We need more monetary stimulus, and we need it now.

This is not an argument for more government spending.

I advocated a big fiscal stimulus (spending, and some tax cuts), but as far as I can tell, the current political environment is not conducive to bigger short term deficits. Well and good. The intransigence of the Congressional GOP has been contemptible when they haven’t been arguing in good faith (which is most of the time), but there are nevertheless genuine differences in opinion about which reasonable people can differ, and in essence that’s what we have now with respect to the desirability of higher deficits in the next two years. Okay then.

So this thread is about printing money. Or a little more precisely, this is about getting dollars that have been printed moving through the economy. This is about moderate increases in the price level spurred by the monetary authority.

Of course, we actually use computers nowadays instead of “printing” the money, but the metaphor is still apt. Think of it as a giant press running hot, and you’ve still got pretty much the right idea. The problem is that that right idea is still incomplete. It’s not enough to print. We need to increase short term inflation (or nominal GDP) expectations a smidge. We need more monetary stimulus to accomplish this change in expectations, and we need it immediately (or really, two years ago, but the problem hasn’t changed). I’ll arrange this OP as a Q&A of sorts, anticipating the sorts of inquiries that are likely to crop up, so that I can provide reasonable responses to those questions.

OH-EM-GEE-HYPERINFLATION-ZORG-END-OF-THE-WORLD-GOLD-IS MAGICK-AAAAARGH!!!1!

You’re a fucking idiot. Find another thread.

But what a sec. I’ve read history. Governments that print a lot of money have hyperinflation. Don’t they? Am I something missing?

Printing a lot of money can cause hyperinflation. Absolutely. But there’s something more to it. Hyperinflation is spurred when governments print money specifically to pay their bills. The central banks of advanced countries do something else. They print money in order to achieve specific targets for broader policy goals, such as targeting a change in the price level. So the process is more complex than printing money => more money => inflation. That is to say that printing money doesn’t necessarily mean that there will be more money.

Pull the other one. It has got bells on.

I’m serious. I’m just trying to point out that there are different definitions of “money”. What the central bank directly controls is the monetary base, the M0. This is the printed bills I was talking about (plus certain digits on computers). And the US Federal Reserve has in fact printed a trillion new dollars into existence. This is to say that they more than doubled the M0. They printed a helluva lot of new money.

There are problems with determining the exact stock of money in its broader forms. Still, the M3, the broadest definition of money, is falling even as you read this. The M2 has effectively plateaued–it’s even dropped a touch in 2010. The Fed has printed a lot of new base, but that base isn’t getting lent out. Let’s not beat around the bush here. This is an enormous problem. You can find professional economists running the gamut, from liberals like Paul Krugman to libertarians like Milton Friedman, all agreeing that a drop in the money supply is a serious problem. In fact, it was Milton Friedman who (with Anna Schwartz) argued in the Monetary History of the United States that the Fed deserves blame for the Great Depression. Why? Because the Fed allowed the money supply (by which he meant the broader money supply, not the base) to fall.

It was only when FDR dropped the gold peg and let the currency depreciate that the country began to recover from the Depression.

But what if there’s inflationary pressure building? What if it’s a dam just waiting to break?

There’s no evidence to support this. None.

For one thing, you can’t argue crowding out of private investment when there’s a liquidity trap. Higher interest rates on government bonds are a sign of higher inflation expectations–which is a good thing, because higher inflation expectations are a sign of recovery. But right now, the government can borrow extensively without raising interest rates because there are so few private investment opportunities for the government to displace when the economy is doing so poorly. There are no inflation indications at all, despite the US debt. In fact, there is just the opposite. The dollar is strengthening fast. This happens in response to world financial concerns, because the dollar is still the world’s backup when everything else goes to hell.

And that is, in fact, one of the problems right now. A lack of confidence stemming from the European debt crisis is causing a flight to quality–with “quality” being defined as the United States dollar. That’s precisely why the dollar is stronger than we want it to be. We want it to be losing a bit of strength. And if the USD is what investors rely on in times of trouble, that’s an excellent demonstration in itself of the potential potency of more aggressive movement from the Fed.

Now, this can’t continue forever. The US will certainly have problems if we continue along the current debt path for another two or three decades. But that’s a long term problem with fiscal policy, not monetary policy. If that sort of crisis of confidence in the fiscal solvency of a country develops, there’s simply nothing that a central bank can do. Countries like Greece need to get their government spending back in order, and they’re going to have to suffer for it. But we in the US are not there now, and we won’t be for many years yet.

As Martin Wolf of the Financial Times notes in his own commentary about British money matters, you can’t apply a rational policy by giving the markets what you assume they will demand in the future. That’s just bloody stupid. You give markets what they desperately need in the present, and you set up a rule by which you change your policy to monetary contraction based on clear signals.

But the Fed can only print the dollars. They can’t force the banks to loan.

Force? No. Provide enough incentive so that the banks want to loan? Yes.

I’ve been talking here about “printing” money for convenience, but the Fed has more tools at its disposable than firing up the dollar presses. To echo Scott Sumner (who I highly recommend you read regularly, since does such an excellent job of explaining this issue), the Fed can charge banks a small fee on any funds they hold over their reserve requirement. This doesn’t force lending, but it does strongly encourage it.

But too much easy money was the original problem!

No, it wasn’t, though I can see how you can think that.

Were their mal-investments in the housing industry? Yes, of course. But you simply cannot look at the horrendous depth of the economic plunge we’ve experienced and blame it all on the pain of reallocating excess resources out of a single industry. This is a Great Recession here, and the problem is deeper than the collapse of an asset bubble, even one directly related to our construction industry. The problem this time was a general collapse in aggregate demand stemming from a crisis in confidence in our financial system (caused, yes, by the collapse of the bubble). Very similar to the Depression of old, when you get down to it.

It wasn’t easy money that was the problem. After the bubble collapsed, tight money was the problem–money tighter than it should have been–as you can see if you pay attention to the general price level, nominal GDP, and other measures broader than the mere monetary base. The explicit purpose of the TARP and other such financial packages were to encourage the banks to lend again. But they didn’t go to the source of the problem. The source is the Fed’s own policy that’s keeping money much tighter than it should be. And now that we’re undergoing another wave of fear, the dollar is strengthening yet again, and the Obama administration is talking about another fiscal stimulus, one which it likely won’t be able to pass through Congress. Meanwhile, the officials at the Fed sit with their thumbs up their asses. They expanded the base by a trillion bucks, sure, but now they think their job is over. They even appear to be eyeing rolling back what they’ve done so far. We are close to reliving the past, in all the worst ways.

We need more money. But we don’t necessary need to spend it when we can print it.

How does the Fed unwind its position if it puts too money dollars out there?

Easy. If collapsing the Fed balance sheet isn’t enough on its own, it can still pay interest on excess bank reserves. This is the opposite of paying a fee on those reserves. When the Fed was undergoing its unprecedented expansion of the monetary base, it raised its interest on excess bank reserves to a full percent. Even now, it’s paying a quarter of a percent. There’s no need for that. It should stop paying a red cent on reserves in order to stop encouraging the banks to do nothing with their money. If that doesn’t work, it should levy a small fee. If that doesn’t work, it can engage in quantitative easing by bringing down the interest rates of longer term bonds (by printing more money).

Well, I’m a conservative type. This makes me uncomfortable.

As a conservative type, you should agree with me on this. Historically speaking, monetary policy instead of fiscal policy is an economically conservative way to think of these issues–not the only conservative way to look at things, of course, but certainly the most informed of the conservative views. It was Keynes who argued that the government should spend money in a time of insufficient aggregate demand. It was the libertarian Friedman who argued that the government didn’t need to spend as long as the central bank did its job. It was Friedman who argued the primacy of money.

Unfortunately, Friedman made a mistake. He came up with a “rule” for the central bank to follow, and the rule was crap. That undermined his argument somewhat. This might be one of the most unfortunate oversights of his career, because if he’d come up with the right monetary policy rule the first time out, he could have potentially buried the idea of Keynesian government spending for good.

But aren’t you contradicting yourself? I thought you said you supported the Obama fiscal stimulus.

I did say that. But you know what? I could have been wrong.

Of course, I don’t think I’m wrong. For example, I was not wrong about the need for stimulus. Stimulus, in and of itself, is uncontroversial in contemporary macroeconomics. What the big debate is about in economic circles–and it’s a biggun, yes–is what kind of stimulus should be employed, and how big it should be. Someone like Paul Krugman (and not incidentally, someone like me) wants to throw absolutely everything at the problem, both monetary and fiscal.

Why is that? Because Krugman believes that the Fed can walk back any inflationary pressure from excess fiscal spending. But that begs the question: If the Fed is powerful enough to walk back any excess inflationary pressure from the government, can’t we just rely on monetary policy the entire time? Because if that’s so, we could start getting our debt situation under control right now instead of waiting for economic recovery. In simple terms: We don’t need to spend money when we can print it. I would prefer doing both, but I’m also a pragmatist. If money by itself works, then I’m fine with that.

That might sound like a perversion of conservative principles, but it shouldn’t be. The process is not conservative on its face, but the underlying reasoning still is.

It involves printing money now (or charging banks a fee on their excess reserves). But that policy can still be pursued according to an explicit Friedman-like rule that the Fed is forced to follow. Based on the sophisticated arguments from Scott Sumner, I think the ideal could well be nominal GDP (M*V) level targeting, where the Fed makes up for missing its target one year by raising its target for the next.

You can’t do without a central bank in a modern economy. But if you’re conservative, you want some clear controls on the central bank’s activity, right? And what could be clearer than an explicit rule that the central bank has to follow? It provides confidence to the markets, because they don’t need to predict any unusual movement from the central bank. They know what monetary policy is going to be, just by looking at the economy. And if the rule is designed just right, it could quite possibly end the need for counter-cyclical government spending for the express purpose of economic recovery. (It would not end counter-cyclical government spending from automatic programs like unemployment benefits, but the purpose of those are to mitigate the damage of the downturn to out-of-work families, not to lead to a recovery.)

What we don’t want to do in any circumstances is repeat the historical mistakes of the Depression, or of the Japanese, who themselves pursued a half-assed and inconsistent fiscal stimulus policy of government spending projects for years on end while their idiot central bank deliberately kept money tight and thus undermined the entire purpose of the spending. We don’t want to get ourselves further in debt, while our Fed counteracts the very reason why we’re spending that money.

The broad money supply is falling. We need to increase the money supply and the velocity of money, we need to moderately increase the price level, and ideally we need to start targeting stable long-term growth in our nominal GDP. We need more monetary stimulus, and we need it right bloody now.

(And yeah, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan should absolutely do the same, in part to mitigate the currency effects of our own policy, but also because they desperately need more money, too. Germany can eat some higher inflation if it means more stability for the periphery states of the Eurozone. Japan… Well, Japan’s a damn mess. I don’t know what they’re going to do. Something stupid, most likely. For example: doing nothing; continuing to neglect to increase price level expectations, as they’ve done for nearly two decades of needless economic stagnation.)

This is a technical topic but not, I hope, an incomprehensible one. I’m just pointing out one area, a big glaringly obvious area, where more absolutely could and should be done.

I agree with the general thrust of what you are saying but the crucial issue is: what does Bernanke think? My impression, and I could be wrong, is that he is reluctant to carry out any further monetary expansion. If that is the case then re-appointing him may have been a serious mistake by Obama not least because monetary policy over the next couple of of years will have a serious impact on his re-election chances.

An interesting issue is to what extent the administration can apply rhetorical pressure on the Fed to loosen monetary policy. Normally I think central bank independence should be respected but these are clearly not normal times.

And what about the rest of the FOMC? Would it be possible for them to overrule Bernanke if they strongly disagree with him. I am a little unclear on how exactly the FOMC works.

I’m pissing against the wind here.

Bernanke out and said just last week that he was against a 4% inflation target because it would potentially be an “unstable equilibrium”. Never mind unemployment at near 10 percent–a veritable army of idle resources that could soak up those dollars before they put undue upward pressure on prices. Never mind that Japan has spent nearly two decades engaged in this exact same stupidity, with nothing to show for it. Never mind that Bernanke himself, before he was Fed chair, recommended that Japan pursue long-term price stability with a higher inflation target instead of maintaining its deflationary course. Never mind that the FOMC can’t even manage to maintain its 2% inflation target in the face of rapidly collapsing core inflation.

That last point drives me especially crazy. The Fed’s job, its entire reason for being, is to facilitate employment and maintain its price target. And it’s failing at both. But instead of adjusting whenever they miss it year after year, they keep failing to hit their bloody stationary target. It’s like lobbing shells at an enemy, and when you see the previous salvos have come short, you refuse to adjust your guns, assuming that the next round will somehow magically reach its destination. I just cannot fathom what’s going on in their heads.

Theoretically, yeah. But if you look at their minutes, you can see that their primary concern is still collapsing their balance sheet rather than actually doing their job. All of this blind focus on process, while entirely ignoring the results. The Kansas City rep has gone so far as to already push for higher rates. He is apparently taking this situation as an opportunity to relive history. Having sadly missed experiencing the first Depression, he’s happy to lay the groundwork for another.

There’s probably some political angle I’m missing. I can never understand the political angle.

You can’t arbitrarily change the inflation target, because doing so goes against the entire point of having an inflation target in the first place. An inflation target only works if everybody believes that the Fed is actually going to hit the target. Change it, and then you’ve proven to the world that you’re not serious about hitting the target, and you’ve thrown all of the benefits of having an inflation target out the window.

Of course, just as bad as changing the target is consistently missing it as they’ve been doing.

Okay. This is a potentially valid point. I don’t necessarily agree that the costs outweigh the benefits–and neither did Bernanke when he used to talk about Japan, as I must hasten to point out–but at least this is a reasonable argument. But taking your point as given, it doesn’t alter the ability to engage in long-term level targeting, assuming that you manage to reach your starting point safely.

If you are at already 2% inflation (or perhaps better, 5% NGDP growth), and you announce then and there that you will henceforth begin level targeting, then you are not breaking any promises. You fall short one year, you overshoot the next. You get 1% this year, you go for 3% the next, according to a rule that the markets were already aware of. When you’re back on track, your target is the same as it was originally. If it is, as you believe, too costly a breach of trust to have the rule retroactively make up for the ground we lost two years ago, then that still does not count against the idea moving forward from here.

I have to disagree with you here somewhat. Gummed-up credit markets certainly hurt the economy, but I think having such low interest rates for such a long time was one of the main drivers of the housing crisis. It drove the banks into riskier and riskier investments in order to get their desired return, and the Goldmans and Lehmans were all too happy to supply them, even as they bet against them (but hey, the rating agencies liked them, so what the heck?). Given the last 10 years of interest rates, is it really surprising that private sector debt is 4x greater than the public sector and that the personal savings rate is so low?

The rest of your post I’m generally in agreement with. Here’s Brad Delong describing the playbook for the government. As for fiscal stimulus, while I think there’s room for it, I don’t believe it’s been employed very well and I’ve begun to doubt whether it can be. Krugman’s view was always in support of a fiscal and monetary stimulus blitzkrieg during the early part of the crisis; he was not happy with what Obama actually sought. Edward Harrison of CreditWritedowns has been particularly critical of the stimulus. He thinks any further fiscal stimulus will just end up in the pockets of crony capitalists, and I’m having a hard time disagreeing with him. That’s why China should be sending up red flags. They have lots of unnecessary infrastructure development going on (including an entire empty city). Of course, China also has lots of dollars, so they may as well spend them now while the dollar is strong.

On the other hand, monetary stimulus alone may not be enough to tackle the real problem with our economy today: too much private debt. Plans to offload riskier assets from the banks and give them safe assets to instill the confidence to lend again is all well and good, but what’s to be done for the average citizen? If we don’t help the American people deleverage, all the bank stimulus in the world isn’t going to matter.

You raise some very good points. To elaborate on my earlier argument, let me distinguish between the run-up to the collapse and the aftermath.

You can, of course, rightly claim that easy money was a factor in inflating the bubble. People were scrambling to take advantage of (what appeared to be) a good deal, since our large deficits weren’t crowding out private investment when we had the large influx of funds from abroad to support our irresponsible spending. Countries like China were happy to buy up our debt, as long as it meant that we kept buying their exports. And yeah, the Fed certainly could have worked against this by making loanable funds more expensive.

The problem is that monetary policy is too blunt an instrument to bring only the guilty parties to heel. Even now, I do not believe that the central bank should use the money supply to contain unreasonably high asset prices. This is largely due to the difficulty for policy makers in identifying asset bubbles in real time, as opposed to after the fact, but that’s only the beginning. Even if you successfully identify a proper bubble, rather than shooting at shadows, you’re not going to be popping only the mal-investment. As I said before, the mal-investment, large as it was, was still only a small percentage of our current downturn. Everything’s doing badly now, not just housing. For that same reason, the Fed can’t fine tune its bubble popping, so you’re also going to be cutting back on all the good stuff, too, which in real terms outweighs the bad.

This is why I don’t blame the crisis on easy money. Much better, to my mind, to have a strong financial regulatory structure, and not the monetary authority, to deal with over-leveraging. That is where the brakes on bubbles should be placed.

Of course, we didn’t have that either, but I’d say it’s still a dicey proposition blaming money when regulation is always necessary in the financial sector. And even if you do blame easy money for pumping up the bubble, you’re still stuck with the tight money after the collapse of the bubble that made the situation much much worse. Tight, of course, is in the sense of not reaching the Fed’s own targets–this can be a weird definition to apply, looking at the unprecedented expansion of their balance sheet, but to focus on the balance sheet is to focus on process and not result.

This leads me to another good point you made that I didn’t much talk about in the OP (which I deemed was already long enough), and that is: private deleveraging. I specifically wrote about the need to get loans moving again, but that was an oversimplification. We don’t actually need more private sector debt. We do have too much debt, exactly as you said, and fear of being able to pay off that debt is a factor that’s depressing aggregate demand. But look to history, at the heavily indebted private sector when the country ditched the gold peg during the Depression, and you see 1) a decline in real wages, 2) an increase in real output and jobs–with an exquisite correlation between those first two points–and also 3) an extremely large decline in private debt, and 4) an increase in public debt (associated first with New Deal spending programs, and then the war).

The currency depreciation had many salutary effects, because even with the unfortunate decrease of individual purchasing power, the people as a whole were still able to lessen their debt loads from the time of dropping the gold peg right until the end of the war, much of this spurred by 1) the reduction of the real value of the debt from inflation, 2) the ability to “refinance”, so to speak, their private debts by the issuing of public debt (fiscal stimulus) that could be maintained at lower interest rates, and also 3) the new jobs that were available as the new funds pulsed through the economy.

This is why I earlier referred to the problems of measuring the broader money supply. It’s not just lending (and the “money multiplier”) that’s important. Velocity is essential. It’s money with velocity (nominal GDP) that we need to concentrate on.

This was Friedman’s mistake. The Fed has a lot more control over the velocity of money than they like to let on, and this can be shown in how the country was able to begin recovery from the Depression, with the benefit of monetary stimulus, at the same time that private actors were decreasing their debt. It came from aggressively fighting the deflationary pressure, as the new dollars that were bouncing around were used to pay down debt and employ idle resources, and not just to bid up the price of already existing goods.

The same can happen again.

Now that I’m on this topic, let me elaborate on my response to this, too, and say that the lesson from the Depression is the same reason why changing our policy to long-term level targeting would not come with the costs that you might otherwise expect, given our insufficient aggregate demand. We’re not talking Nixon here with supply-side shocks. We’re talking FDR with demand-side shocks.

The exact same sorts of arguments were leveled against FDR. They were simply not borne out in the slightest.

Dropping the gold peg was the single most important step to economic recovery (1930s, not 1970s), even though breaking the previous promise of gold convertibility was as big a shock as, or most probably an even bigger shock than, a temporary change in our current price level target. We had “proven to the world” that we couldn’t maintain our gold peg–and yet the result was indisputably for the best. The US maintained its general credibility even after dropping the gold peg, and we would do the same again today with a decision to begin engaging in level targeting. We would not be pushing for a permanent 4% inflation target. We should simply be determined to make up for lost ground. That’s not an irresponsible, untrustworthy monetary policy. Quite the opposite, in fact. This would be a monetary policy that responds to the actual problems we’re facing, with a clear focus on long-term stability instead of short-term fears.

It’s about giving the markets what they need now, not giving them what we merely assume they will want in the future.

Seems your OP scared everyone off ;).

How drastic of a currency depreciation occurred when the gold peg was dropped? You acknowledge that it represented a big shock to the market. Can we really expect our wishy-washy government to commit to and hit a relatively aggressive inflation target to achieve a comparable shock?

I guess I’m somewhat pessimistic about the ability of monetary stimulus alone to do the job in the face of such massive individual debt. I’m starting to think a social movement based on widespread strategic default by individual debtors might be the only way to start climbing out of this hole. It’s like we’re trying to pour big buckets of water into a lake to get it to overflow a dam, when the best solution might be just to remove the dam.

There are two basic questions here: the historical and the political. Historical first.

You can see from the Minneapolis Fed’s CPI data that the onset of the Depression brought with it a collapse in prices of over 9% for two consecutive years. Or you can turn things around and argue that the expectation of collapsing prices (or collapsing nominal GDP) brought with it the Depression. That collapse was halted with the abandonment of the gold peg, and inflation got back up to a respectable 3.1 percent in 1934, a 13 point swing in a mere two years. With that came the beginning of recovery. That is, until they removed the economic stimulus–both monetary and fiscal–and prices dropped again in 38 as the nation plunged back into recession.

Hard to blame them for that one, since they didn’t have the same history to look back on. Their mistakes are our data. Still, a sad state of affairs.

The political question is different. It’s not a matter of figuring out the right thing to do, but trying to get our policy makers to implement the right thing now that we’ve found it. Can we expect to overcome the short-sightedness and ideological rigidity of our central bankers and get them to engage in the necessary change in inflation expectations? No, I don’t expect so. Our current need is less drastic than what they needed in the Depression, but even so, the central bankers of the world seem to care more about future fears than about actually doing their jobs in the present.

I don’t have a crystal ball, but I’d say the most likely outcome right now is turning Japanese–a lost decade of stagnation because policy makers aren’t paying attention to the situation.

Well, as I said before, the private debt load was quite large leading up to the Depression, getting up to around 240% of GDP. Then it dropped like a rock. We’re higher than that now, but the same forces can push our private debt load down again.

I don’t always agree with the small-government views of Scott Sumner, but it’s hard to argue with the broad outlines of his analysis of the Depression. The tight link between real wages and industrial production, which existed only during that period, was an amazing find. And that’s a macroeconomic correlation. That’s the aggregate of countless independent actors who are looking after themselves, and yet in their money crunch, all those people acted as if in concert: easier money led to more production, and thus to recovery. The primary fear in any model is oversimplification, and yet the relationship here, in this particular situation of insufficient aggregate demand, is incredibly robust. If you get dollars bouncing around more quickly, the economy would recovery more quickly and debt would work its way down again as a percentage of GDP. While there are definitely other good methods to reduce the debt load and to keep it from rising irresponsibly in the future–e.g. better regulation of our financial system–money is the place to start right now.

Twenty years from now, I do believe that a lot of us will look back on the unreliable policy of the present, where our central bankers not even meeting their own stated goals, and conclude that Sumner was exactly right on this.

Even so, I don’t want exciting monetary policy. I want money to be boring, boring, boring. As I said before, the underlying reasoning here is actually quite conservative in a Friedmanesque sort of way. I want the price level (or maybe following Sumner, nominal GDP) to grow at the same dull rate every year. 5% NGDP growth this year. 5% NGDP growth the next year. 5% NGDP growth the year after that. And so on. If we have 4% growth one year, then we shoot for 6% the next. Boring. Predictable. Dependable. Reliable. Stable. More money by itself doesn’t create more growth. It normally just causes inflation. But stable long-term expectations are the foundation on which future production, prosperity, and wealth can be built. And at present, that means making up for lost ground. It sounds exciting and frightening to some, but it really shouldn’t.