What do you think of the Chechens?

Sorry, the link doesn’t work. I get a Yahoo message “The file you are looking for is inassessible”. I’m not a Yahoo member. Do I have to “sign in” something?

Damn, it used to work for my committee members, and it worked for me just now! Try back a bit later; I’ll try changing the security settings. In the meantime, some linguistic clarification:

From the Chechen Dictionary and Phrasebook by Nicholas Awde (I bought mine at Borders, believe it or not, but you can find it online at http://ingush.narod.ru/chech/awde/):

Chechen
(person) Nokhcho
(adjective) Nokhchii(n)
(language) Nokhchii(n) mott

Also, my absolute favorite online bibliography of all things North Caucasian:

http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Enterprises/2493/circbibliog.html

and the bibliographer’s home page, with lots more interesting North Caucasian stuff on it:

http://www.geocities.com/Eureka/Enterprises/2493/

In the interests of fighting ignorance, of course…

From reading the FAQs, I think Yahoo! has changed how the Yahoo Briefcase works, such that non-Yahoo members may not be able to view files in the Briefcase. So you guys can likely set up a Yahoo account if you want to read my file, or if anyone has a suggestion on where else I can post the file for public viewing, I’m open to suggestions.

Wait…You trust Pravda? Jeez, you might as well trust the guy who rants on the street corner. Have you read any of their articles covering Afghanistan? According to them, the Taliban killed over 100 American special forces troops in combat, and that the bodies were shipped secretly back to the US in a cover-up.

Selectivity my friend, selectivity. I by no means trust any one source exclusively. But for domestic Russian news, Pravda is my main source.

And I do realize they love messing with casuality figures and whatnot, primarily I guess because Russian generals have pulled those stunts before, and their media figures everyone does it. Thats my theory, at least.

Brutus, RFE/RL quotes extensively from alternative Russian domestic media sources (all well-attributed, of course), many of them available online. I’m not sure which are in English, but if you can read Serbian, you ought to be able to puzzle through the Russian ones OK. I suggest you check them out and consider adding some more breadth to your source collection.

And yes, Pravda pretty much sucks. There’s a saying from Communist days in Russian; “nyet pravdy v isvestii, i nyet isvestii v Pravde,” Pravda (The Truth) and Izvestiya (The News) being the main two party newspapers; so “there’s no truth in The News, and there’s no news in Truth.”

I, for one, see a serious parallel between Russia’s activity in Chechnya and the US involvement in the Middle East. The US wants unchecked influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia wants the same in Chechnya. Intervention provokes fightback, which lets the respective major governments demonize the other country’s entire population by focusing on the most violent elements of the resistance and justify increased oppressive intervention. I find it completely disgusting.

Eva, some of the things you’re saying about yourself are setting little bells off in my head. This is a total left-field question, but did you ever make a completely unexpected discovery about your relatives while researching your family tree in Italy?

Well, I have nothing against left-field questions, and I’ve made lots of surprising discoveries about my family, but none of them have anything to do with Italy (so far, anyway). I’m pretty much your basic Central/Eastern European Jewish mutt.

Ah, you’re not who I thought you might be, then. I had a college buddy at Georgetown who was heavily into the Chechen issue - went over there for a while, as a matter of fact - and I thought you might be her. Worth a shot, anyway.

[/tangent]

Nope, I almost went to Georgetown for undergrad, but did my M.A. in Russian & East European Studies at Indiana U./Bloomington.

[bumped due to obvious and recent events]

To elaborate on and redirect the O.P somewhat, without losing everyone’s contributions thus far, what should the majority of Chechens (who are not terrorists but who probably want the Russians to leave them alone to run their own affairs to a greater or lesser extent) do to accomplish their goal of autonomy?

If you accept that terrorism on Russian soil is not a viable solution for moral and/or political reasons, what is left to the Chechens that might actually work, given the resources they have available to them? How can they gain what they have been promised by the Rssuains, and are due under international and Russian domestic law, even leaving aside the issue of complete independence? (They may sure be stubborn, but even I don’t think a Chechen state, with a population of about 1 million if all the dispersed Chechens came back to their homeland, would be politically viable.)

Hi, Eva Luna. You asked me a similar question in that other thread, but I think that I’ve formulated a slightly more coherent answer to this question:

After thinking about it for a little while, it seems to me that several things have to be done.

First, the Chechen people have to disassociate themselves from the extremely radical, terrorist element which was quite definitely responsible for the recent hostage incident. That means that they may need to cash in their current crop of spokespeople for new ones with a more moderate message. The message must be simple and oft-repeated: we seek to peacefully regain our right to self-determination. Experienced public relations experts may well be needed.

Second, that autonomy, and that commitment to a non-terrorist solution, has to be demonstrated. You can’t preach a peaceful message one day and have a rival faction blow up a school bus the next. Fortunately both can be demonstrated at once if the Chechens are willing to police themselves and isolate, turn over, kick out, or detain those rebels who are contemplating futher terrorist acts. The best way to gain autonomy is to practice it, and running out the radicals would be a good way to demonstrate it.

Third, if there really are legal guarantees and promises which are due the Chechens, then they must pursue those guarantees in some legal and political fashion. I don’t know anything about how to go about that, but it must be done. I suspect that the guarantees are predicated upon a requirement to demonstrate a lawful and orderly cooperation with the Russians, which takes you straight back to points one and two.

All three of those basic things have to happen more or less simultaneously. Off the top of my head I can’t think of a nation that won its independence without already demonstrating most of the elements required of a sovereign state. But most importantly, those elements must be demonstrated to the outside world, not exactly the simplest thing for a smallish nation tucked deep within the folds of the former Soviet Union.

Does that sound like a reasonable path to pursue, or is it too unrealistic given the long history, hard feelings, and current realities of the situation?

Well, I fear it may not be realistic. I’ll go back and check on some cites in my thesis, but in general the Russian Constitution states that it is subordinate to international treaties to which Russia is signatory, so maybe there is some hope there. How one addresses this issue as a practical matter, I have no idea.

Any international lawyers want to step in and fight some ignorance?

Another chunk of my thesis (I swear, the whole darn thing will be posted somewhere eventually), for the convenient reference of any passing international law expert…this should at least provide a starting point in terms of relevant law. (Sorry for the focus on language policy, because that’s the focus of my paper; this was the best quickie abstract I could provide. Other rights of ethnic minorities/indigenous peoples are generally laid out in the same places.) Commentary, anyone?

“In the realm of international law, the United Nations has promulgated several treaties, which Russia has ratified, with provisions relating to education rights in general and the native-language education rights of minority populations in particular. These include the Convention against Discrimination in Education (1962), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969), the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1982), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992). In addition, a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has been drafted (1994), but not yet passed or ratified by United Nations member states.

Some principles encoded in these treaties include that discrimination in education is a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that it is in all human beings’ interest to allow all people to enjoy civil and cultural rights, including self-determination (meaning, among other things, the right to freely pursue one’s social and cultural development); that all signatories “recognize the right of everyone to education;” that “any distinction…which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education” constitutes discrimination; that parties to the Convention should “discontinue any administrative practices which involve discrimination in education; that all people enjoy equality before the law regarding social and cultural rights, particularly education and training; that states have a responsibility to provide educational resources to all population groups on a nondiscriminatory basis and “tak[e] appropriate steps to remedy the handicaps from which certain racial or ethnic groups suffer with regard to their level of education and standard of living;” and that “it is essential to recognize the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or teaching of their own language.”

Many of the above rights are repeated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities. Several articles of these treaties provide more detailed descriptions of states’ responsibilities regarding the preservation of minority languages and cultures, declaring that “states shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity,” including the adoption of “appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.” <snip>

The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, if promulgated, would go even further to protect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples, establishing their right to redress for “any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities,” or “any form of assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways of life imposed on them by legislative, administrative or other measures.” In addition, the Draft Declaration provides that “indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture,…education,…[and] economic activities, as well as ways and means for financing these autonomous functions,” meaning “adequate financial and technical assistance, from States and through international cooperation, to pursue freely their political, economic, social, and spiritual development and for the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Declaration.”

In addition to Russia’s obligations under international law, the Constitution of the Russian Federation contains several provisions which protect educational rights of the entire population, as well as other specific rights of ethnic minorities. The most important of these provisions for the purpose of guaranteeing the cultural and political rights of minorities, given the current undeveloped state of Russian domestic legislation in this area, may be the guarantees contained in Articles 15 and 17 of the supremacy of international law and international agreements over the Russian Constitution, and in turn, of the Constitution over other Russian domestic laws. Regarding the relationship of international to Russian domestic law, Article 15, Section 4 of the Constitution states that “the commonly recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal system,” and that “if an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stipulated by [Russian] law, the rules of the international treaty shall apply.” Although this provision might not seem to incorporate principles of international law directly into the Russian legal system with the high level of authority of the Constitution, Article 17, Section 1 later states that “basic rights and liberties in conformity with the commonly recognized principles and norms of international law shall be recognized and guaranteed in the Russian Federation and under this Constitution.”

Furthermore, various articles of the Constitution which address specific rights and liberties of citizens of the Russian Federation mirror almost exactly the specific language of various United Nations treaties that were designed to guarantee similar basic rights. For example, Article 19, Section 2 states that “the state shall guarantee the equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership in public associations, or any other circumstance. Any restrictions on the rights of citizens on social, racial, national, linguistic, or religious grounds shall be forbidden.” This language nearly mirrors that of Article 2 of the United Nations International Declaration on Human Rights, which declares that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.”

<snip>

Although the Constitution, Law on Education, and Law on Languages contain many provisions ostensibly designed to ensure the development and preservation of indigenous languages of the Russian Federation other than Russian, there is no specific enforcement mechanism built into any of the three. Most relevant may be the lack of recourse available to citizens who feel that insufficient means (e.g. Federal, regional, or local budgetary funds) have been allocated to native-language instruction. The legal provision most closely resembling a funding enforcement mechanism is the last clause of the Law on Languages. Article 28 states that anyone who violates Russian Federation legislation on the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation will be subject to prosecution under the laws of the Russian Federation and those of the republics comprising the Russian Federation. If the Government of the Russian Federation does not comply with its own legislation, however, there may be no practical recourse for affected parties, whether they are private citizens, administrative subdivisions of the Russian Federation, or even federal government units such as the Education Ministry.”

*Originally posted by Eva Luna *

Eva Luna,

Maybe you could shed more light on the Chechan autonomy movement. My (very limited) understanding is that the current Russian/Chechen tensions (post USSR) stem from the attempts by the Chechens to achieve independence and the Russians subsequent crackdown on these attempts.

I’m curious as to whether elements in this Chechen movement (towards independence or autonomy) instigated the chain of violence or whether it was Russia’s “heavy-handed tactics” in trying to subvert/negate this movement. In other words, were the initial attempts by Chechens post-USSR peaceful and the Russians started playing “hardball”, so to speak, or did the Chechens (or elements associated with autonomy/independence) engage in violence that “forced” the Russians to crackdown. Or does the truth lie somewhere in between?

I bring this up in context of understanding why Russia may have used heavy-handed tactics (if that was indeed the case) in trying to subvert/negate Chechan independence/autonomy. My take is that if the Russians were to seriously consider their claims for more autonomy/independence, then what’s to stop all the other minority groups (Dagastanis, Inguestians, Karelians, Tatars, etc.) from doing likewise? If so, this could precipitate the further crumbling of the “Russian Empire”. I don’t think the Russians are currently equipped (politically and even possibly, psychologically) to deal with such a scenario.

As regards your (secretly held) suspicion that the Russian government knows more than it’s letting on about the apartment bombings, I’ve heard some reports tonight that Russian authorities have arrested 30 people in connection with the Moscow siege…

…including some police officers and advisors to the Putin administration!!!

Curiouser and curiouser (as Alice noted).

Well, I think it’s impossible to isolate the post-Soviet years, as Russian policy in Chechnya has essentially been a somewhat more violent version of the tail-end of Soviet policy in Chechnya, involving even some of the same political players. I also think that even if one acknowledges that a very small minority of Chechens have done anything violent at all, their capital has been leveled, and probably half of Chechens are internally displaced elsewhere in Chechnya, next door in Ingushetia, and to a lesser extent in neighboring Krasnodar Region in southern Russia (and throughout the rest of Russia). The nature and level of human rights abuses against innocent Chechen civilians on the part of the Russian military has been well-documented, and Chechens throughout Russia are discriminated against and generally treated like crap. (See sources listed above.)

If the Russians feel the need to punish a few violent Chechen rebels, they have so far done so largely by punishing their entire people, which has only resulted in a ridiculous level of escalation, the natural result of which we have all seen these past few days. There has been no sense of proportionality in Russian reactions to Chechen actions. And I fear there will be much more of the same to come, from both sides.

“Who started it?” will quickly become a circular discussion, unless one goes all the way back to the initial Russian conquest of the North Caucasus, but if you’re going to look at who has made the more egregious human rights violations, that title definitely goes to the Russian military, with Putin as commander in chief. Until last week, I’m not aware of any instance of Chechen militants targeting Russian civilians; even mothers of dead, kidnapped, or disappeared Russian soldiers who go to Chechnya in search of their sons have been treated with respect by the locals, by all accounts I’ve seen. The Russian military, OTOH, has deliberately targeted civilians for bribes, rape, disappearance (they’ve been known to round up the entire male population of villages, many of whom are then never again seen alive).

Perhaps this is because I just got home from a lecture by Kenneth Roth, the Director of Human Rights Watch, but every day I feel more and more that if people are treated with justice and humanity, they generally do not resort to violence when seeking solutions to real and/or perceived grievances. ANd IMHO the Chechens have some very real grievances (even leaving aside their original conquest during Imperial times, and their deportaiton to Kazakhstan/Siberia during WWII and loss of their ancestral lands at the hands of Stalinist resettlement policies, which are within the lifetime of many Chechens and/or their parents). The Russian government has been violating its own laws in its treatment of them, not to mention various international treaties to which the RF is signatory, as I have outlined above.

As to whether Chechnya will create a “domino effect” if Russia lets them go: well, they are located on Russia’s international border with Georgia, where most of the other groups you mention are surrounded on all sides by RF territory, so it’s a different situation. But maybe, just maybe, the Chechens wouldn’t want to leave in the first place if they weren’t being treated they way they are. Even 1 million people probably isn’t a viable independent nation these days, particularly if surrounded by hostile neighbors.

(And P.S.: the Dagestanis aren’t one single ethnic group; “Dagestan” literally means “Land of Mountains,” and those particular mountains are home to several dozen ethnic groups, numbering anywhere from a thousand or less to a couple of hundred thousand. Plus the Daghestanis haven’t shown any inclination to leave the RF, although there are a couple of ethnic groups that straddle the Dagestani/Azeri border, with families split between 2 countries after the breakup of the USSR, and those people probably wouldn’t mind being able to travel back and forth more easily.)

If you want a good general book to read on modern life in the North Caucasus, and how those wacky Caucasians got that way, I highly recommend Yo’av Karny’s Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus in Search of Memory. It’s out recently in paperback, and you can find it in any decent-sized bookstore. (Plus Karny’s a journalist, not a historian, so it’s very readable and won’t put you asleep; it abounds with some quite colorful characters, all of them real, believe it or not.)

OK, I must stop obsessing now and get some sleep. More later upon request.

*Originally posted by Eva Luna *

Eva Luna,

Thanks for the info - I’d have to agree that one needs to look at the history of the region to gain some perspective on what’s currently happening.

My “domino theory” scenario was, of course, pure speculation, but I posited it as a possible reason for understanding why the Russians have resorted to heavy-handed tactics towards the Chechens. I know historically that the Caucasus region has been somewhat a thorn in the side of the Russian Empire (and later the USSR). By dealing with the Chechens (a group that has historically caused problems for the Russians) harshly, it sends a clear message that Russia will not tolerate any trouble (perceived or actual) from other minority groups wanting more autonomy/independence.

Hopefully, someone more knowledgeable in Russian history can step in here to provide a better rationale than mine.

And you guys wonder why I’m depressed about prospects for peace in the RF, especially in Chechnya…here are some more snippets from today’s Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (all bolding mine) at www.rferl.org:

PUTIN: ARMY WILL PLAY GREATER ROLE IN FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
During a cabinet meeting on 28 October to discuss the recent hostage crisis in Moscow, President Putin said that Russia ** “is now paying the price for the weakness of the state and the consequences of its inaction [in the past], but the country will make no ‘understandings’ with terrorists nor surrender to their blackmail,” ** ITAR-TASS and other Russian news agencies reported. Putin also said Russia will more actively use its army to combat international terrorism and that he has already issued instructions to that effect to the General Staff. “If anyone uses weapons of mass destruction or the equivalent against our country, Russia will respond with measures commensurate with the threat wherever terrorists, the organizers of their crimes, and their ideological and financial supporters might be,” Putin said. Earlier this month, influential political consultant Gleb Pavlovskii wrote that the Kremlin considers suicide bombers to be a new type of weapon of mass destruction (see “RFE/RL Security and Terrorism Watch,” 15 October 2002). VY

EXPERTS DEBATE THE PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY SERVICES
An unidentified veteran of Israel’s elite antiterrorism squad told RFE/RL’s correspondent in Tel Aviv on 28 October that the special-forces operation to free the hostages was very successful because “never before in a single operation were so many hostages released and so many terrorists killed.” He emphasized that the antiterrorism units faced an extremely difficult task, having to seize a building filled with 2 tons of explosives scattered in more than 30 locations, RFE/RL’s Russian Service reported. He said any such operation resulting in fewer than 30 percent casualties should be considered a success. However, dissident former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Aleksandr Litvinenko, who was granted political asylum in Great Britain in 2001, said he sees the incident as a failure for the security services, RFE/RL’s Russian Service reported on 28 October. He said he believes ** the hostage takers could not have pulled off such a raid in the center of Moscow without important accomplices within the security community. Litvinenko also finds it significant that, reportedly, no police or security agents died during the theater takeover. He said there are almost always police present at events such as this performance. However, there are no reports that the Chechen fighters encountered any police as they approached the theater or that any police officers attempted to resist them **, Litvinenko said. VY

FSB ARRESTS INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICER WHO ALLEGEDLY HELPED THE HOSTAGE TAKERS
FSB agents on 28 October arrested a senior Interior Ministry officer who allegedly spoke by cellular phone to the hostage takers from the crisis-management headquarters during the hostage drama, “Izvestiya” reported on 28 October. An unidentified FSB spokesman is cited as reporting that the officer might have been able to reveal information about the preparation of the operation to storm the theater. The spokesman added that the FSB is looking for other possible moles within the law enforcement agencies. Moscow’s Interior Ministry reported on 28 October that three Chechens were arrested with weapons, explosives, and a plan of a Moscow railroad station, NTV reported. The Interior Ministry on 28 October also arrested in a Moscow hospital a Chechen woman who was among the released hostages, charging her with being one of the hostage takers, RTR reported. VY

CHECHEN PRESIDENT EXPRESSES CONDOLENCES TO DEAD HOSTAGES’ RELATIVES
In a statement carried on chechenpress.com on 26 October, Aslan Maskhadov expressed condolences to the relatives of those hostages who died during what he termed the “inglorious” and unnecessary storm of the Moscow theater by Russian troops earlier that day. Maskhadov again stressed that he condemns terror as a means to any end. He said that although the hostage taking was not carried out in consultation with any official Chechen body, and although “we did everything we could to avoid bloodshed,” as president he nonetheless feels responsibility “for those who in despair decided to sacrifice themselves.” But ** greater responsibility, Maskhadov continued, lies with the Russian leadership, whose barbaric policies have reduced thousands of Chechens to the conviction that there is no point in remaining alive. ** LF
I really must turn off my computer now, for my own sanity…

…but first, ** eponymous, ** of course that’s been one of the RF government’s justifications for their behavior all along. It has a certain internal consistency, but that doesn’t make it right. I still believe that if you empower people to a reasonable degree and treat them with respect, according to the rule of law, you’re a helluva lot less likely to have trouble with them, especially violent trouble. To me, it’s where morals meet political pragmatism.

I support Checnyan right to independence, but I dont support the groups who are using terrorist tactics.

The major problem is who would take over in Chechnya if the Russians pull out.