As mentioned - this event exceeded the worst-case predictions. If this event had not exceeded expectations the sea walls would have been high enough, the shelters dry, and we’d all be applauding Japanese engineering while watching a tsunami crash against concrete and steel barriers on YouTube.
They did the best they could with what information and resources they had. Unfortunately, Mother Nature played a trump card.
Actually, they did:
- Normal cooling
- Diesel backup
- Battery back up to the diesel generators - 8 hours worth which, by the way, functioned just fine. For 8 hours.
Now, I agree that more backup would have been better, and better placement of the diesel generators would have been better. There is considerable room for improvement here, I’m just pointing out that there WAS tertiary backup.
MOST powerplants of that sort are not situated in tsunami-risk areas. MOST of them have 96 hours of battery backup. We can’t change the location’s tsunami risk, but they should have made the safety modifications more Mark 1’s received after Three Mile Island. THAT someone should be held culpable for.
Agreed. Apparently, tertiary backup isn’t sufficient for a nuclear power plant.
The reason for venting the hydrogen is to prevent an explosion from breaching the primary containment vessel. Better to vent it into the building at the risk of the outer building going boom than keep it bottled up until the main vessel blows. Although the explosions we witnessed were powerful and serious, what they blew up was an ordinary building with little if any radioactive stuff to spew around. If the primary reactor vessel had blown up it would have been much more destructive, as it would have required greater pressures to do this, and there would be MUCH more radioactive gunk thrown around.
In other words, as nasty as the recent explosions were, they were the lesser of two evils. By allowing that to occur they limited the damage. Believe it or not.