I’m not sure what task you have imagined that I had planned. I’m just going to muse about the OP and your responses. I’m not at all interested in convincing you that humans don’t have spirits or that things with spirits are human or that Jesus doesn’t say/seem/show what you think he does.
A couple of general notes first.
The OP, as others have noted, seems a bit unclear. Are we defining membership in the species homo sapiens sapiens or are we defining a further quality of “humanity” (which might be sentience, posession of a soul, qwonaciousness, etc.)
Things with a spirit are human is clearly directed at the second. Lib, I think that as with our discussion on morality your standard, while perhaps consistent and correct, lacks functional utility for mortals. I believe this is what Lightnin’ (and others, perhaps) has reacted to with scorn. Certainly, if the goal is to find a useful (even as hypothetical exercise) definition of humanity then functional disutility is enough to disqualify the solution.
I can read the OP and find an implied condition of human utility, and Lightnin’s follow up posts certainly made that criterion clear. Whether this was changing the question or clarifying the context for which answers are being sought depends, it seems, on how one understood the OP in the first place.
Lightnin’ objects to using possession of Spirit as a test since “Lib’s solution requires that we be able to detect a soul- otherwise the answer is meaningless. It’s the same as saying, ‘Well, I’d just know!’” This is a valid objection, once the criterion of utility (for us) is establishd. Interestingly, I find that Lightnin’s own proferred answer “if a sentient being (of whatever sort) thinks of itself as human, it is.” also fails this test of utility. After all, it lacks an explicit method for us to determine whether a sentience thinks of itself as human. Both amount to variations of “I’ll know it when I see/feel/experience it.”
Now we get to the point where Lib offers means with which to recognize that a being possesses Spirit.
1. He should have the potential for some sense of his own existence beyond simple fight or flight. Besides merely eating, shitting, fucking, and sleeping, we might expect that he would seek out a broader fulfillment. We would not expect him to be satisfied otherwise.
Humanity requires drives beyond those of simple instinctual survival. I agree.
2. He should have the potential to develop a comprehension of Platonic ideals. We would expect that he might parlay his thoughts into poetry and interpretation, rather than simply processing sensory input and reacting to his environment.
Humanity should possess artistic understanding and the urge to create patterns. I agree. I am somewhat troubled by the inclusion of Platonic ideals per se. I would rather argue that the creation and recognition of patterns combine to foster a sense of significance to pattern which extends beyond the particular manifestation. Whether that significance takes the form of Platonic ideals does not strike me as critical.
3. Closely related, he should have the potential to create. We would expect his interpretation of his environment to go beyond that of mere survival. We might expect him to see a banana as perhaps an idea for creating art, and not as just something to eat. We would expect him to assign meaning to things that don’t mean anything in and of themselves.
I actually wrapped this into my discussion of point 2. I agree.
4. He should exhibit the potential to reach outside himself, just as his Creator did. We might expect that he would explore for exploration’s sake, that he would not merely migrate, but hope and yearn that there is something better on the other side of the hill.
Exploration and creation. It seems to me that this is simply a special case of (1) + (2&3). While I think that this quality is definitely present in humanity as a whole, I am not at all certain that it is a prerequisite for humanity in the particular. If a yogi finds contentment looking inward instead of outward I do not think he forfeits his humanity. Likewise a real-life candide should not be excluded from humanity for preferring to tend his own garden.
5. He should show that he has the potential to fight, not just for territory, not just for possessions, but for principle. We would expect things that aren’t even material to matter to him. We would expect him to hold on to a thing, not just because he found it, or because it helps him survive, but because he treasures it.
Humans demonstrate possessiveness and the wilingness to exert force for myriad causes. Again, while I find both of these traits quite common in humanity as a whole, I do not think that either mendicants or pacifists should be denied their place in the fraternity.
It strikes me that you might be trying to evoke a more general idea of Spirit being found in the valuation of the abstract above the material, perhaps above life itself. I cannot be certain, though. A person’s treasure might well be material and a principle might be grounded squarely in material self-interest.
6. He should have the potential to develop a morality, i.e., a comprehension, not just of a relational ethic or pecking order, but of good and evil. We might expect to see in him shame, not just over a deed, but over a thought, not just because he might be punished, but because he values goodness. Alternatively, we might expect that he would delight in evil for evil’s sake.
Humans have a sense of good and evil divorced from social, political or personal context. I disagree. By divorcing morality from the context of ethics you seem to be demanding that humans accept a metaphysical definition of good and evil. While I understand that as a point of view that many people share, and which might in fact be correct, it is nevertheless true that many homo spaiens sapiens do not develop such a morality.
Now, you specify “potential to develop . . .”, which perhaps hedges the bet. But if the goal is a working definition then you are left saying things like, “well, Spiritus must have that potential even though he does not evince it because we know that he is a human . . .”
I am more sympathetic to the simpler idea that humans have a sense of morality, whether it be grounded in ethics, metaphysics, hedonistic selfishness, etc. Even there, I feel the ground is shaky. Do sociopaths forfeit their humanity?
7. He should demonstrate the potential to recognize his own specialness, that is, he should ask himself such questions as “what makes me, as a human, different from the other animals?” We might expect that he would debate this question with others, and that the others who join him in debate share his specialness.
Humans are self-aware and classify their environment according to shared traits. I agree.
Back to the OP
As noted above (and by others) I sense 2 questions. Where does the line of biological identity lie, and what does the abstract quality of “humanity” require? To address your specific examples:
example Homo Sapiens Sapiens Humanity
Baseline human YES YES
+ prosthetic limb YES YES
+ prosthetic organ YES YES
brain in a can NO YES[SUP]1[/SUP]
personality in a computer NO YES[SUP]1[/SUP]
Robot thinks it'S human NO YES[SUP]1[/SUP]
Robot made by humans NO NO
Minorly altered human YES YES
Majorly altered huuman NO MAYBE[SUP]2[/SUP]
Completely altered human NO MAYBE[SUP]2[/SUP]
Alien raised as a human NO MAYBE[SUP]2[/SUP]
Alien NO MAYBE[SUP]2[/SUP]
[sup]1[/sup][sub]If the interface between machine and
environment retained sufficient complexity to
replicate/simulate the phenomenological complexity of the
human glandular and sensory systems. Otherwise no.[/sub]
[sup]2[/sup][sub]At some point of genetic differentiation
it is possible that the being would cease to experience its
environment in a manner which is sufficiently analagous to
our own for us to allow for a fraternal association. One
example might be a being that lacks any ability to respond
emotionally to an aesthetic experience.