Without my cites at hand, it probably was. You can’t replay history, but the facts are that
- The war was a very narrowly decided thing in 1918, and
- It’s hardly a controversial stance to take that subtracting a number of divisions from a close-fought war might have tipped the balance.
However, there is an argument to be made the other way. I don’t necessarily agree with it but let me play devil’s advocate:
Despite entering the war in 1917, the U.S. had no significant presence in Europe for quite some time. It was not until March 1918 that the AEF had even three divisions in France, which represented a very small part of the Allied front - probably less than five percent - and were very green and in many cases underequipped troops. The AEF at that point in the war wasn’t a tenth the fighting presence that the Canadian Corps was, and the Canadian Corps was a small part of the British force, which in turn wasn’t as big as the French Army.
Later in the year the AEF got very large and engaged in massive combat operations against Germany; by September, to continue with the comparison, the AEF was five times bigger than the Canadian Corps, had battle experience and was kicking ass and taking names in what had become a war of manoevre. So the question is, when was the war decided? One could argue that the war was effectively decided by the failure of the German offensive in March, and that once that failed they’re pretty much shot their load and were doomed to defeat. If you buy that, then you can argue American troops were not a decisive factor. But if you argue the Germans could still have fought the Allies to a standstill, it’s impossible to dismiss the contribution of a gigantic field army that engaged in combat operations on a scale never seen before.
It all boils down to how decisive you think the failure of the German offensive in March was. If you believe that that doomed Germany, and that civil unrest and the fall of the Kaiser were inevitable once Paris couldn’t be taken, then you can fairly reasonably conclude that the AEF just sped up the end of the war, rather than deciding it.
If on the other hand you think a failure of ALLIED offensive in the middle of 1918 would have allowed the Germans to conclude a favourable peace - there’s no doubt in my mind the war was going to end no later in 1919, no matter what - then the sher volume of U.S. troops was undoubtedly indecisive. John Keegan comments tha tthe sudden arrival of the Americans was disheartening to a lot of German troops, as you can certainly imagine; here they’re crushed the Russian Empire, have damn near beaten the French and the British, victory’s at hand, and along comes a fresh new army with a seemingly limitless number of men. It’d be like winning a tough boxing match through fourteen bloody rounds and then in the middle of the last round they send a brand new guy out to start punching you. Keegn doesn’t really support how much this demoralization meant, though, and it’s hard for me to believe battle-hardened German troops would just give up. They fought hard enoguh to kill fifty thousand American soldiers, so they sure weren’t going easy.