And then what? Were the Soviets going to decide to leave Germans alone as long as they stayed on their side of the river? Of course not - they would have just attacked them anyway. And the Soviets would have had a secure base in the city and the Germans would have been fighting out in the open field.
That’s my point. A few miles outside Stalingrad was no safer than the middle of downtown Stalingrad. The Germans were going to be attacked wherever they were - there was no safe place for them to withdraw to. So what was the point of withdrawing? It’s like being trapped inside a burning building - there’s no point in arguing about which room you should go to because they’re all going to burn.
My uninformed guess is that they all would potentially interfere with the efficient use of all available resources. Bad in any leader, but REALLY bad in a military leader.
The German army excelled at mobile warfare. Giving that up to fight in fixed positios nullified a major strength. After Stalingrad and the loss of all those men, the Germans fought mobiley and brought the Russians to a stop.
No, it was a choice between being encircled by the Soviets in Stalingrad or being encircled by the Soviets outside Stalingrad. There was no choice of not being attacked by the Soviets.
Huh? After Stalingrad, the Germans ran away. They pulled back about four hundred miles. They “stopped” the Russians only in the sense that the Russians chased them until they ran out their supply lines.
Mobile warfare was key to the German problems. It allowed them (or the Soviets or the Americans when they used it) to capture a lot of territory with well-planned attacks. But mobile warfare doesn’t hold territory - the Germans needed to figure out a way to defend all the ground they captured.
That wasn’t my impression…sure they ran away…but they didn’t run away so far there wasn’t pressure. The Germans fought a masterful mobile campaign in Souther Russia that winter…
Or that’s what my recollection was…will have to look it up.
This is getting a bit bizarre. Of course there was no choice of not being attacked by the Soviets. But are you honestly contending that there’s no difference between fighting in Stalingrad, surrounded on all sides by the Red Army, no re-supply except by air, no possibility of shifting in reinforcements, etc, and retreating before being completely encircled (or fighting back through the encirclement, as might have been possible for a while), maintaining contact with your supply lines, having a somewhat protected rear area, support on the flanks, etc? Are you honestly contending that Paulus was just a well off fighting in Stalingrad with every conceivable strategic disadvantage arrayed against him as he would have been in a fighting retreat with fewer of those disadvantages?
Well, Stalingrad certainly exposed Hitler as an amateur strategist. What was his obsession with that city, anyway? By the time the Germans got in, the city was a burned out shell. Had Paulus been allowed to retreat, he might have saved the army.
From what i read, the last days in Staligrad were pretty horrible-the germans were reduced o eating rats and horses. What was Hitler’s reaction? He promoted Paulus to field marshal-hoping that Paulus would commit suicide (no German field marshal had ever surrendered).
That must have been a real morale raiser for the other generals-kill yourself when you are faced with defeat!:eek:
Why do you think withdrawing would have avoided this fate? The Germans had contact with their supply lines, a protected rear area, and support on their flanks at the start of the battle. They didn’t get encircled because they lost those advantages; they lost those advantages after they got encircled.
Cutting them off was the Soviet plan. The Germans didn’t get cut off at Stalingrad because of some defect in that particular location. The reason the Germans got encircled at Stalingrad was because that’s where they were so that’s where the Soviets attacked them.
Suppose the Germans had tried to avoid being encircled at Stalingrad by withdrawing to Rogachick, a small city twenty miles to the east. What would have happened? The Soviets would have attacked them at Rogachick instead and they would have been encircled and cut off from supply there instead. So how would they have avoided getting cut off at Rogachick? Withdraw back to Volgodonsky. Then how would they have avoided being encircled at Volgodonsky? Withdraw back to Kalach-na-Donu. Are you seeing the problem with this pattern?
If the Germans were going to avoid running away they needed to pick someplace where they would stand and fight. Obviously, the best place to do that was wherever they could find the most defendable position. And the most defendable terrain was the rubble of Stalingrad.
Little Nemo, are you claiming that it was not possible for the Germans to avoid a total defeat, that there was nothing to do with it except to retreat indefinitely or lose, and that the outcome was wholly predetermined?
True, but once they had been encircled, or once it was clear they were about to be encircled, it probably would have been smart for the 6th Army to try to get out of there. At the very latest, they should have coordinated with the 4th Panzer Army during Winter Storm to break out.
So rather than preserving a veteran army, skilled at mobile warfare, and pulling it back to a point where it could regroup, it was better for the Germans to abandon it in Stalingrad because the rubble provided excellent cover? That’s a new one.
He is right about the rubble, though. It took months for the Russians to ferret out the remaining German soldiers hiding in basements and sewers. So at least they had that going for them.
Strategically, the German problem was their entire military strategy was based on attacking. Every time there was some military setback, Hitler and the OKW thought the solution was to attack and conquer more ground. Germany would have been a lot better off if they had been working on ways to hold the ground they had already conquered.
So as I wrote earler, the issue shouldn’t have been whether the Germans should stand in Stalingrad or withdraw - they should have never gone to Stalingrad in the first place. Once they got there, they had no good options.
I haven’t read much about the Stalingrad disaster. What explains the german’s terrible intelligence? Surely they had spotter planes, that were watching the Russian Army advance?
The other thing I don’t understand-Hitler was terrified of fixed battles-his experiences in WWI had convinced him that siege warfare was a trap-why didn’t the germans just bypass Stalingrad and keep advancing?
How did the german popaganda machine explain this disastrous defeat? Surely troops going home on leave 9and the lucky medical evacuees from Stalingrad) could not all be silenced-the stories they brough back could NOT have been good for morale!
They were aware of it. They just expected to be able to capture the city and redeploy before the Russians would be able to counter-attack
Stalingrad (now Volgograd) was a choke point and a major river port, crossing the Volga above and below the city would make sense militarily, except that the Germans were :
[ul]
[li]at the limit of their supply line (if I remember correctly, when the Soviets counterattacked, the converted rail line hadn’t or barely reached the Don,[/li][li]and, through their experience so far in the war, whenever the Soviets were hit solidly, they folded.[/li][/ul]
Officially, they did not. If I recall correctly, they decreed a national mourning period after the surrender. What they did conceal, is the reasons why it occured in the first place.
Look at a map, they didn’t need to take the city to go into the Caucasus.
Ummm… technically true, practically false. With Germany at war with Russia, it was a strategic necessity; otherwise, you have a major industrial city in enemy hands a short distance from a choke point in your oil supply lines. Trying to get shipments past Rostov with Stalingrad, only 300km away, in Soviet hands and the intervening territory in dispute, would have been hazardous in the extreme.
Yes, you’re right. But… You could mask the city. Isolate it through bombing. Mine the river. You didn’t have to take the city. Neutralizing it would have been enough.
Please refer to Maj. Gen. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, L.C.F. Turner, ed., trans. by H. Betzler, (Norman: University Press of Oklahoma 1956). In a section headed “Russian Tactics,” (page 296) von Mellenthin writes,
The Russian form of fighting—particularly in the attack—is characterized by the employment of masses of men and material, often thrown in unintelligently and without variations…Russians have always been renowned for their contempt of death…a [Russian] attack delivered twice will be repeated a third or fourth time irrespective of losses…
I suppose von Mellethin is “ignorant” as well, after all, he was merely Chief of Staff of the Fourth Panzer Army. I apologize for being blunt, but you simply do not know what you are talking about.
The reliability of Panzer Battles has been called into question over the years. Critics point out that Major-General von Mellenthin tends to downplay German failures while focusing exclusively on successes, while some of his observations on the positive and negative qualities of the Russian soldier are little more than crude overgeneralisations.