The point has been made above that, as citizens in a democracy, the US public’s primary means by which they are able to support or reject the actions of their Government is via the ballot box.
If this is indeed the case, and relating this to the OP, it would (perhaps) seem to follow that if citizens do not make use of their voting power to censure their govenment when it engages in criminal or immoral acts they share some complicity in those acts (and must thus take a share of any moral blame). This, it might be claimed, is the essence of democracy.
My suggestion would be that the current democratic system as found in nations such as the US or Britain etc. perhaps does not allow us to hold the citizens of a particular democracy fully responsible for the actions of the state of which they are a part.
The best account I have seen for this comes from Brennan and Lomasky in their Democracy & Decision (Cambridge 1997).
For any individual to be morally responsible for a given action it would seem that there are at least two fundamental requirements:
- that the agent involved is aware of his or her action
- that the agent is also able to choose an alternative course of action.
I guess this is basically what we mean when we speak of an agent making a ‘rational choice’: ie. that the agent chooses a maximally preferred set of achievable outcomes from a selection of available outcomes.
Clearly, the shape and makeup of our govenments do not ‘just happen’ - they are brought about by the various voting acts of the public (a ‘democratic’ expression of political will). So are we as a voting public thus responsible first for the type of government which is in power, and second (by implication) for the particular acts in which this government engages?
Or, to put in more concretely: is the US public (or any given individual member of that public) responsible for the (possibly) illegal and immoral acts of the US government?
Imagine the elections in the US were decided by each member of the voting public tossing a coin. If it comes down as ‘heads’ their vote goes to the democrats. If it comes down as ‘tails’ their vote goes to the republicans. Let’s also imagine that the citizens have no option but to toss the coin, and that they also have no option but to cast their vote in the way the coin has dictated.
The resulting government would be the casual responsibility of the voting public: by their actions they caused it to come about. But we would not say that they are morally responsible for the shape of the government. It cannot be said to be a true expression of their ‘rational’ will.
There would seem to be a requirement for intent for the US citizenship to be held morally responsible for their government’s actions.
But (and this is the point made by Brennan and Lomasky) as it stands the current democratic voting system also fails to fulfill the requirements that would allow us to apportion moral blame to the US public.
In any large election the actions of any given individual voter are pretty much incidental to the overall outcome. If one person had refrained from voting in the last US elections the result would not have been any different.
Therefore, it hardly makes sense to say that any given voter is acting in a ‘rational’ manner when they cast their vote: by this we mean that the voter is not acting intentionally to secure a favoured outcome. Indeed, Brennan and Lomaksy suggest that it is ‘delusional’ to think that when I vote I am influencing the result in any way.
Even ‘undeluded’ voters (who are aware that they are not acting ‘rationally’) are doing something other than choosing political outcomes intentionally.
However (and this is the key point for this discussion) if a large enough amount of people - all of whom are not acting rationally - produce a given political result, can this really be said to be a true expression of their (strictly) rational will? If this is not the case, then it would appear that we cannot claim that they are thus ‘morally responsible’ for the subsequent actions of the resultant government…
The answer, therefore, to the question of whether 'civilians [are] duplicitous in their government’s policy would perhaps be ‘nope’.