McClelland was never alone in the belief that the South would capitulate as soon as they realized the cost, and ultimate sure defeat from the North. Just the knowledge that the North had raised enormous armies and that they were possessed of the better manufacturing and supply lines would be enough to bring them to the negotiating table.
In the meanwhile, the South decided they needed to strike quickly, take Washington, if possible, and force the North to give them Independence. McClelland’s armies prevented that, even if they weren’t aggressive and didn’t inflict massive casualties on the South.
Tactics and strategy evolved into the sense that only by using overwhelming forces could the war be won.
Lincoln knew this, but couldn’t get McClelland to comply. After Vicksburg, Grant came East and got the job done.
My take is that we should have let them go. They would not have survived the next great slave uprising, anyway.
Apart from the failings already mentioned, McClellan’s worst performance came in the 1864 Presidential campaign, when he pretended to be the only person who could hold the Union together. What this really meant was that if he had succeeded in getting elected President, he would have tried to end the war on terms agreeable to the Confederates, including preservation of slavery.
Good at organizing and training an army, otherwise a useless self-important git.
In fairness, while the Democratic platform was for an immediate negotiated end to the war, McClellan repudiated this. His desire was to restore the Union, albeit, yes, with slavery to continue.
Even before he created the Army of the Potomac, McClellan was instrumental in detaching West Virginia from Virginia,leading to the creation of a new state that was on the Union side.
Right, and McClellan might have been the best choice. He was a superb organizer, and had great strategic vision. WAY too cautious in actual field command, but think of what would have happened if the North had been Burnside or Rosecrans .
Both sides started the war with the mistaken belief that all that was needed was a good battle victory or two and then the other side would see reason and sit down to negotiate.
It wasn’t going to happen. Both sides were committed to keep fighting as long as they had the capacity to fight. So the strategy of the war became wearing down the other side until it was unable to continue.
Lee, despite his reputation, never saw this. He kept looking for the decisive battle long past the point when he should have realized there wouldn’t be a decisive battle in this war.
McClellan was right in not attacking, but for the wrong reasons. You cannot march into miniball fire in formation and then the revolvers up close using Napoleonic tactics. Every general who tried it got their troops slaughtered. New weapons required new tactics and they were not developed until later.
But after the war, Lee was quoted as saying McClellan was the most challanging commander he faced.
McClellan was timid and constantly overestimated the forces arrayed against him. But that meant his forces were very difficult to attack. Lee lost or drew most of the Seven Days’ battles, showing that McClellan was strong defensively.
Unfortunately, McClellan’s timidity caused him to withdraw after each battle, even after winning them. He was especially worried at that point that Washington might be unguarded so he avoided risk far too much.
I always got the impression that McClellan was doing some sort of Fabian strategy, and rather well, but that the overall problem was that he shouldn’t have been defending, and should have been attacking.
I may have been too harsh in calling McClellan a lousy field commander. He was even good at that up to a point.
To his credit, I don’t recall McClellan allowing Lee to ambush him as happened to Hooker at Chancellorsville & Grant in the Wilderness. Nor did McClellan have to go to his grave with battles like Fredericksburg or Cold Harbor on his conscience.
As already noted, McClellan held his own against Lee during the Seven Days & again at Antietam.
I seem to recall a colleague’s observation of McClellan at the poker table that summed up his qualities as a commander. He said that McClellan was a great poker player all the way up to the point where he should go all in. He said that McClellan would inevitability fold & miss out on winning the big hand.
Here’s a conspiracy theory for you: Lee intentionally “lost” that set of orders during his Maryland campaign. He needed to bring McClellan to a battle so he could defeat him. But McClellan was always too cautious and kept shying away from the battle Lee wanted.
So Lee split up his army, wrote it all down, and then left the document where he knew Union soldiers would find it and give it to McClellan. He figured McClellan would finally figure he had enough of an advantage to commit himself to a battle. Which was what Lee wanted.
McClellan occasionally had a good military idea. He used the Union navy to ferry his troops to attack the area around Richmond directly. Of course once he was there he hemmed and hawed and threw away his advantage. He did organize an army that was far larger than the country ever had. His troops loved him, as he had a 19th century sense of chivalry- making sure Robert E Lee’s wife, suffering from severe rheumatism, was protected and escorted to Confederate lines.
I suppose one could say McClellan suffered from bad intelligence as Pinkerton continually inflated Confederate strength. But at some point Little Mac should have realized the North had far more resources. McClellan had been successful and was afraid of failing. Grant had failed and knew he would survive-and often the enemy was as afraid as he was.
Almost any general will have SOME good ideas and some skills. But like poker or golf, war is an endeavour in which having a few strengths doesn’t matter if you have a lot of critical weaknesses. McClellan, regrettably, demonstrated many of the psychological traits of a general who, no matter what his other skills, was never going to be a successful general in the role he had been assigned.
The contrast between McClellan and Grant could not be greater; where McClellan LOOKED great and played the part well, Grant had little interest in politics and appearance and spent his time actually trying to win the war.
Grant was very interested in electoral politics. He even ran for public office twice in his life and won the presidency both times. He was a lousy political operator and his administration was corrupt because he couldn’t lead in politics.
Grant stayed out of politics as much as any general did DURING the war. McClellan was always playing politics. He remained on as general right up to Election Day 1864, in fact.
True, but, I also heard that the next words that he said was “Hey, everybody-watch this!”
I do wonder if McClellan’s reputation is kind of like Robespierre’s, which rides the pendulum every 20-25 years. I read a volume from the 1940s and it seemed to be aware of the points that are made here, but, it pointed out that McClellan’s shortcomings were just reactive to Lincoln’s interference.
e.g., McClellan was going to attack point A. Lincoln said “Use General X with a counterattack” (military phrase just pulled out of my hat). McClellan: “OK-oops! Gee, Mr. Prez, there are too many Confederates. Gotta go!” and, in so doing, saved the army from a disaster.
Something like that.