I didn’t see you address the point I made about limited library access (after reading the district transcripts I’m dropping the point about limited resources). The argument is that government-imposed restrictions on access to the government-run library prevented Mr. Watson from learning that he had a cause of action against the government, which in turn prevented Mr. Watson from filing an SF-95 on time.
~Max
I’d need more information. The district court opinion indicates that “Plaintiff’s abilities were also limited by the resources available in the library of the detention facility at which he was held, and by restrictions on use of those facilities.” And that he “would visit the detention center’s law library several times a week. Without an attorney, he used as best he could the library’s resources, such as books and the LexisNexis program, to write his briefs and motions in connection with proving his citizenship.” That opinion (which I only skimmed) doesn’t appear to provide more information on the nature of the restrictions and I’m not going to read the transcript.
If he was uniquely limited in his access to the library, then I think that could qualify as something “extraordinary” that would be fairly attributable to the government. If this particular detention center limited access to the library for all of its detainees in some extreme or unusual way, I might be able to be convinced. But, if the restrictions and limitations were fairly standard, then it doesn’t seem “extraordinary.” (Which is somewhat circular reasoning, but if they gave him access several times a week and he had access to Lexis, then it doesn’t seem like his access or resources were unusually limited.)
The point, again, is that a plaintiff needs to demonstrate some sort of “extraordinary” circumstance that “prevented” him from timely filing his claim. It seems to me that this case presents “extraordinary” circumstances that make his case particularly compelling (although the discussion of BIA’s interpretation of Jamaican law on legitimacy makes me wonder how clear cut this case actually was); but that he was “prevented” (if at all) from filing his claim by entirely ordinary things.
The dissent’s point (I think) is that lots of ordinary things can combine to be extraordinary. (And the dissent’s other point, which seems right, is that the review of the district court’s decision is supposed to be pretty deferential to its discretion). I don’t know if I buy that in theory, but in this case the combination of factors (limited education, pro se status, incarceration when the claim accrued, limitations on access to materials because of incarceration) seem like they are going to exist together in a lot of cases.
The existence of a limitations period for claims is going to inevitably result in some number of plaintiffs with legitimate claims being shut out of court. And that’s an argument for getting rid of limitations periods. But exceptions to the limitations period should not include simply being really sympathetic to the untimely plaintiff.
You correct him on this one error but let a dozen instances of “counsil” pass without comment? :dubious:
First I’ll quote the library portion of the defense’s opening statement, which isn’t too long. It’s in this first spoiler.
[SPOILER]So the library, contains 1,023 volumes including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, treatises and casebooks on torts, and the federal rules. One of the more popular books, published by the Columbia Law Review is called the Jailhouse Lawyers Manual, provides useful summaries, and explanations about FTCA claims.
You will learn another resource available to the plaintiff was the ability to research administrative claims on the Internet. The plaintiff was able to ask library staff to search the Internet, to determine how to file a claim against the Government, but again the plaintiff failed to take advantage of that resource.
The evidence will show that the third major resource at his disposal was LexisNexis. The plaintiff had total access to the LexisNexis program, provided with instructions on how to use this tool, and you will learn that plaintiff had the ability to take advantage of easy to access LexisNexis research summaries which addressed issues related to FTCA claims.
Interestingly, you will learn from the plaintiff that on one hand he had no trouble using LexisNexis when researching cases for immigration court, but on the other hand, he argues that Lexis was insufficient for his FTCA claims.
Fourth, the evidence will show plaintiff could have accessed and printed commonly used printed forms, such as blank SF-95s on the detainee computers and he had access to mail, telephone, which he admits he used one to five times a day, and visitors at the facility.
Ultimately the evidence will show that despite the wide variety of resources, the plaintiff did not diligently pursue the claim. He will tell you, the plaintiff will tell you, he did not educate himself while at the facility.[/SPOILER]
It was ultimately stipulated that the library contained the resources necessary for Mr. Watson to learn about and file an SF-95. But the plaintiffs argued, and evidently the judge accepted, that given the circumstances of access it is unreasonable to expect Mr. Watson to do so, notwithstanding his pro se filings in immigration court and on appeal. I’ve made a summary in this second spoiler.
[SPOILER]During Mr. Watson’s testimony he said the books in the “very small” legal library concerned, as far as he knew, just immigration proceedings. Mr. Watson’s testimony also indicates the library held maybe three computers and four typewriters, and the prison contained “several hundred” prisoners. Prisoners were apparently given a sign in sheet, by which up to twenty people at a time would visit the library.
Mr. Watson said he went “around three to four times” a week, but each time he “could only stay for an hour”, and nobody told him he could request additional time.
He was not “able to access the Internet on the library computers”, neither was he “able to access the Internet at any point” while detained. Nobody ever told him there were people who could do Internet research for him upon request, and nobody ever told him about the disc that contained the SF-95 printable document.
He was not “able to take legal books out of the library to [his] cell”, although he knew he could and did request “printouts, drafts that [he] had made to put in [his] motions and [his] briefs that [he] didn’t finish” because of his limited time in the library.
He knew about recreation specialists, but he could not ever recall them being in the law library, and they never helped or offered to help him with research, neither did he know they could do that.
He attended the know your rights presentations, but they only talked about immigration laws (i.e. not helpful if he was a citizen), and they weren’t lawyers but law students.
There was a detainee called the Law Clerk in the law library that “was there to assist”, but Mr. Watson says the Law Clerks didn’t help him and were to busy “finding their own cases and […] didn’t have time to help anyone else. […] they used their position as a law clerk to get more [library] time so that they could focus more on themselves.”[/SPOILER]
See the judge’s conclusion from the transcript, in this third spoiler.
[SPOILER]MR. MARUTOLLO: So, Your Honor, we would ask for stipulation, other than the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge, about filing an administrative claim, there were no circumstances that the library that prevented his ability to file such a claim.
THE COURT: No, that I don’t think is appropriate.
If you want to put on all your witnesses, I will allow you to do so.
A stipulation that there was a library there, with information adequate and other facilities, Nexis and Lexis, adequate for a person of skill and understanding, to determine with reasonable diligence that he could file a suit against the Government for unlawful arrest and imprisonment.
Can you read that back.
(Read back by the Reporter.)
MR. MARUTOLLO: Your Honor, we would ask for this additional stipulation, other than the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge, he has identified no circumstances that prevented him from filing suit.
THE COURT: I’m not going to require that stipulation, because I have a person with limited education, in a state of depression and with limited knowledge of his rights, who has been informed by a Judge that he is not a citizen. So, I can’t accept that, and expect the plaintiff to make that stipulation, that you are now asking for.
So if you want to put on all your witnesses, put them on, but I don’t think it is necessary.[/SPOILER]
If you do want to read the transcript, I’ve added it to RECAP.
The theory is not difficult to understand. “Limited knowledge of his rights” and effectively limited access to the means of acquiring that knowledge combine to make a Kafkaesque situation where the government is effectively saying, it is your fault for what you could not be reasonably expected to know. Unlike most civil cases, such as discrimination cases, there was no conspicuous notice laying out all of the rights. It wasn’t stupidity that prevented Mr. Watson from knowing he had a course of action - not to the Judge, not to me, and probably not to a jury, which should be the one actually deciding that question. No, the Second Circuit precluded that by saying it doesn’t matter whether he could be reasonably expected to know his rights, ‘the resources were there, on a disc in a locked drawer two hallways down, he could have obtained justice if only he had known the secret words, and that is enough for us to say he had his chance.’
The theory you defend is ignorantia juris non excusat, and if you read up on that, you will see the doctrine of promulgation, in words of Gratian, leges institutuuntur cum promulgantur, law is instituted when promulgated. An explanation of this corollary is simple: if one cannot be reasonably expected to know the law, how can he be rightfully subjected to it?
~Max
I was hoping nobody would notice… it’s phonetically correct!
~Max
Your theory is perfectly easy to understand. And I’m not necessarily opposed to it. Although, I do not agree that “most civil cases” are premised on “conspicuous notice[s] laying out all of the rights.” And I also don’t think that equitable tolling should be presented to a jury.
Your theory (generally put as I understand it) is that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until your claim accrues and you have knowledge of it (not just the facts supporting it, which would support traditional equitable tolling, but knowledge of the actual legal claim and the procedural requirements to assert it). I think that approach would largely undermine the rationale behind statutes of limitations, but it’s not inherently unreasonable. It would essentially eliminate the statute of limitations approach in favor of a robust laches doctrine.
My point all along has only been that this is not how equitable tolling works. Your original post claimed to discovered an argument (based on traditional equitable tolling principles) that you thought the Second Circuit overlooked; I don’t think you did (and you seem to have abandoned that argument). Then you continued to try to frame this in the traditional terms (relying on the rationale of the district court and dissent), and I continued to disagree that the circumstances which you indicated “prevented” the suit were extraordinary. I didn’t persuade you. That’s fine.
I was thinking equal employment, nondiscrimination, etc.
Not equitable tolling itself, but the factual question of whether a reasonable person in a similar situation can be expected to know he had a cause of action. I think this falls under the Seventh Amendment.
Not until you have actual knowledge, but until there is a reasonable expectation that a diligent person in that situation would acquire that knowledge. If we had a criminal case where the criminal was convicted due to incompetence of their court-appointed lawyer, and the criminal despite his diligence could not be reasonably expected to have known he could move for a retrial before such a motion is time-barred (eg: he is busy pro se trying to stay his execution by introducing evidence he knew about at the time of the previous trial, and has limited library time, and the library did not make it apparent that he could claim incompetence of counsel, and such a cause of action was not common knowledge), I would say it is against the principle of equity to execute the man because his claim of incompetence of counsel is time-barred.
I still don’t understand why not, but oh well. I’ll agree to disagree if you do. :rolleyes:
~Max