The Japanese Navy got beat by the quantitatively and qualitatively superior US Navy pretty bad, but were there any areas where they were better?
At the beginning of the war, Japan had far better torpedoes and the Zero was a better carrier based fighter. The fighter pilots were better trained also early on. In general, Japan was ahead on carrier tactics also.
I would need to verify but 1941 and 1942 I believe they had the advantage with longer ranged optics and this led to an advantage in night fighting also, along with training for night Ops. Keep in mind even at the start of the war they were behind on radar and kept falling further behind.
By the end of the war, the US Navy was superior in every aspect.
One note, despite the fame of the Yamato and Mushashi Battleships, the Iowa Class was actually superior. Mainly speed of fire and accuracy, but that was huge. Finally the Iowa class could achieve speeds over 33 knots, the Yamato was only 27. By the end of the war, the Iowa class’s anti-Aircraft guns were the best in the world and far superior to the Yamato. The Yamato had bigger guns that could fire further and really thick armor.
Hopefully all of that helps.
Fighting at night. We lost four heavy cruisers in a night time engagement.
In 1942 the USN had seven operational fleet aircraft carriers (off and on, several were sunk, more were built) but only three in the Pacific. The US had somewhere around 14 Battleships, but only 9 in the pacific.
The IJN had ten operational fleet carriers- with 10 Battleships.
So in 1942 the IJN was materially superior to the USN.
Note- all those numbers changed as some were sunk and more were built, especially carriers.
In particular, their optics were higher quality than ours, especially at night. (like @What_Exit says)
This was offset and then some later in the war by radar, with the massacre in the Battle of the Surigao Strait in 1944 being the direct result of that. Oldendorf’s force of older battleships detected the Japanese earlier, maneuvered into position, crossing their “T”, and accurately opening fire with radar fire control before the Japanese were even aware of their positions.
The F4F gave as good as it got against the Zero once the tactics were worked out. It’s true the Wildcat didn’t want to get into a turning fight against the Zero, and it had shorter range, but I’m not sure you could definitively call the Zero better.
At the start of the war it was. By the end we had fighters designed to kill the Zero.
The bit quoted out of context started with:
As I pointed out in my reply, even the F4F, our standard carrier fighter on 12/7/1941, could fight at even odds with the Zero as long as they used the right tactics - which did take a few months to develop. By August, the kill ratio was in favor of the USN, and it stayed that way through the end of the war - for the Wildcat.
Once the F6F and F4U got into the fight, the Zero was completely outclassed.
The F6F, was designed to defeat the Zero based on the reversed engineered one recovered in the Aleutian Islands. It worked great.
As I recall, it took most of 1942, not a few months for the catch-up by the F4F, but maybe you’ve seen different numbers? I’m pretty confused. The Hellcats just about owned the skies once they came out.
Oh, the technique was brilliant that was implemented, but 1 on 1 still favored the Zero vs Wildcats.
Corsairs and Hellcats both were better than the Zero.
The IJN dominated Mk 1 optics right up to the end of the war. Because they knew American radar put them at a disadvantage, the Japanese went to extraordinary lengths to recruit and train the finest eyeballs in the country.
They were probably ahead of us on ears, too.
Also in manned cruise missiles. Even to the end of the war. Especially at the end of the war.
Can you say they had the advantage if no one wanted to compete with for that option?
Holy crap, what a depressing invention.
The Germans looked into the concept as well:
The first Iowa-class battleships weren’t deployed until August 1942, about the same time as the Mushashi. The Yamato entered service just after Pearl Harbor. I guess you could say the Japanese had a qualitative advantage there for the first eight months, but one battleship couldn’t be everywhere.
Speaking of superb training, the Japanese had the best pilots at the start of the war.
The trouble was, their standards were so exacting that they had washed out many candidates unnecessarily. Then they overworked the pilots they had, not rotating them back for rest and teaching others. Lastly, they did a terrible job in comparison to the U.S. of rescuing downed airmen.
By the time they realized the shortage their policies had created, it was too late, and they wound up rushing unqualified pilots into combat, with predictable results like the Marianas Turkey Shoot.
The Japanese super battleships weren’t in a lot of action until late in the war, partly because they consumed vast amounts of fuel. The Yamato spent so much time in port that others in the IJN derisively referred to it as the “Hotel Yamato”.
But there were still a good number of Brewster F2A-3 Buffalo at the start, and they were definitely outclassed by the Zero.
Yep, which is why some scholars think the Battle of the Coral Sea was more of a Strategic victory for the USN (the battle was clearly a tactical win for the IJN)- two of the IJNs best carriers were not available for Midway- one of them because that ship lost so many aircraft- and this trained pilots. That loss of trained IJN pilots might have hurt more than the loss of the USS Lexington.
As the war went on, our pilots got better, the IJNs pilots got worse.
This has if anything been really understated. Long Lance as it’s now called, the primary IJN torpedo, was immensely superior to Allied torpedoes. It allowed Japanese formations to fire spreads of torpedoes from 20 kilometers, beyond the gun range of most ships, and it was tremendously destructive when it hit.
I would question of Yamato and Musashi were good weapons at all.
John Lundstrom wrote The First Team and The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign to analyze, blow-by-blow and combat-by-combat, every time that USN and IJN fighters clashed during the first year of the war.
So, for example, when F4F went head to head with the Zero at Coral Sea, 14 Zeroes went down compared to only 10 F4Fs. Early battles (the Marshall-Gilberts raids, for example) did go badly for the Wildcat, though there was some early experimentation with the Thach Weave even that early. Summing everything up, Lundstrom recorded pretty much 1:1 losses for that first year, with some improvement on the U.S. side toward the end (August 7-November 15, 1942 - 70 Wildcats lost in air-to-air combat against Zeroes, while shooting down 72 of the other - for the subset of carrier-based aircraft, 31 Wildcats lost vs. 42 Zeroes).
The Thach Weave wasn’t the only tactic that improved the Wildcats’ score. Teaching pilots to climb above the Zero and then use “boom-and-zoom” techniques to attack rather than getting into turning battles also improved their one-on-one outcomes. Of course, the tactics had to match the mission as well.
And that relates to another factor that comes into play - the Wildcat during Guadalcanal generally had an easier job than the Zero. Zeroes were coming to the battle all the way from Rabaul, and even if a pilot survived being shot down (the Zeroes were firetraps) it was hard for the IJN to do a rescue. The F4Fs at Cactus, with early warnings from coastwatchers and radar, could get into the air quickly and bounce the Zeroes from above, taking advantage of their better dive performance.
The Zero did have better range, as was typical of Japanese planes in that first year of the war, which was a real positive - if the IJN could quickly launch a strike from a greater distance, it had a solid chance to do damange to a US carrier before coming into range itself. However, Japanese intel, recon, and doctrinal deficiencies prevented its carriers from utilizing that advantage before it was erased by better and new US equipment.