I agree with you there, Cheesesteak. This, and this is IMHO, probably got written into the Convention so some Soldier on the battlefield would tell himself, “Hey, they’re my prisoners. I’ll do what I want with them!”
(Mods, please forgive the second copy of this post)
In the associated Pit Thread I posted:
Which is the understanding from which I proposed my answers.
Actually, Gus, we weren’t “breaking the law” by failing to stop and take the surrendering Iraqi soldiers into custody. Some of our follow-on elements, which included an MP company specifically tasked with the collection of EPWs, were mere kilometers behind us, travelling with our Batallion Command Group.
By calling the info on EPWs to higher (in our case, Battalion), we had also informed the MP Company Commander (on the same radio net). Within minutes of our passage, the MPs would arrive to take the EPWs in hand.
No laws violated there.
As far as our “rules of engagement” go, we were in the clear there as well. We could reasonably construe any of the actions that allowed us to engage suspected EPWs as “hostile.”
Monty: Monty, Monty, Monty…:rolleyes:
Yes, I well recall your military record; my ding on your answer had nothing to do with its factaul content. As usual, your knowledge and research of UCMJ material is impeccable.
For the non-initiate (non-military, non-veterans) I also thought it was incomplete, in that its simplicity failed to cover possible contingencies, and how it may be practically interpreted and applied in real-life combat situations.
IOW, there’s already a world of difference between military and non-military people, and the miltarily legal terminology only exacerbates the problem of trying to translate legal theory into practical rules of conduct for soldiers. Much less civillians.
I was attempting to provide a non-hypothetical, non-Hollywood, real-world example of how the Geneva Convention may be operationally interpreted and followed correctly in combat, drawing on my one and only experience of having had to exercise my own discretion as a trigger-man in a combat unit encountering enemy soldiers attempting to surrender.
FWIW, no one in our unit (Battalion) that I know of fired upon a surrendering Iraqi soldier. So I guess that either our rules of engagement/SOP were explicit enough, or our soldiers (Infantry and Armor) were humane enough, not to simply assume the slightest deviation from our instructions was a “hostile act” and fire upon surrendering Iraqis.
You see, Tank, I disagree with the concept that civilians shouldn’t get to judge the wartime actions of the military. Civilians (Congress) wrote the UCMJ and civilians (the governements concerned) ratified the Convention. (An aside: I’m not terribly fond of peacetime courts-martials being composed only of military either; that’s another issue, though.)
OK, now I think we’re done.
Please?
Did I say otherwise? I just think that it is sometimes difficult to explain the arcane world of military life and military operation to those who haven’t experienced it. That doesn’t mean that I think it shouldn’t be done; just the opposite, in fact.
Of course, that task is made much simpler here on the SDMB, where the average IQ of the average member at least lies above the mid-point of the curve, but language problems (military colloquialisms can be downright obscure to even some military people) still abound.
But the various national leaders which deliberated, wrote and ratified the Geneva Convention at least had the benefit of being legislators and national executives of some sort; this gives them a framework reference for understanding military stuff.
I make no assumptions about the members of the SDMB; therefore, I try to keep the language as simple as possible while making the answer as complete as possible.
And while the OP can be answered with a technical explanation, it was a question (even if an implausible “what-if”) concerning the practical application of the Geneva Convention.
I’m wary about bumping this, but I think this is worth mentioning. In the connected Pit thread, Monty finalyy answered the question definatively (with help).
Which was followed by
So, question answered, case closed, and now we can all sleep at night.
I am coming to this fight a little late. I do, however have some credentials. I was trained as an infantry officer in the mid-1960s and briefly served as a rifle platoon leader with an infantry division. From 1967 to 1972 I was a judge advocate officer at a training center in the Midwest and with the European air defense command. My reserve tour was as a mobilization designee to a Washington, D.C., headquarters and with a corps engineer headquarters. One of my jobs on active duty was to teach “law of war” to trainees. In each of my assignments it was my job to teach law of war to commanders and to monitor law of war compliance. I never served in a combat theater, I certainly never shot at anyone and as far as I know I was never shot at.
While I was on active duty, the Army suffered several black eyes for atrocities. The My Lai Massacre was certainly the one that received the most attention but there were others and there were all sorts of stories about throwing prisoners out of helicopters to encourage the others to talk. There was a heightened concern that our troops at least knew what the rules were all during that time.
Like much else the Geneva Conventions rules are a “one size almost fits all” proposition. Clearly their purpose is to reduce the level of savagery in the conduct of a brutal business. For the soldier (or Marine) on the ground compliance with the Conventions does not take first place in the order of priority. Duty to comrades always comes first, accomplishment of mission comes second. Compliance with the conventions comes after that.
The approach I took in dealing with the law of war was to try to persuade my people was that observing the rules was in their own self interest. To a great extent the behavior of soldiers on the battle field toward their enemy reflect what the soldier thinks the enemy’s behavior would be in the same circumstances. Conversely, if we allowed our tendency to savagery to run uncontrolled we could be pretty sure that our enemy would likewise mistreat our people who fell into their hands. Once there is a loss of discipline on one side a similar pattern will inevitably emerge on the other side as a matter of policy. For instance, there can be little doubt that there was minimal effort to take prisoners after the Malmondy Massacre in the winter of 1944-45 became known, or after executed US soldiers were found with their hands tied with their own boot laces during the Korean War.
The basic question in this thread is what does the soldier do in a situation that it is not practical to safeguard prisoners as the Conventions dictate. Others have pointed out that it is the rare situation indeed that prohibits the humane disposition of prisoners of war. In almost all situations there is some way to move prisoners out of the fight and into the custody of people trained and equipped to deal with them. This is why there are Military Police and rear echelon infantry. For a unit on the move, as was the case in the Gulf Campaign, the school answer is that unless an enemy is a threat you let a follow on unit take care of him. Just because an enemy tries to surrender doesn’t mean that you have to accept his surrender. Your duty to comrades and imperative to accomplish the mission come first–if taking prisoners and moving them to the rear interferes with those primary duties you just don’t accept the surrender. You leave them alone as long as they are no threat. You by pass them and let someone else worry about them. If they are a threat then you deal with them as a hostile enemy–once resistance is overcome you either mop up or let the follow on units clean up, sort out the prisoners and move them to the rear.
The one situation I have encountered where prisoners become a problem is long range reconnaissance patrols- usually small groups of soldiers ranging hostile territory and out of contact with friendly forces for an extended time. Sometimes the purpose of these patrols is precisely to take prisoners–they can hardly claim to be embarrassed by having prisoners since that is their whole purpose. Other long range patrols were just out there to sneak around and see what was going on. They wanted to avoid contact and did not even want the enemy to know they were there. They properly did not accept surrenders and certainly did not try to take prisoners. The primary duty to comrade and mission simply forbid prisoner taking and the answer was often to kill the poor unfortunates who had the bad luck to stumble on them.
The real world problem is how do you deal with the enemy hunkered down in his hole who fights until the last possible moment and then throws up his hands. Often the answer is to say “too late,” and put him down. When this sort of thing happens in the heat of the fight no one is going to worry about it very much. The killing of a prisoner who has had his offer of surrender accepted and who poses no threat is a different matter altogether. That is an act of savagery that invites retaliation and must be dealt with quickly and severely.
Sorry, SG; what you just described is akin to The Blue Wall of Silence. That’s how atrocities happen and continue to happen. One’s first duty is to the law he swore to uphold.
If the folks with “bad luck” are armed combatants, then that’s just the way war goes: they get killed by the other sides’ armed combatants as both groups (the patrol and those with bad luck). If the folks with “bad luck” are noncombatants, then killing them is simply murder and the “Olive Drab Wall” you posited is an immoral and illegal act.
Alan: I answered the question, without help, in this thread.
Drat. I left out
after
Where do you get the idea that a soldier swears to uphold the Geneva Convention? I think you’ve got a fundamental confusion in your mind, Monty, on the difference between a soldier and a policeman.
Here is what a soldier swears to uphold, Monty:
Where do you see any mention of upholding any “law” other than the Constitution of the United States?
Doghouse, doesn’t the Constitution these soldiers swear to bear allegiance to allow the Federal government to enter into treaties with other nations? Hasn’t the US signed on to the Geneva Conventions? If so, it looks like the soldier has indirectly sworn to follow the Geneva Conventions.
What I’m getting from this is that even when you’re talking to people within the military, there’s significant disagreement over what the GC obligates soldiers to do.
Daniel
Right, Daniel. The Soldier is obligated, as everyone else is, to obey the law. Y’all know, the things that Congress has decided to enact. That includes international treaties the Big C has approved.
One of our law Dopers please correct me if I’m wrong, but as far as I can tell a treaty signed by the Executive and ratified by the Senate does not have force of law unless the whole Congress explicitly enshrines its provisions as law.
If we can agree that US military personnel are obligated to follow the laws of the United States as their first priority, then I find it interesting that I found hardly anything in that actual body of law that refers to the Geneva conventions, and nothing at all concerning those conventions’ stipulations concerning treatment of enemy prisoners of war. Again, I welcome the input of any more legally proficient Doper.
This seems to be an interesting point. It would also present another option to the list of hypothetical options from the pit thread.
by UncleBill
To which I would add:
G.) Don’t take him prisoner in the first place.
I know there is very little (or no) practical difference between this option and option B. But, legally there is. It has been pointed out that it would be a violation of the UCMJ to release a prisoner (Uncle’s option B). But, if what SG is saying is correct then you can choose not to take the prisoner at all (my option G) and not be in violation of the UCMJ.
To stretch it a little further…
Actually, it seems to me that you could even disarm the person and then leave them tied up, and technically not have taken him prisoner at all. And thus, not have been violating the UCMJ.
I hate to say it, but can somebody define the moment that a combatant becomes a prisoner?
When they surrender? When they are disarmed?
Monty, I think you missed my point; to the extent there was one. Dreadful things happen in combat and in the wake of combat. As a practical matter the authorities can deal only with obvious and unambiguous atrocities. My Lai is a classic example of the sort of thing that must be treated as a violation of not only the Conventions but of any sense of decency. You cannot, however, hold some 19 year old trooper responsible for things that happen in the heat of a fight while the overriding emotions are fear and anger. Thus you cannot treat the machine gunning of defenseless and unthreatening people as being the same as shooting a combatant who makes a tardy offer of surrender when seconds before he was trying to do you harm.
As others have said, the essence of combat is savagery and there is no switch that turns it off and on like a light bulb. While the ideal soldier is docile in barracks and savage in battle, some allowance has to be made for the reality of combat. Without doubt people are killed who, in the light of leisurely contemplation, you may think should have been spared. The one thing a soldier in combat does not have is the luxury of contemplation. All the good will in the world cannot prevent a soldier oppressed by fear and anger from doing things he would never think of doing if he had the opportunity to think about it.
If there is culpability it lies with the junior officers and NCOs who are on the ground and who are supposed to control of their people. This is why in the My Lai prosecutions it was the officers, the platoon leader and the company commander, who were prosecuted. You will remember that there was a fair amount of public sympathy for both those men. The only thing that kept the prosecutions from going further up the chain of command, perhaps as far as the brigade commander, was the death of the battalion commander within a few days after the incident. There was no Green Wall of Silence (and of complicity) at My Lai—the authorities were examining the situation within days of the event although it was a long time before the whole matter became public.
Battlefield atrocity is not a black and white proposition. There are areas of ambiguity. The deliberate murder of a captive whose offer of surrender has been accepted and who has been rendered harmless is unlawful under almost all circumstances. The killing of a combatant whose capture is not complete or who still offers a threat to comrades and mission falls into the gray area where hard and fast rules can not be employed and the particular facts of the event are critical. It gets even worse when it is difficult to distinguish a combatant for a non-combatant. Remember that in the half-light obscured by smoke, illuminated by muzzle flashes, with the senses numbed by noise, fatigue and fear, anything that moves is likely to look like an armed and hostile enemy who simple self preservation compels you to shoot before he shoots you. A decision made under those circumstances is one I would not like to second guess.
No, you can’t disarm the person and leave them tied up and claim that you never took them prisoner.
So, now I get it, how could I have been so dense? In the thread titled “What are you supposed to do with the enemy when taking them prisoner isn’t feasable?”, the obvious and correct answer is to “take them prisoner”! As pointed out, “feasible” means “possible”. “Not feasible” would then mean “not possible”. What color is the sky in that world?
And introducing the surprise backup mission at such a convenient time in the discussion, when it had been non-existant before! Brilliant strategy! In the case I set up in the other thread, the Contingency Plan is to sit by and let the tanks cross the bridge you are supposed to destroy, let them rearm and refuel at the logistics depot, then let them destroy a defenseless city, watching the kiddies die, then, 12 hours later, hit them with A-10’s.
Brilliant. As brilliant as it is logical. I’m sure glad we have Monty on our side, people.
Spavined Gelding: a good, humanistic analysis of the realities of armed conflict, as filtered through the lens of the man-on-the-ground.
When bullets fly, the old adage of:
The Mission Is The First Priority;
Your Unit Second;
Your Own Ass Third;
Everything Else A Very Distant Fourth.
is still the universal military rule-of-thumb for the common soldier, regardless of how many tomes of abstract law someone else attempts to heap on top of it.