that pioneered democracy and social reform in Europe. The Kaiser had very littler power, if any. As a matter of fact he was rather a harmless fruit-cake sort of guy that mostly cared about his score of Pekingese dogs and what plumes to were in his hat to the Opera on Friday. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were Imperialists, without a doubt, but even they would have been appalled at the idea of a non-constitutional monarchy. More importantly, as I have already said the Socialist movement was strong, very strong as we came to see in the November Revolution of 18 and during the Weimar Republic. It’s just a pity that history had another route in plan for Germany and Europe.
**Conclusions/b]
As I think that I have shown Germany stood at a fork in the road in late 1917 with Russia safely tucked away under Lenin, hence Austria-Hungary’s needs in the East secured, and a western front at stalemate. The US had just entered the war and it would have been until 1919 before a significant impact from the US involvement could be felt tactically. Meanwhile the naval blockade in Skagerak is hurting Germany badly.
Still the prospect of a single front and the elusive carrot of colonial power to be gained and a stable boarder to France in the West spurs Hindenburg and Ludendorff to press on in the belief that they can achieve victory before the US can bring it’s crushing manpower to any effect.
First the Western Offensive of 1918 fails. Then the Allies launch their September Offensive and press back the Central Powers, but not decisively. Ludendorff still immediately capitulates and hands power over to the opposition.
Why? Was it the US presence or was the war lost anyway?
I say yes to both. The war would have been lost anyway, but Ludendorff didn’t see it. With the prospect of the US entering fully into the war in the next year he conceded that the Left Wing was correct and did the only reasonable thing. He acted too late though and the price the world paid for his mistake was a peace that paved the way for another war.
Had the US not been in the war it is of course impossible to say what would have happened. There is however an interesting possibility that opens up when you see it from the German Left Wing’s perspective. The Western Offensive still would have failed. The September Offensive might not have happened, but if it did it probably would have led to at the worst another stalemate and more likely a more modest Allied victory (the Allies didn’t intend it as a final offensive in the first place, but were gearing up for a final offensive in 1919). Had the September offensive happened, it probably still would have been enough to push the political balance inside Germany to the Left Wing’s advantage. However, the peace to then be negotiated would not have carried the prospect of crushing defeat in 1919 and would have been negotiated between parties that still stood at each others necks along the Marne, each with a non-involved potential ally carrying huge reserves of manpower and natural resources.
The world would have looked very different indeed.
Sparc