But there was no pressure on Monty to open up Antwerp at this time. Antwerp was not set as a priority. He was never told to secure it. All the self- flagellation on the issue is hindsight
I have seen period documentation misused or selectively used before so anyone who claims to have a “whole picture” using documentation is to be viewed suspiciously. I think even Yeide has the ability to admit that his picture is by no means clear.
I am hardly unique in this opinion:
No. Absolutely not. Monty was perfectly capable but he was *not *the expected commander of the D-Day invasion.
Really? Patton is said to “argue for hare-brained schemes”, to be “more driven by hatred and ego than cause and purpose”. And of course there’s more invective in a 162-post thread than a 45-post one, there’s more of everything.
Montgomery is mentioned in passing in the OP, then in post #6, when Sparc notes that only a choice of Rommel or Monty is more difficult than Rommel or Patton…ie, praise for Montgomery.
Crusoe is British, and you snipped the part of that same post where he wrote that Monty “was up against more experienced panzer and SS panzer troops than Patton, which inevitable coloured the end result (glorious breakout by Patton, bloody stalemate at Caen by Monty).”
You’re seeing what you want to see, plainly…including ignoring the MacArthur thread, which is full of unkind words for that general.
Bradley doesn’t get knocked much because at the end of the day he wasn’t as exciting. Patton had a lot of theater attached to his name, as did Monty. Rommel even had a dashing reputation ,deserved or not.
Bradley? He’s mostly known as the ‘Soldier’s General’ because he wore a soldier’s uniform instead of Popinjay clothes like Patton (and sometimes Monty).
If Bradley called press conferences, there’s not a whole lot to remember about them, wheras Patton and Monty loved to play with the press to promote themselves with outlandish or self-promoting statements.
You grab the spotlight, you can expect the rotten tomatoes. Its not that Bradley didn’t have an ego (he had a huge one) it just wasn’t devoted to theater as much.
Yes strange how perfectly clear quotes get re-written to suit the perspective of the person making them.
Take this from the above link:
To be sure, the Germans were not wholly unaware of Patton. For example, Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt believed Patton was one of the best Allied commanders, but he also felt Montgomery deserved such praise (415).
Now are we to assume Rundstedt was fulsome in his Patton praise and that as an afterthought he tagged on a mention of Monty?
The original quote is:
“Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met. Field Marshal
Montgomery was very systematic”.
All this can be cleared up if the period German documentation of this fear/respect for Patton is produced.
British tea and the English language.
While looking up articles concerning the “Cooking/Boiling Vessel FV706656" installed on British armored vehicles, the sentence below, referring to the Battle of Villers-Bocage, caught my eye (much better now, thanks). The article is written by James Simpson, who I assume is British.
*At 8:30 AM, they stopped for morning tea and a spot of maintenance in the crossroads town of Villers-Bocage, 18 miles from Caen.
A squadron of the 4th County of London Yeomanry proceeded to a ridge known as Point 213, a mile outside of town. The British officers held an impromptu briefing in a nearby house while the crews of the squadron’s armored vehicles began brewing tea.*
Nazi tank(s) then took advantage of the situation.
To an American reader (ie me), it’s written as if the British had actually stopped for tea. And then decided that the officers should have a briefing and the tank crews should attend to their vehicles. I doubt that is how things happened.
A British reader would know/assume that the officers needed to figure out where they were and/or what they should do next, which was the real reason for the break. Wrench turning and tea brewing would have been a secondary concern.
An American author wouldn’t say Patton had stopped for coffee on the way to Messina. Even if he had. It would just confuse the readers.
I’m not even sure what the complaint here is.
The build-up of German forces had been observed In the Cologne area for some weeks before the attack, and the possibility of a German attack through the
Ardennes was thoroughly studied by me and my staff. ’
In leaving the Ardennes line lightly held, we took what in known in military terminology as a “calcuIated risk” to strengthen our northern and southern drives.
In other words, instead of employing our surplus divisions in the then quiet Ardennes, we used them to attack in other sectors.
This technique of striking boldly while taking calculated risks is what has gotten us to the German borders.*
So you see it was all a cunning plan to lure the Germans into attacking-worked perfectly!
A perfectly clear 1st hand quote was rejigged in order to give more prominence to one of the mentioned parties.
Well, the book and the review were about Patton, not Montgomery.
Why does this upset you so much?
Its seems like you are making a distraction rather than confronting the meat of review.
Your doubt is justified. What happened is that the column was getting strung out and a key part of the attached Motor Infantry Battalion had not yet landed in Normandy -the Carrier Scout Platton. The Commander of the Tank Regiment (4th CLY) decided to hold an ‘O’ group briefing at the highest forward point (Pt 213) and every Officer went forward to attend leaving the men to fend for themselves. At the precise moment they were in conference the Tigers (plural) burst on to the road between all the officers and the Infantry Battalion. The Officers were cut off and the battle for the town went on without them.
I am not upset. I am providing you with the original quote so you know what was really said. How you use or interpret it is your affair.
I note an error in my earlier post on Bradley. THis is how it should look.
The unathorised Press Conference Bradley gave on Jan 7th 1944 in reply to Monty’s authorised Jan 5th Press Conference certainly was highly memorable. If for nothing more than the lies he told that day
The build-up of German forces had been observed In the Cologne area for some weeks before the attack, and the possibility of a German attack through the
Ardennes was thoroughly studied by me and my staff. ’
In leaving the Ardennes line lightly held, we took what in known in military terminology as a “calcuIated risk” to strengthen our northern and southern drives.
In other words, instead of employing our surplus divisions in the then quiet Ardennes, we used them to attack in other sectors.
This technique of striking boldly while taking calculated risks is what has gotten us to the German borders.
So you see it was all a cunning plan to lure the Germans into attacking-worked perfectly!
It sure seems nitpicking to try and dismiss a review that puts your author in a less flattering light.
I have a golden rule. Never opine on a subject where your knowledge is limited. I know nothing about MacArthur.
It would be wise for others to follow this dictum and refrain from posting 5th hand overheard conversations about that awful General Montgomery.
Two reasons. The first was that it wasn’t the United States that made the decision. There was an Anglo-American alliance and that meant the British got to pick their own generals.
The second was that Montgomery wasn’t a terrible general. He was competent. I’m just saying he wasn’t great.
Personally, I’d count Market-Garden, Falais, and Antwerp as major avoidable errors. These were situations where Montgomery failed to achieve the primary goal of the operation.
There were other situations where it’s arguable that Montgomery succeeded but could have done better.
I would add to that the failure to take Cherbourg to timetable and the inabilty to secure Brest in a timely manner and in a usable state. It was the failure at Brest that shifted the focus to Antwerp and made Montgomery a scapegoat for other generals failures.
Similarly, it would be wise to refrain from declaring that criticism is never applied to generals other than Montgomery in on this board, when that’s simply untrue.
You can’t be suggesting that this is what Bradley meant by his remarks, can you?
Bradley was caught with his pants down. He refused to admit he had lost contact with one of his Armies. He was apoplectic when Ike transfered Hodges to Montgomery and tried to blackmail Ike into reversing the order by threatening to resign. Ike called his bluff . He held a completely unauthorised Press Conference where he gave the impression he had everything under control. In short he lied through his teeth in order to salvage his reputation. He was as big headed and egotistic as Montgomery. They were two peas from the same pod.
I say the criticism levelled at Montgomery is far more personal and visceral than that directd at any other WW2 General. More to the point in the majority of instances the criticism is rooted in outright lie and invention.
Look to one of your earlier claims:
That is not true. Where on earth did you get that from?
Is it just something you ‘know’ to be right (because it sounds right) and is ‘common knowledge’?
You have assiduously avoided any further explanation of it so I now call you out.
Tell us how you came to believe such a fiction.
Do you still insist it is true and if so where and when did this happen?
Source please.
But I hardly see how those failures can be blamed on Montgomery. It was other generals (American ones) who were assigned to capture those ports and failed.