Was the Cold War nuclear threat for real?

[Latro]

@The_Second_Stone

The whole point of the policy of “containment” set forth by George Kennan in his Mr. X article was that the Soviets would not push expansion if confronted by firm opposition at every single instance. He was correct. However, many in the US hierarchy did not understand the doctrine of “containment” or even seem to know about it, viewing all the confrontations as an inevitable escalation to war rather than acts of containment.

Although the Cuban Missile Crisis was touted as “America standing firm against Soviet expansion”, it was actually the other way around.

The crisis started because of the threat of the U.S. invading Cuba plus the fact that the US had just placed nuclear missiles in northern Turkey.

The Russian convoys to Cuba were not halted because of the “firm stand” by Kennedy but by Kennedy’s agreement to remove the missiles in Turkey and a promise not to invade Cuba.

[TriPolar]

MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) is one of the factors that saved us from global catastrophe. Those in power on both side realized that it was a lose-lose situation, and their power would be lost by starting a nuclear war. The most dangerous times were early on before the build up of weapons when either side could have believed a pre-emptive strike would be successful. By the time the nuclear arsenals hit the worldwide destruction level it was unlikely that they would be used other than to counter a conventional invasion. Kennedy brought us close to the brink with the Bay of Pigs, and when China began to build a nuclear arsenal they appeared at times to be close to engagement with the Soviets, something largely not seen by the west who operated on the simplistic mindset that the China and the USSR were staunch allies.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

@madsircool

What paranoid drivel. Where is any evidence of these incredible claims?

It’s documented here. Ironically, Reagan hated nukes and saw it as his divine mission to prevent Armageddon (unlike the aforementioned Falwell.)

[TriPolar]

@Really_Not_All_That_Bright

It’s documented here. Ironically, Reagan hated nukes and saw it as his divine mission to prevent Armageddon (unlike the aforementioned Falwell.)

Reagan looked like a monkey playing with a wrist watch when it came to nuclear arms, at least as far as his publicly stated policies. They sometimes sounded like he wanted to upset the balance of power. However, I think the Soviets were easily convinced that he was playing internal US political games, something they understood well, and actually the results of negotiations was to maintain parity.

[Sailboat]

Some of the leaders involved certainly contemplated nuclear strikes.

Meet General Curtis LeMay.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, LeMay clashed again with U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara, arguing that he should be allowed to bomb nuclear missile sites in Cuba. He opposed the naval blockade and, after the end of the crisis, suggested that Cuba be invaded anyway, even after the Russians agreed to withdraw. LeMay called the peaceful resolution of the crisis “the greatest defeat in our history”.[35] Unknown to the US, the Soviet field commanders in Cuba had been given authority to launch—the only time such authority was delegated by higher command.[36] They had twenty nuclear warheads for medium-range R-12 Dvina (NATO Code SS-4 Sandal) ballistic missiles capable of reaching US cities (including Washington) and nine tactical nuclear missiles. If Soviet officers had launched them, many millions of US citizens could have been killed.[citation needed] The ensuing SAC retaliatory thermonuclear strike would have killed roughly one hundred million Soviet citizens. Kennedy refused LeMay’s requests, however, and the naval blockade was successful.[36]

Since the president checked LeMay’s impulse, is the danger “not real” or “real?”

[CapnPitt]

Not the Soviets and not MAD, but you could certainly look to the Formosa Straits crises in the 1950’s. Sec’y of State John Foster Dulles believed in “brinksmanship,” but the Joint Chiefs had approved the use of nuclear weapons against Communist China. Eisenhower overruled them.

So yes, very real.

[bump]

@Colibri

It was certainly a very real mindset at the time.

After the atrocities committed by Stalin and Mao, there was the view in the US that Commies were capable of virtually anything, including sacrificing a large part of their own populations in order to advance their ideals (or their own hegemony). The mass famines prompted by government policies, human wave attacks by the Chinese in the Korean war, all contributed to the idea that the Reds would stop at nothing.

Don’t forget that the Soviet/Chinese MO was to actively ferment Communist revolutions anywhere they could, and their propaganda was very belligerent toward the West and capitalism just for existing, rather than for anything in particular that the West planned to do to the communist world.

In other words, they seemed very much like a threat, because they did unthinkable things internally, their propaganda was threatening to the West, and they actively supported people trying to overthrow nations friendly to the West.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

We did that too, you know.

[Odesio]

@Really_Not_All_That_Bright

He was? I’m pretty sure I remember the Soviets continuing expansion efforts after Korea. Vietnam and Afghanistan spring to mind.

From what I can recall of Kennan’s writings is that he said the Soviet Union would always back down when faced with the prospect of actually going to war with the United States. They’ll bluster and threaten but they don’t actually have it in them to pull the trigger.

[TriPolar]

@Odesio

From what I can recall of Kennan’s writings is that he said the Soviet Union would always back down when faced with the prospect of actually going to war with the United States. They’ll bluster and threaten but they don’t actually have it in them to pull the trigger.

We were the same way. That’s why we ended up fighting proxy wars.