The common wisdom is the Treaty of Versailles was a mistake - it was so tough on Germany that it made another war inevitable. The Germans certainly felt it was unbearably harsh.
But honestly, what where the Germans expecting? They were the ones asking for an end to the war - they must have realized that was a sign they lost. Did they expect everyone would shake hands and say “good game”?
The Germans must have realized they were going to lose some territory - that had been happening after wars for centuries. Did they honestly think they were going to keep Alsace and Lorraine in a settlement? Or their overseas colonies? Or Northern Schleswig (which was mostly inhabited by Danes) or the eastern corridor (which was mostly inhabited by Poles)? They had gotten all these territories in previous settlements - why were they surprised this settlement took them back?
The reparations were nothing unusual either - they had been a standard issue in previous settlements. The Germans had certainly imposed reparations on other countries when they won wars. So again, why were they surprised when reparations were imposed on them?
Germany couldn’t even complain it was getting the worst of it in 1919. The settlements with the Hapsburg Empire and Ottoman Empires were much harsher than the one with Germany - those countries were dismantled. Even Bulgaria gave up more.
So where the Germans just completely unrealistic in their expectations? Or were they hypocritical in complaining so much about a relatively light settlement because the shoe was on the other foot this time?
It was, but the mistake was on the part of the allies. The Germans basically had no choice but to accept.
Germany was collapsing from the crushing weight of the war. They had no options but to sue for peace. What were they expecting? No idea…they probably didn’t really have any either, and were in no position to dictate terms. So, the allies had pretty much a free hand to do whatever they liked and the Germans basically had to take whatever terms they could get.
The difference was that both sides were on the brink of total collapse. I remember reading that towards the end the Germans were digging up their lead pipes to try and keep materials going towards the war. I don’t think the Germans were all that surprised by the reparations, but the terms were quite harsh in both monetary terms and in territorial terms…not to mention in terms of restrictions on their military and parsing up the various overseas imperial possessions of the losing side.
It was inevitable that such conditions and the economic hardships and resentments they engendered were going to lead to future conflicts.
Germany had to give up several key territorial possessions, as well as most (all?) of it’s overseas possessions. All of the defeated powers got pretty harsh terms. The irony is that the allies were on the verge of collapse too, and it could just as easily have been them to fall first instead of Germany.
I don’t know that Germany’s expectations were so high in what terms they thought they would get. They basically didn’t have any choice and had to take what ever was offered them. I don’t think that most historians feel that what was imposed on them was a ‘light settlement’, however. It was pretty harsh, all things considered. It was harsh enough that the US pulled out of the League of Nations and basically washed our hands of the whole mess in disgust (until we were dragged into the inevitable WWI part II, electric bogaloo).
Surely it was the amount of reparations that was the issue, not the fact that they were asked to pay at all?
After the Franco-Prussian War the French were forced to pay $25 billion (in current dollars). After WW1 the Germans were to pay $750 billion (again in current dollars).
But you see, unlike those two empires they could complain, because they were still there. The reparations had such a major effect because they were big enough to hurt and enrage the Germans, but not enough to destroy them. Usually if you intend to loot a country, you destroy it or occupy it and keep it from rearming while you do it instead of just demanding they hand over everything while leaving them able to build back up for a rematch.
Winston Churchill seems to blame the U.S., at least partly, for Germany’s onerous debt burden:
(As I’ve implied before, WW I / WW II history is very low on my list of reading interests so I’m content to suffer with Mr. Churchill’s one-sided opinions. ) Comments?
Nice writeup. All of the colonies, which were pretty extensive.
Germany lost:
[ol]
[li]Posen, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia to Poland (and Danzig)[/li][li]The Memelland, a coastal strip north of East Prussia, to Lithuania[/li][li]Alcase and Lorraine, to France[/li][li]Eupen and Malmedy, to Belgium[/li][li]Northern Schleswig, to Denmark[/li][li]the Rhineland, still their territory but demilitarized[/li][li]the Saar, to France for 10 years, with a referendum on wiether to return to Germany, stay French, or other promised[/li][li]German East Africa, to British and Belgian mandates. This is now mainland Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi[/li][li]Kamerun, to British and French mandates. This is now the Cameroons, plus a small piece of Nigeria and another small piece of Chad[/li][li]German Southwest Africa, to a South African mandate. This is now Namibia[/li][li]Togoland, to British and French mandates. The British piece was incorporated into Gold Coast, now Ghana; the French piece is now Togo[/li][li]A set of ports and trading centers in China, to Japan[/li][li]Papua and the Bismarck Archipelago, to Australia[/li][li]Micronesia, except Guam, to Japanese mandate. This is now the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Belau, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas.[/li][/ol]
They were supposed to pay $750 billion originally. But that figure was dropped to the equivalent of $442 billion in current dollars.
A high sum but there’s also a time factor. France paid off the equivalent of $25 billion in three years - an average of 8.33 billion a year. Germany paid off the equivalent of $442 billion over ninety-one years - an average of 4.86 billion a year.
As for the comparative totals, it’s late and I can’t find the figures offhand. But while the ratio of reparations between World War I and the Franco-Prussian War were about 18:1, I think it’s almost certain that the ratio of destruction caused by the two wars was much higher. If Germany was charged more, it was because Germany wrecked more.
But as I said in the OP, almost all of these territories were places Germany had captured as prizes in previous wars. If Germany made other countries give it land when it won a war, why was it surprised to have to give the same land back when it lost a war?
I’m sure they expected to give up Alsace and Lorraine and pay reparations. I’m equally sure that they didn’t expect to give up Northern Schleswig and West Prussia/Posen/Silesia. Denmark wasn’t even in the war, and they had WON the war in the East. So the surrender of territory like Schleswig and West Prussia seemed like it was less to reward the victors and more to punish Germany.
That was the big problem the Germans had with the Treaty. It was galling enough to the Germans that they had lost, with a lot of Germans taking the attitude that Germany had surrendered on the verge of victory, but what was offensive to them was the implication that they were not the wronged party; that they were to blame for the war and that they deserved punishment for starting the war and for their actions during it.
The only concessions made to these proposals was a plebiscite in Upper Silesia and civilian oversight of the occupation of the Rhineland.
The German conference delegation recommended Germany reject these terms, and the German government consequently resigned. It’s successor government felt it had no alternative but to accept given the situation, and signed off on everything except the war guilt clause and the trial of the Kaiser; faced with invasion it finally agreed to those points too.
No they were not, in 1917 that was true (especially for France), but certainly not in 1918.
I agree with **Der Thris **that the combination of harsh demands/no invasion of Germany was a nasty cocktail. The German population did not really register that they were seriously defeated, and it gave opportunity for German nationalism to renew itself as Nazism. The Allies should either have been softer (especially on territorial losses) or they should have invaded and occupied.
That said, Germany had been as harsh as the Allies when they were victorious, so no ground for them for calling Versailles unfair (if unfair means anything in those matters).
There is also a strong element of that.
Of course the Germans didn’t see themselves as the agressive Huns, like they were depicted in allied propaganda, and were still more chivalric in how they looked at war.
Yes, they started the peace talks but the allies were just as warweary.
The impresssion the Germans got was indeed along the lines of:
“I say chaps, shall we just stop this awfull silly war?”
“All right Hermann, you just leave your trench and go stand behind that line and we’ll shake hands”
“OK, will do, Tom!”
“Errr… Tom? Why is Francois pointing his gun at me, Tom?”
“Hmm?, just hand over your money now, Hermann, you dirty Hun.”
The X factor here is overweening nationalist arrogance.
Expectations fed by propaganda leading up to the Great War was that Germany should dominate Europe, as well as competing at least equally with Britain on the seas and as a colonial power. When that dream was taken away there was disproportionate shock and anger, fed by destructive military apologism (we didn’t lose the war, we were “stabbed in the back”).
France was overwhelmingly defeated in 1870, lost important territory and was hit with reparations that were intended to crush it long-term. It made a huge effort to pay those off fast and got back on its feet quickly - and while rearming it did not morph into a nation intent on conquest.
The different approach in Germany suggests a fundamental difference in national outlook.
I think Wilson’s fourteen points speech had something to do with it. The German’s went into Versailles expecting it to be the basis of the peace treaty. And instead got British and French delegations which had no intention of following it. Here are the relevant points:
5-The adjustment of colonial claims in the interest of the inhabitants as well as of the colonial powers
6- The evacuation of Russian territory and a welcome for its government to the society of nations
7- The restoration of Belgian territories in Germany
8- The evacuation of all French territory, including Alsace-Lorraine
13- Independence for Poland, including access to the sea
In addition some reparations were also to be expected.
The Germans were surprised at the level of reparations. And they lost additional territory above and beyond what was anticipated. Memelland, Northern Schleswig, Upper Silesia, Danzig, the Rhineland and the Saar were all unexpected losses of territory. The overseas territories were all also disposed of without regard to “the interest of the inhabitants.” They lost all their overseas territory. Which was previously unheard of in peace settlements.
Basically the Germans went in expecting the settlement to be inline with past peace settlements and based on the Fourteen Points. They expected to lose some previously stated territory. They expected to lose an overseas colony or three (certainly not all of them). They expected to pay some reparations, certainly no more than $100 billion. The actual peace treaty was vastly more punitive and the Germans lost a lot more than they were expecting. The whole thing must have felt like a massive bait and switch to the average German. Not that that excuses the Nazis. But the Germans had some causes for complaints.
Part of the reason for so much territorial grabbing was that many, many promises had been made to get the alliance of what turned out to be piddling little powers that made almost no difference (Romania comes to mind). In trying to fulfill all the promises they made the Allied powers ended up pleasing no one.
Part of the difference is, Germany didn’t consider itself overwhelmingly defeated. In the Franco-Prussian War, German troops occupied Paris. At the end of World War I, as the Germans proudly pointed out, not one allied foot was on German soil. The only reasons the Germans lost, they believed, was because, on the verge of victory, socialists and defeatists back home forced Germany to sign an armistice and the Kaiser to abdicate. But, even with that, the Germans believed, they hadn’t really lost the war. They just decided to stop fighting.
So, the Germans, any peace settlement should be, like Wilson advocated, a just peace, without victors and vanquished, between equals, with the goal not territorial acquisition, but an end to future war. So they saw Versailles, and the fact that they weren’t even allowed to negotiate there, as a betrayal.
The French occupation of the Saar, and the later occupation of the Ruhr, crippled Germany’s ability to pay reparations and was a leading cause of its hyperinflation.
It’s one thing to demand demilitarization and surrender of territories; it’s quite another to cause economic ruin, seemingly out of spite.
Hard to sell harsh terms to the German people when Russia already gave up and not one Enante soldier stood foot in Germany at the time of the treaty signing.
What did the French and British expect would happen years later from Versailles?
) Comments?