What Are The Steps Needed for the U.S. To Go To Quick Thermonuclear War These Days?

Factual Questions
1

I was reading about Colonel Stanislav Petrov recently. For those of you that don’t know, he is perhaps the greatest unsung hero in the world. He was called for unscheduled duty at a Soviet nuclear command facility on September, 26 1983 to fill in for a superior. Later that night, systems showed a nuclear launch from the U.S. towards the USSR. Wait orders were given. Systems showed another launch and then another. It appeared that the U.S. was fully prepared for MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) in which the entire nuclear fleet of both nations would be unleashed. Systems readied the ICMB’s under his command to fire, his subordinates worked with the systems to prepare last minute details. His imperative was to follow systems and procedures. When the time came to notify superiors to start WWIII, he ordered a standdown against systems and procedures. The whole thing turned out to be caused by solar flares. He had to retire from the military with some undercurrent of shame for disobeying systems and orders after that.

My questions are:

  1. Does the U.S. still have a policy of MAD with Russia or anyone else?
  2. How fast can the POTUS react to an impending nuclear strike?
  3. I hear about this nuclear “football” with the nuclear launch codes. Does one person follow the Pres around with them all the time?
  4. Are new nuclear launch codes set every day?
  5. For a remote station, like a nuclear sub, how does the person in charge get notification to launch the nukes and how does that communication come?
  6. How do they arm and launch a nuke.?Is it by keypad or something else?
  7. Can U.S. nukes be set in real time to hit any reasonable target on earth?

I realize that much of this is the most highly classified info on the planet.

What would happen if U.S. satelites picked up data with high confidence that an ICBM of Russian origin were headed to New York and would be there within 30 minutes?

2

Given that the President has stated that if the US is attacked with WMDs, we’ll nuke the responsible party, I’d say yes.

It all depends upon where the POTUS is at the time. If he’s on Air Force 1 or at the White House, you bet he can respond within minutes of being informed.

More or less.

Dunno.

Coded message via radio, though there may be some circumstances in which the sub can launch without notification from HQ (like they surface and find NYC to be a radioactive slab).

For ICBMs, tow seperate operators must enter codes into a computer, then both of them must put keys into a console and turn them simultainously. The key holes are far enough apart that one person couldn’t do it. I presume that submarine launches would be done the same way.

IIRC, the newest missiles can, but older models can’t.

Mr. Shit, meet Mr. Fan.

3

You sure ask a lot of questions.

  1. See the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan)
  2. Yes
  3. Many ways. Satellite. VLF. TACAMO.
  4. Most nuclear devices have PALs (Permissive Action Links).
  5. Depends on the weapon system.
4

You may want to rent crimson tide. It’s not that great a movie IMO but I believe it has the launch protocols down pretty well (lots of verification and confirmation steps, measures to prevent any one person making with the mushroom clouds, etc.).

5

Nitpick:

MAD is/was the policy of deterrence, not a state of war/readiness like Defcon 1.

6

One point (that I’ve seen made on serious documentaries, and had confirmed first-hand from a friend in the US military) - there are procedures in place to allow one person to turn both keys, using a piece of string. I don’t know what the precise circumstances in which this is allowed are, but they do exist.

7

IIRC, thinking way back to the movie War Games, there’s a (triangular?) piece that one could presumably tie string to for remote activation, as long as the key was in the cylinder so it could be turned.

As for Question 4 - I sure hope so. We (the bank I work for) change “override” approval codes for loan transactions daily. My token for server access changes codes every minute. I’d like to think something that could trigger global annihilation is changed at least once a day, if not more often. Otherwise, that would be a very “ripe” target for terrorists to try and hack into.

8

What does turning the key(s) actually do? Couldn’t the locks themselves be hacked (locksmith)? Or the (whatever turning the keys does) process the keys initiate be hacked into upstream of the keys?
Say turning the keys tells some computer to go ahead with the launch sequence, couldn’t the computer be altered to ‘see’ the keys being turned? Or the wires that come from the lock to close the launch contacts on the PLC be jumpered?

9

The answers to the questions you answered are:
Dunno.
Probably.
Probably.
Probably, but it would be nasty hard without all kinds of inside information.
Quite probably.

Here’s why none of your questions mattered:
All of your hypotheticals take TIME.
If you manage to gain tactical control of a nuclear launch facility and hold it for the fifteen minutes or more it would take to complete most of the above processes, you’re doing pretty darned good. You won’t do it by yourself. You won’t do it with your dozen best friends. You won’t do it with a SWAT team. You’re looking at deploying a ton of soldiers… more guys than you can infiltrate quietly with. If you try to force your way in from outside the facility perimeter, I’ll wager you’ll encounter locked doors that you’ll have to force, slowing you down further.
If you can’t get to the launch site in adequate time, I’m imagining you’ll either have a ton of backup showing up at the base, or perhaps a cruise missile hitting somewhere that will end your whole plan.

10

I read an interesting article about this once. From it, the answer is yes, one person carries the ‘football’ for the President at all times. This job is performed by an officer of the armed forces (an 04, specifically), and the job is rotated among the 5 services.

There were some interesting stories of how the football carrier would sometimes get seperated from the Prez, and the efforts they went through to get back to within earshot of him.

A little bit of info.

11

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia have “de-targeted” each other. Both side’s missiles are now aimed at a point in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. So attacking would now require the additional step of re-entering the target codes. Unless you are planning on launching a sneak attack on Aquaman.

I read once that the United States had unofficially confirmed that it was possible for some military officers to launch nuclear weapons without orders from higher authorities. Basically this would have been the officers on a missile launching submarine in a situation where the United States was surprised by a nuclear attack and everybody in charge was killed before anyone had a chance to issue any orders. As I recall, a missile launch without orders from above would have required four different officers on the submarine to enter launch codes.

12

I don’t know about these things but I just read Testy’s post in this thread about sub stuff.

Quote: “As far as “Crimson Tide” goes, I hated that movie. The representation of submarine life was one step away from the seaview and I’m surprised they didn’t have a “flying sub” aboard somewhere. The other thing of course is that the war department does NOT send things to the Captains saying they might want to nuc someone soon. You either get the doomsday message or you do not. Captains do not decide to obliterate someone on their own hook. Besides, they couldn’t do it anyway.”

13

Ah well, another bit of ignorance fought… :smiley:

14

Published accounts of exactly what was required for crews to launch land-based US ICBMs during the Cold War tend to differ by a fair amount in the details, though the outlines are clear enough. (For instance, compare the version in Daniel Ford’s The Button, George Allen & Unwin, 1985, p117-9 and that in Pringle and Arkin’s SIOP, Sphere, 1983, p126-8.)
However, there is agreement that the system involved each two-man launch control centre, which could launch up to 10 missiles, being grouped with four others. These were nearby and linked, but physically separated. Not only did the two man team have to go through the launch procedure, this also had to be repeated in at least one of the other four. (Furthermore, any of the other four could veto the launch at any stage.) The system was thus a bit more involved than the simple “two-key” picture presented in popular culture.
The exception is that allowances were made for the case where all but one of the five teams were killed in an attack. At that point things were apparently designed to allow the remaining team to implement the orders for all five, so there may have been get-arounds.

What changes have been made since the Eighties, I don’t know.

The UK certainly allows for cases where a submarine might find itself armed and alone following an attack that has destroyed the country entirely. During the Cold War, a commander who thought he might be in this position had to follow a procedure to decide whether the UK government might still exist. Famously, the final test was to wait for several days listening to see whether The Today Programme was still being broadcast, the assumption being that BBC Radio 4 going off the air really would be the end of the world. At that point the commander and crew would be granted autonomy by default, including the authority to launch missiles without orders from London. Such a system naturally involved the submarine being capable of launching its missiles without any information from higher up.
The exact rules currently governing the UK’s Trident fleet aren’t public, but Peter Hennessy’s informed comments on the matter in The Secret State (2002; Penguin, 2003, p209) are that similar leeway is still included in their orders.

15

Exactly.

One other thing to keep in mind is that there is no way you’re going to be to delay things by taking hostages, for instance. The lives of a few people are nothing compared to the millions at risk if a terrorist were to gain control of a launch facility.

When I reported to a ballistic missile submarine berthed in Holy Loch, Scotland, I was advised that if hypothetical terrorists ever took control of the sub and took me hostage, I should simply do my best to get away, because when shore forces opened fire on them, they would not hesitate for my sake or anyone else’s.

This is why just about any movie that depicts terrorists openly taking control of nuclear weapons is ridiculous. The military response to such an action would be overwhelming and brief, regardless of the collateral damage incurred.

16

True enough. If it was suspected a terrorist had got his paws on a functioning, loaded, Trident missile sub, nothing (up to and including nuking the entire sub base and everyone in/near it) could be worse than allowing that situation to continue.

17

Just a comment from the USAF perspective …

We had shoot-down authority waay back in the 80’s for use against any airlift aircraft carrying nukes that was hijacked or strayed from its plan. I’d wager that has, if anything, expanded since then. Collateral damage is NOT a concern where retaining control of nukes is concerned.

As to launch authority, in the USAF tactical forces I’m familiar with (F-4, F-16, F-111) it took a LOT of codes & multi-person cooperation to get an airplane airborne with a weapon on board. The cops, the maintenance folks and the pilots all had separate local command centers and comm systems that all had to agree to let a nuke-armed aircraft start & move.

I don’t know whether the launch & arming codes even existed at the base, or at the regional headquarters or whether they had to come from Washington or one of its backups. Holding the codes, or a critical piece of them, back in the States would ensure that even if some local General & his entire command center crew went nuts they couldn’t launch a strike.

OTOH, if the codes DID exist at the base and the Base Commander & staff went nuts and sent the proper codes I’d have launched & gone off to incinerate some unsuspecting garden spot in Eastern Europe.

AFAIK a nuke-armed tactical airplane was never allowed off the ground without already being in possession of all the codes needed to arm & release the weapon. My understanding is the nuke-capable Navy carrier planes operated similarly. So by the time you were in the air, WW-III had already entered the Doomsday phase.

I also understand that was NOT the way SAC operated. The bombers often launched to just go on partol so to speak, like the SSBNs, and needed additional codes delivered by radio to get the weapon(s) armed or released from the jet.

Back to the tactical forces …

Once legitimately airborne with all the codes it was at least theoretically possible to take your weapon anywhere & drop it on whomever you pleased. Most of the nuke-capable planes had 2-man crews and that provided some backstop against unauthorized re-targeting. At the extreme, either crewmember could simply eject both of them from the airplane, ensuring the plane crashes nearby with an unarmed bomb still attached.

In the single seat F-16 I flew, the 2-man concept broke down completely once airborne. You were alone, unafraid, and armed with the biggest stick on the block. And you could take it anywhere within a few hundred miles of your takeoff point. Three … Two … One … Sunrise!!

Some humor …

Amongst lots of other steps, there were two switches that had to be set to arm the bomb; one practically reachable only by your left hand and one practically reachable only by your right. We joked about needing to make sure that neither hand was a Commie traitor.

In fact it was simply the result of taking the standard 2-man nuke arming system and putting the typical controls for both people into a single very jam-packed cockpit. Since the switches were seldom used, and never needed in a hurry, they got stuck in hard-to-reach nooks and crannies out of the way.

If somebody ever did get legitmately airborne with a nuke destined for the Warsaw Pact enemy and then went off on their own, I have to expect that the Command & Control system would try to send somebody to shoot the errant plane down. Given the dire straits the Allies would have been in if we were really launching the nukes, I doubt they’d succeed at stopping the renegade. By then the war would’ve been a total cluster-**** with the Allies near losing.

I’m glad that hair-trigger business is mostly wound down. But …

Folks should understand that substantially all the capability & training still exists today, although the total warhead count is much reduced. In the old days, widespread total nuclear warfare (“wargasm”) could be triggered off within a few minutes; nowadays we’d only get maybe 50-60% of it launched in half an hour; it’d take several hours to get the other 40-50% preped and launched. By which time their attack might well be moot, or they might be destroyed during preparation.

Nighty night …

18

Another book well worth reading is “Arc Light” by Eric L. Harry.

WW3 starts following invasion of S.Korea by the North

19

[QUOTE=Tuckerfan]
…then both of them must put keys into a console and turn them simultainously. The key holes are far enough apart that one person couldn’t do it./QUOTE]

I’ve never understood this. This security seems very flimsy to me. Couldn’t it be circumvented with a monkey wrench and a string? If someone planned to single-handedly launch an ICBM, surely this would not stop them?

20

I agree with most of what’s been posted already.

Striber and Kunetka’s apocalyptic thriller Warday has a good chapter on the final hours just before an abortive U.S.-Soviet nuclear war, and the terrible toll it takes on the White House and DoD officials involved as they see disaster drawing near, and find themselves powerless to prevent it.

On a lighter note, Hugh Sidey, in his “The Presidency” column in Time magazine, told of a practical joke played by one Football officer on his successor. The second took a peek inside what he thought was the Football, only to find a crushed beer can and an empty condom wrapper.

Several who served in the Carter Administration have described the time that Zbigniew Brzenski (sp?), the national security advisor, got the President’s approval to do a little test of his own. Zbig went up to the guy with the Football and said, “I’m the National Command Authority now. Let me see the codes.” The football guy gulped and let him see them.

Zbig also demanded that Marine One be scrambled for his immediate evac from the White House. No one told the Secret Service, which almost shot down the helicopter when it came in, hell for leather and unannounced, over the South Lawn.