What are the limits to the orders that subordinates in the military must obey?

It’s common knowledge, and perfectly logical, that in the military it is a serious offense to refuse to obey a direct order from your superior. Obviously, if you are given the order to advance on the enemy, and you decline to do so, they can’t have you doing that. Or if your sergeant puts you on KP duty, and you tell him to go fuck himself, there is something wrong there.

But what are the limits to the scope of orders that a superior may lawfully issue and that a subordinate is bound to obey on pain of penalty? Obviously, it is your duty to refuse an unlawful order. But other than that? How much control over the person of a subordinate does a superior in the military have?

For example, suppose an officer got the idea to arrange kamikaze attacks in a theater of war. Would it be within their authority to order soldiers to do things like charging the enemy and blowing themselves up, or do other things that would be 100% deliberately suicidal? Would it be unlawful to refuse to obey such an order?

Or take something that falls outside the scope of military duties. Let’s say for example that the general’s niece needs a date for a dance. Can the general order the sergeant to take her out to the dance (I recall a situation similar to this from an old “Beetle Bailey”). If the latter refuses, can he be disciplined for it?

Or can a superior arbitrarily make up their own rules, including ones that contravene liberties afforded to military personnel by the regulations? Example: grooming standards. It’s common knowledge that many, if not most militaries require men to have short hair; moreover, in many militaries, their heads are shaved / their hair is closely cropped on entering basic training. So for example, I read years ago the grooming regulations in the US Marines. I don’t know if these rules are still current, but as I recall, “regulation length” for male Marines (i.e., the longest hair a man could have) was a tapered cut starting at zero length at the bottom and graduating to no longer than three inches on top. There was also a rule saying that no Marine could be required to have hair clipped to the scalp, except during basic training (i.e., the induction haircut). So, suppose some NCO ordered his troops to get high-and-tight haircuts (the very short haircut that many Marines wear). Can they lawfully refuse to on the basis of regulations allowing men to have up to three inches of hair length on top? Or suppose he orders them to shave their heads. Can they lawfully refuse on the basis of the regulation that specifically says a Marine outside basic training may not be required to have hair clipped to the scalp?

Similarly, I recently read that this year effective September, the Canadian Armed Forces allowed personnel to have long hair, regardless of gender, and that would apply to basic training as well. So if now a Canadian NCO orders a soldier to get a haircut, can they say “with respect, Sir, regulations now allow long hair” and ignore the order with no consequence? Or is that still a lawful order regardless of the permissive regulations?

Incidentally, I just remembered an anecdote dealing with grooming regulations. There was a time when the British Army required its members to wear mustaches. But some soldiers flaunted the rule and dared to shave theirs anyway. On 8 October 1916, General Sir Nevil Macready signed an amendment to the King’s Regulations deleting the requirement not to shave the upper lip (and promptly got rid of his own mustache, which he disliked). This was during World War I. I recall reading an anecdote that someone who served in the (Grenadier?) Guards during the War recorded. He didn’t wear a mustache, and an NCO (let’s say a Sergeant Major) told him that he was at once to discontinue shaving his mustache and start looking like a Guardsman and a man! To his remark: “But Sir, King’s Regulations allow a man choice in the matter!” He got the answer that that may be so, but that his Sergeant Major’s regulations do not. Would said NCO really have had the lawful authority to arbitrarily require a mustache of his subordinate? Had the informant refused, could he have been court-martialled?

Where, then, is the line drawn?

A legal order must have a military purpose. You cannot order someone to lend you $10 until payday.

A lawful order may still have a near-guaranteed likelihood of death. Under command, you do not have the right to refuse orders in order to save your own life.

Right, but there’s a difference between “charge that hill” and “blow yourself up”.

True, but that person will need to convince the jury at their court martial.

Yeah, I’m pretty sure that ordering someone to commit suicide would be an unlawful order. Now, asking for a volunteer to do something like that is a different story.

The rule of thumb when I was in the service was “If you’re going to refuse to follow an order because you think it’s unlawful, you’d better be 100% right and have witnesses.” In other words, it’s generally a really bad idea to refuse to do something you’re ordered to do. That they were following what they believed to be a lawful order was the defense for all of those men who murdered several hundred Vietnamese at My Lai (doesn’t explain why they were raping the women and killing children, of course), and none of them other than Calley were convicted.

As for the OP’s example of ordering someone to go on a date: well, is it really a good idea to piss off the general for something that petty? Likely not, and while disciplinary action would be unlikely, life could become uncomfortable if the offended party was a big enough asshole.

What about an order that clearly violates safety protocols. “I want you to go in there and spray paint that access shaft, I don’t care if its ventilated and you don’t have a respirator, just do it.”

FQ answer, the limits are to be determined case by case by a military tribunal, post-hoc. We know this because the law only speaks to punishment for disobedience of lawful orders, and courts-martial are empowered to adjudicate such cases.

Article 90 et seq, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890-892 (2022) [UCMJ].

§890. Art. 90. Willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer

Any person subject to this chapter who willfully disobeys a lawful command of that person’s superior commissioned officer shall be punished—

(1) if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct; and

(2) if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.

§891. Art. 91. Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer

Any warrant officer or enlisted member who—

(1) strikes or assaults a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer, while that officer is in the execution of his office;

(2) willfully disobeys the lawful order of a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer; or

(3) treats with contempt or is disrespectful in language or deportment toward a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer, while that officer is in the execution of his office;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§892. Art. 92. Failure to obey order or regulation

Any person subject to this chapter who-

(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;

(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or

(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

There is some guidence in the rules and procedures of courts-martial themselves. But ultimately lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be decided by judges.

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) [MCM], pt. IV, ¶ 16.c(2).

c. Explanation

(1) […]

(2) Disobeying superior commissioned officer.

(a) Lawfulness of the order.

(i) Inference of lawfulness. An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime.

(ii) Determination of lawfulness. The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge.

(iii) Authority of issuing officer. The commissioned officer issuing the order must have authority to give such an order. Authorization may be based on law, regulation, custom of the Service, or applicable order to direct, coordinate, or control the duties, activities, health, welfare, morale, or discipline of the accused.

(iv) Relationship to military duty. The order must relate to military duty, which includes all activities reasonably necessary to accomplish a military mission, or safeguard or promote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of members of a command and directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the Service. The order may not, without such a valid military purpose, interfere with private rights or personal affairs. However, the dictates of a person’s conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful order. Disobedience of an order which has for its sole object the attainment of some private end, or which is given for the sole purpose of increasing the penalty for an offense which it is expected the accused may commit, is not punishable under this article.

(v) Relationship to statutory or constitutional rights. The order must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights of the person receiving the order.

(b) Personal nature of the order. The order must be directed specifically to the subordinate. Violations of regulations, standing orders or directives, or failure to perform previously established duties are not punishable under this article, but may violate Article 92.

(c) Form and transmission of the order. As long as the order is understandable, the form of the order is immaterial, as is the method by which it is transmitted to the accused.

(d) Specificity of the order. The order must be a specific mandate to do or not to do a specific act. An exhortation to “obey the law” or to perform one’s military duty does not constitute an order under this article.

(e) Knowledge. The accused must have actual knowledge of the order and of the fact that the person issuing the order was the accused’s superior commissioned officer. Actual knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

(f) Nature of the disobedience. “Willful disobedience” is an intentional defiance of authority. Failure to comply with an order through heedlessness, remissness, or forgetfulness is not a violation of this article but may violate Article 92.

~Max

I’ve long wondered how military personnel are supposed to know which orders are lawful. I mean, an 18-year-old private can’t be expected to understand the subtleties of law, especially in the heat of the moment, and there’s no legal authority standing by to tell them, “No, that’s a legal order, son” or “Yes, you can refuse to obey that one.”

Rank and file aren’t supposed to know the subtleties of law, and when an order is issued they aren’t supposed to question its legality. Orders are presumed legal and should be followed unless it is of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense would know it must be illegal; for example, shooting unarmed women or children.

~Max