I have a passing interest in French politics. (Although I do not even speak the language.) So tell me, what is the modern popular opinion of Marshal Petain and his ‘French State?’ That is the say ‘Vichy France?’
Traitor or deluded old man? Why did he do it? Why did Parliament vote itself out of existence? Why did the EF ship off French Jews to the Camps?
Are there any statues of Petain?
Well, he “won” at Verdun.
Traditionally, there’s been a tendency to blame Vichy on Laval rather than Petain.
I should clarify my post above. I was really thinking about the initial Vichy period in 1940 and immediately after. At that time, France was in a desperate position, and many people, on all sides of the political divide, thought France should seek an armistice and whatever self-government could be scavenged. The situation was very fluid at this point, and Vichy comprised elements that ranged from the patriotic and the pacifist to the outright Nazi.
Over time, Vichy came to have a much more Nazi and anti-Semitic complexion, but initially, I would say, it was more collaborationist from necessity than from pro-German or pro-Nazi feeling. As to how guilty Petain was, it’s still a matter of controversy. But at a minimum, Petain was an authoritarian reactionary – more in the mold of Franco than Hitler. But in 1940, the French people could be forgiven, in the deporable situation they were in, for thinking it wise to put power in his hands.
Still, I find the Parliament voting itself out of existence to be remarkable. No other occupied country did that. Like much of modern-era French politics, a remarkable story.
Just to add a bit to what **Sal Ammoniac **said.
As a non-French who attended French International schools all my life, I can say that during the history classes for the period, the teachers made no attempt to sugar-coat or in any way minimize Petain’s actions during WW2.
Why did Petain declare the armistice? Well, not only were the French soundly beaten in their fight against the Germans in 1940, it’s also the fact that in a single month of fighting, the French had almost 130.000 dead. Coupled with the civilian refugees, there was a general feeling of capitulation among the French population.
They also said that Petain fully expected the British to lose against the Nazis as well so he wanted to accommodate France as much as possible in a Nazi Europe.
Why ship off the French Jews? See above. Vichy wanted to accommodate the occupying power as much as possible. They didn’t really have much choice in the matter.
Though there’s plenty of evidence that the Vichy government went above and beyond, particularly as time went on. Petain himself was by no means innocent of anti-Jewish feeling, and certainly gave others such as Darnand a free hand against the Jews.
France was in a unique situation – militarily beaten, but only half occupied. Moreover, the Italians had just declared war against them, and were threatening the southeast border. France was, as I say, desperate. The decision to surrender and collaborate was cerrtainly debatable, but it was not irrational. It was the pressure of circumstances more than anything that led to Petain’s installation.
Let’s not be too quick to exonerate Petain. France still had some fight left in it when he gave up. The Germans expected France to keep fighting for several more weeks and still considered victory uncertain (most of their forces in France were being ordered into defensive positions for an expected counter-attack).
Petain and many of his like-minded colleagues hated the French government. The current government was made up of a coalition of left-wing parties and the nation’s military leadership had publically stated they did not support the government (and they didn’t trust foreigners like the British either).
Petain, who had been out of active service for several years, was brought in to the government after the initial defeats because he was regarded as a symbol of France’s defiance of Germany. But he immediately and continously argued for a French surrender. The generals kept pulling the French army back away from the German army and the Germans kept advancing. Eventually Reynaud called a meeting to decide whether the French government should move overseas to Algeria to keep fighting. Reynaud and several civilian leaders argued yes; Petain and the military said no. Reynaud resigned and Petain was named as Prime Minister. His first act was to give the surrender he had been calling for all along.
I think this has to be tempered by the understanding that France was in both a very desperate situation and had to make a decision very quickly. **Little Nemo’**s point echoes the stand taken by many at the time, but I’m not sure how realistic it was. The French army probably had a number of units that were intact, but many weren’t. Some units had even gone so far as to shoot the officers who told them to fight on. Orderly retreat into the unoccupied zone was made impossible by the fact that the roads were clogged with refugees.
Morever, as A qui profite le crime? pointed out above, there was every expectation that the Germans would quickly overwhelm Britain and find themselves the masters of Western Europe. France had Fascist enemies on every side – the Germans to the north and east, Spain to the South, Italy at the Southeast. Retreating to Algeria would have meant passing through German-allied Spain, or trying to get an army across the Mediterranean. And when they got there, what would they have had to fight with? At best they could have formed themselves into a guerrilla army.
In hindsight we may say this is exactly what they should have done. But in mid-1940, the military situation was so bleak for the Allies that I don’t think we can blame Petain for trying to save the sovereignty of half of France. (Which is not to say we can’t blame Petain for his later actions as the Vichy dictator.)
This strikes me as a very optimistic view of the situation in France. Most of the French troops were surrounded in the Northwest and most the rest were routed. Fighting would have just delayed the inevitable by what? A couple of weeks at most? On June 12, Weygand had ordered a general retreat since they were unable to maintain any semblance of a front. That was 7 days after the battle for France had started. 7 days! Even de Gaulle, knew that “Continental” France was lost and wanted to keep fighting in North Africa. The battle for France was lost in a week.
And as Sal Ammoniac correctly states, France was surrounded and isolated. Italy had initiated hostilities on the 10th. Even thought he French were able to hold the front in the Southeast, it still meant almost 200.000 soldiers tied up on a secondary front. At that point, the French simply could not fight and hope to even salvage a draw against the Germans.
Could Vichy France have been less accommodating to the Germans? Certainly. But at that point, an armistice probably looked like the least despicable of the few available options to the French.