Were there any areas where the Imperial Japanese Navy exceeded the US Navy during WWII?

Factual Questions
21

The US was never remotely close to equal, much less superior to the IJN in torpedoes. The best that can really be said about American torpedoes is that they were acceptable by the end of the war and finally exploded when they were supposed to more often than not.

The Mark 15 torpedo, the torpedo used by USN surface ships throughout the war could either travel 4,500 yards at 45 knots or 14,000 yards at 26.5 knots with a 363kg warhead. The IJN Type 93 Long Lance could travel either 24,000 yards at 50 knots, or 44,000 yards at 36 knots with a 490kg warhead. Air and submarine launched torpedo differences were similar, if not quite as dramatic between the USN and IJN. And yes, if you’re familiar with just how unbelievably unreliable the USN Mark 14 submarine torpedo was for the first half of the war, the Mark 15 surface and Mark 13 air dropped torpedo suffered the exact same problems as the Mark 14

The Mark 15 had the same basic design problems that plagued the Mark 14 for the first 20 months following U.S. entry into the war, though this was not realized nearly as quickly by the destroyer crews as it was by the submariners. One major shared deficiency was the Mark 6 exploder, which usually caused duds.[1] Another was a tendency to run deeper than set, often missing the target.[3] Surface-combatant torpedo attacks very often included confusing splashes from gunnery and aerial bombs, obscuring smoke screens, and quick maneuvering to evade counterattack. Rarely was a destroyer given a chance for a slow, careful surprise attack. Torpedo results were difficult to estimate under these circumstances. The correction of the Mark 15’s problems would depend on the submariners solving theirs.[4] Another problem with early war-built Mark 15s was the substitution of zinc for cadmium as interior plating for air flask sections and water compartments, due to a wartime shortage of cadmium. This resulted in zinc oxide clogging water strainers, leading to erratic runs and engine failures. After the failure of corrosion inhibition efforts, the ultimate solution was to re-coat the areas with cadmium or phenolic resin (Heresite).[3] The final straw for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (CINCPOA) to begin to resolve this problem that other admirals and torpedo manufacturers kept claiming was not a design problem but due to the performance of the submariners and surface ships’ crew was when a submarine fleet successfully infiltrated Tokyo Harbor on 11 June 1943 but not a single torpedo that was launched by them hit any Japanese ships. The issues with the Mark 14 and Mark 15 torpedoes were not completely fixed until November 1943 when Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid (Seventh Fleet, SWPA) overruled Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie, who refused to believe that his torpedoes had malfunctions, and ordered all submarine and destroyer captains to disable their faulty magnetic detonators and also the contact pin problem was finally resolved that same month.

One of the major advantages that the IJN enjoyed early in the war in night engagements wasn’t just superior night optics and searchlights, but that they had trained heavily for night engagements by their light forces as part of their decisive battle doctrine, imagining the naval war to be decided by one giant engagement of the respective battlelines. Japan was going to be inferior in numbers of battleships, so attritting the US battleline with submarine and nighttime surface torpedo attacks was heavily planned and practiced as part of their basic doctrine. The USN did contemplate night actions, but largely gave actual training, planning and doctrine for it lip service.

It should also be noted that while the US used surface torpedoes almost exclusively on destroyers, full torpedo batteries were standard on both light and heavy Japanese cruisers. IJN heavy cruisers like the Takao-class carried 16 24inch Long Lance tubes along with 10 8" naval rifles. No USN heavy cruiser carried any torpedoes. Oh, and the Japanese also carried reloads, often a full set, for their torpedo tubes on their surface ships. The USN didn’t carry reloads for torpedoes on their surface ships.

One disadvantage that all of this emphasis on torpedo tactics designed against the US surface fleet by the IJN that should be mentioned is that Japanese submarine doctrine was to use lines of submarines to locate and attack battle elements of the US surface fleet. This was also part of US practice, but only part. The US was much more interested in using fleet submarines for commerce raiding, which Japan almost entirely ignored doing for the entire duration of the war. This led to some amazing successes - the I-19 fired what is regarded as the single most successful torpedo salvo of the war, sinking its target the carrier USS Wasp with 3 of the 6 torpedoes while

The remaining three torpedoes travelled for another 5 miles into the path of the Hornet task force. The spread hit the U.S. battleship North Carolina on its port side and the destroyer O’Brien, the latter of which later sank on 19 October 1942 en route for repairs. North Carolina sustained significant damage and underwent repairs at Pearl Harbor until 16 November 1942.

I-19’s torpedo salvo sank an aircraft carrier and a destroyer and severely damaged a battleship, making it one of the most damaging torpedo salvos in history.

US submarine torpedoes couldn’t even have travelled far enough to reach the second US task group. However, these successes were few and far between, while the US submarine fleet eventually crippled the entire Japanese economy - albeit only once their torpedoes started to actually work after 2 years.

22

The fatigue involved in that long round trip for Japanese pilots was a drag on their effectiveness. American pilots sortied from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal and could be at optimum height when Japanese planes arrived, thanks to advance notice from coastwatchers.

23

You are of course correct.

24

In general, IJN carrier doctrine, tactics and operations were far superior at the beginning of the war. They were the best in the world, and it wasn’t until ‘44 that the Navy caught up.

The IJN created the world’s largest carrier fleet, the kidobutai (First Air Fleet) with six fleet carriers working together, and gave it an unmatched force concentration. This is a good summary:

The greatest advantage the Japanese had in the first months of the war was the ability to quickly launch a massive multi-carrier coordinated and integrated strike package, under a single strike commander, and conduct a well-timed, coordinated, multi-axis attack on the target. At the Battle of Midway, the Japanese launched a 108-plane strike from four carriers in seven minutes, formed up and en route to the target (Midway Island) in 15 minutes, with 107 planes in reserve to be launched against U.S. carriers should they be detected.

Carriers had three types of planes: fighters, torpedo bombers and dive bombers, each with their own cruse speeds. It took careful timing to get all the planes over the target at the right time.

The IJN would launch half of planes from each carrier and then combine them into an integrated strike package, with the ability to place the various types of planes from the six carriers all over the target together.

In contrast, the USN was having its carriers operating independently. They were slow at all the processes for getting the planes launched. It took almost an hour for the Enterprise and Hornet to get their planes launched, although the Yorktown was quicker. The didn’t even coordinate their own squadrons, let alone with the other ships.

Another advantage the IJN had at the start of the war was their torpedo bombers. The Devastator was obsolete before the war, which didn’t help matters.

The Hellcat was already in development, and it seems that they got feedback from pilots who flew against the Zeros, but I think that the one recovered was later.

25

Also, and very important, the Type 93 “long lance” torpedos had much more forgiving drop parameters than the early war USN torpedos. They could be dropped from a higher altitude and at a greater airspeed, allowing for more flexiblity that could mitigate dangers during the vulnerable position of attacking shipping through a hail of anti-aircraft fire.

26

See @Dissonance ‘s post above.

The night optics was part of their strategy for the defensive battle doctrine and predated their encounters with US radar.

Actually, the IJN Sixth Fleet, the submarine force, ordered the subs to concentrate on merchant ships starting in March, 1942, and they had some success, although limited. During the entire war they sunk about 900 k tons of merchant ships, about half of that was in the Indian Ocean.

Of course, they weren’t more successful for many reasons but I’m typing this out with one finger on my phone.

The Type 91 was the aerial torpedo. The Type 93 were far too heavy to be carried by planes.

The nickname Long Lance is often mistakenly used for all Japanese torpedoes but it was the kind used by surface ships.

You are right about the characteristics, but they were for the Type 91.

The Type 91 had a much higher speed at 45 knots than the Mark 13, which had a top speed of 33 knots. The slower speed of the Mark 13 allowed Japanese ships to outrun them.

27

The one minus of the Long Lance torpedo in IJN service was that it was prone to exploding in the event of a fire on board ship - and the torpedo had such a powerful warhead that a chain reaction of detonations might well sink the ship. So the skipper of a ship under air attack might have to chose between jettisoning his most potent weapon or having his ship sunk by its own torpedoes. This was even worse due to the presence of reloads on board - more potential targets, a greater potential explosion. It was part of the “glass cannon” effect of so many IJN doctrinal decisions - the overwhelming preference for offensive firepower over defense and resilience that the Navy pursued during the interwar period.

(I like to point out that every ship sunk at Midway was sunk by a Japanese torpedo - Yorktown and Hammann of course, but the burned out hulls of the four IJN carriers were scuttled by their attending destroyers, and Mikuma was doomed by a dive bomb hit that started a fire in the torpedo room which led to a series of torpedo explosions.)

28

They were dependent on quick, decisive victory. The experts explained all this very carefully, but it fell on deaf ears. They stockpiled massive amounts of fuel oil and gasoline, P.O.L., but it wasn’t enough for extended operations going on for years and years.

29

You would be right. Complete waste of steel and oil, not to mention manpower.

30

Speaking of which, the loss of the carrier USS Hornet was emblematic of the problems with US torpedoes and the superiority of Japanese ones. She was struck by three air dropped torpedoes from Japanese torpedo bombers in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands off of Guadalcanal. With no power and night (and the Japanese fleet) approaching, the order was given to scuttle her for fear that the Japanese would capture her as a prize. Two of her escorting destroyers tried to sink her stationary hull. From Richard B. Franks Guadalcanal:

Mustin carefully fired eight torpedoes at Hornet that provided another sad example of the quality of these weapons: two ran erratically, one prematured, and five hit, but only three exploded. Mustin advised Kinkaid of Hornet’s refusal to sink, and the admiral detached Anderson to help bury Hornet. Between 1915 and 1930, Anderson scored six hits with eight torpedoes, but Hornet still remained afloat.

The hundreds of 5" shells fired by the destroyers thankfully did set her uncontrollably ablaze and useless as a potential prize, but the US destroyers were forced to retire and

Only twenty minutes later, destroyers Akigumo and Makikumo arrived to find Hornet in extremis. After perusing the number 8 on her hull, each destroyer discharged two Long Lances, which finally finished Hornet’s agony; she sank wreathed in smoke and steam at 0135 on October 27 — ironically, Navy Day in the United States.

31

Both of those Japanese destroyers were later sunk by torpedoes; Makigumo hit a mine and, being irreparably damaged, was sunk by torpedo fire from a “friendly” Japanese destroyer, Yugumo, which itself was later sunk by “unfriendly” torpedoes.

Could be some irony there.

32

Fascinating thread!

This may also be of interest: How would an Iowa-class battleship fare against this kind of beating?

33

That is pretty much true of the whole concept of Battleships, once the Aircraft Carrier concept became effective.

For example, the German Bismarck – took 1,500 days to build, lasted 5.5 days on its’ 1 voyage. The steel used to build Bismarck could have built 2-3 dozen submarines, and its’ crew of 2,221 could have crewed 30-60 submarines. And certainly a few dozen more German submarines would have had more effect on the war than the Bismarck did.

34

Not quite, The USN loaded them with anti-aircraft guns, so they could be used as escorts and especially shore bombardment. In that they were quite useful. But the USN did not need to launch more.

True, and maybe a couple of surface raiders like the Atlantis.

But at least the Bismack sunk the Hood, another capital ship. The much vaunted Yamato sank… a destroyer.

35

Another advantage for early in the war was that the Japanese navy had developed land-based level / torpedo medium bomber, the Mitsubishi G4M “Betty”.

These and the earlier model, the G3M were responsible for sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse. the first time capital ships were sunk at sea. They also sunk the heavy cruiser, USS Chicago during the Guadalcanal campaign.

OTOH, the Americans were still under the delusional thoughts that high level bombing would be effective against ships. It wasn’t until the US developed mast level and skip bombing that land-based US bombers could start to sink ships.

Unfortunately for the G4M, it was built with the same constraints as the Zero, also by Mitsubishi, and also sacrificed self-sealing tanks and armor for distance and performance.

They were also part of the decisive battle doctrine, and it was hoped they could be used to attrit the attacking US forces:

According to the first stage of the battle plan, fleet submarines would first be used to weaken the American fleet by 10%, then bombers from land bases and aircraft carriers would inflict another 10% casualties. Air strikes launched from carriers would neutralize the American carrier fleet. Fast heavy cruisers working with destroyer flotillas would attack the US battleships at night, making use of their long-range Type 93 torpedoes to inflict further losses. Now facing a depleted enemy at the limit of his supply chain, this would be the “decisive” stage of the battle, when the battleships of the Combined Fleet, centered on the modern Yamato class, would engage the US battle line. Finally, the older battleships would destroy the surviving remnants of the American fleet.

The IJN was involved in the air war in China, where distance was an important factor.

This does not characterize the situation at all.

The Japanese military and government leadership was a complex web that defies easy explanation.

The core decisions were made at Imperial Conferences where the almost deadly rival services presented unanimous decisions based on recommendations of mid-level officers, and where the top leaders often stated opinions that were contradictory to their own beliefs.

A common misconception is that Yamamoto was the sole voice of reason in the Japanese military, but it was far more complex than that.

36

The Italian Air Force had came up with that concept earlier (1936) with the Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 Sparviero-

If the ships are stationary, it works. Sadly the IJN were unsportsmanlike enough so they they kept their ships moving during battles. :zany_face:

The IJN misused their fleet subs, always trying for kills on Capital ships, whereas the US Submarine forces sank over Five Million tons of Japanese shipping- mostly merchants carrying needed supplies or food.

37

It certainly did. Japanese war planners told the leadership they did not have the resources, particularly petroleum, for anything but a short war. They could guarantee victories for maybe a year, after that, forget it. Which is kinda what happened. They stockpiled as much fuel as they could. The gasoline used in the planes to bomb Pearl was purchased from the U.S.A.

38

Japan was simply much more ready for war than the US. Of course, they had been in a war with China since 1937 so they had already worked out the bugs.

While the US was actively preparing for war, it just takes a long time to become an effective fighting force.

The naval battles around Guadalcanal are where the US had to learn how to win surface encounters, and which admirals were better peace time officers. Several of the battles were complete fiascos on the part of the USN.

The interesting thing is to imagine what Japan could have made instead of Yamato and Musashi.

The answer is that it doesn’t matter because if they hadn’t have built those two giants, they would never have gone to war with the US.

The IJN was so wedded to the decisive battle doctrine, it was going to be an all out battleship fight or stay home and eat yakitori.

Because the US had more battleships, Japan needed bigger guns to get an advantage.

The Imperial Japanese Army would have wanted to go to war, but the decision making process required a unanimous decision by both services and the Navy wasn’t that stupid.

To be fair, the US wasn’t great at the beginning of the war for carrier warfare, either.

Look at Coral Sea. I still don’t understand why every square inch of that area wasn’t being crisscrossed by land-based search planes. (Well, other than MacArthur)

The US efforts at Midway were cringeworthy if judged by the standards of the later war.

It was only by sheer coincidence, three squadrons of five bombers happened to arrive over the Japanese fleet at the same time.

The whole process was poorly executed. Google “WWI the flight to nowhere “

But again, carrier warfare was in it’s infancy.

Oh, I wasn’t just asking for you to restate your assertion. As I said, it was complicated so you really need more specifics.

Specifically which war planners. Army war planners? Navy war planners? War planners from other ministries?

Planners in the Ministry of the Army? Planners in the Ministry of the Navy? Or the Army General Staff? Navy General Staff?

Specifically which leadership. Again, the specific positions and how this came about.

You seem to be suggesting that there was one group that made the plans but that group collectively understood that the war could only last less than a year and the leadership was one easily defined group that rejected the wisdom of the planners.

Are you suggesting that the “war planners”
told “the leadership” that they didn’t have enough resources so then they went out and stockpiled as much fuel as they could? IOW, the decision came first and then they started to stockpile the fuel? That is the order you presented it.

The Japanese system of military and political decision-making was extraordinarily Byzantine.

The IJA and IJN operated as rival institutions with separate chains of command, the ministries were separate organizations from the general staffs, and decisions to both start and end the war emerged from complicated negotiations and interactions among the military leadership, Chiefs of Staff, civilian government, and Emperor.

You are suggesting that it was really simple when in fact it was not, but I welcome clarification.

39

It was simple. I didn’t suggest it was easy.

40

Yes, and that really was the Axis powers’ only (potentially) “decisive” advantage. Decisive to he extent that maybe, if they hadn’t been so strategically and intellectually bankrupt, they might have at least has a chance at winning a more limited war or wars.

They were very good at attacking other nations that desperately wanted peace, or at the very least weren’t super-eager for another war. Once they threw that advantage away and started a world war by bringing in the US and the USSR (at the same time! and with Japan and Germany acting completely independently on top of that!), they were pretty much hosed.

One area in which Japan absolutely did not have an advantage in the first year of the war was in coordination between its allies. Germany, Japan, and Italy never had anywhere near the kind of coordination and interoperability that the United States and the UK had. Likewise, Germany and Japan didn’t even come close to matching the level of coordination that the USSR and the western allies had.

Really, once you step beyond the operational level of war, Germany, Japan, and Italy were a loose collection of absolute dumpster fires that just happened to all be burning at roughly the same time, and in the case of Japan specifically not even in the same general vicinity. It is a wonder to me that so many still marvel over their “achievements” (which culminated and their occupation in near-total annihilation as independent states).