Heavy calvary was the specific reason why the phalanx returned in the rennaisance. It was quite effective at spitting horses and riders when the pikemen were well-trained and disciplined.
Cavalry.
Here’s how the wheels fell off the phalanx in 197 BC.
In fact, the Roman fighting style wasn’t all that different from the phalanx. Their weaponry may have been different - short swords and javelins instead of long spears - but they still fought in shoulder-to-shoulder in tight, disciplined formations. Just like the Greek hoplites, the Roman legions would lock their shields against the enemy’s charge, and so did most European armies in the early Middle Ages, all the way to Harold’s huscarls in the Battle of Hastings.
This particular question is considered in some depth by Polybius. In short, the flexibility of the maniple made it superior to the phalanx except on flat open ground, and you can always just decline to engage in the open.
Yeah, I did read about that. However, the wikipedia article suggested that the two formations’ roles were quite different, and I don’t have enough knowledge to comment on that.
I’m wondering what your source for this is, because John Keegan, in A History of Warfare specifically credits the Greeks and their use of Phalanx tactics with inventing the concept of a pitched battle where the purpose was to annihilate your enemy. This was in contrast to the shirmishing, individualized style of battle that had to that point typified Bronze Age combat.
Yes and no. The honest to God Greek phalanx, with interlocking shields, drilled footmen and whatnot died out pretty much around the time the Romans kicked their butts, as slaphead explained - the Roman formations were much more fluid, could reform very fast to exploit breaches along the line, and once said breach was made and exploited the phalanx became very brittle.
However, the spirit of the phalanx was “rediscovered” later on in different parts of Europe after the Dark Ages, in the form of pike hedgehogs, pike squares, schiltrons and the like, as an answer to the heavy horse which dominated the Early Middle Age battlefields. Horses don’t like pointy sticks in their face.
The renowned Swiss Pikemen and the way their tactics dominated battlefields during the Renaissance were, in essence, a revival of the phalanx - the Swiss drilled and trained so that they could actually mount charges while keeping a coherent pike formation, as opposed to the immobile defensive spear walls that had been used before them. That came as a shock to their opponents.
Then firearms got involved, and another sort of sorta phalanx appeared : the pike and shot Spanish Square (or Tercio). Half pikes, half muskets, all gory death. Which continued to win battles in one form or another (although pikes were eventually ditched for bayonets on the muskets) until the heavy use of better cannon and early machine guns made them completely obsolete. Standing in a close knit formations in front of a gatling gun ? Doesn’t work so well, or so I’m told.
I think by “annihilate” he means that once the opposing army was defeated, then the opposing side has lost. Wikipedia states that actual casualties were around the range of 5%, but often included the leaders and prominent citizens of the city. Armies back then were not composed of professional soldiers, so "warfare was limited to seasonal, relatively local and of low-intensity. Neither side could afford heavy casualties or sustained campaigns, so conflicts seem to have been resolved by single battles."
But Keegan quotes Victor Davis Hanson’s writings on ancient warfare specifically to form his thesis that ancient Greek hoplite warfare introduced the concept of “fighting to a decision” that was absent from “primitive” warfare. He characterizes the fighting as much higher in intensity than the “primitive” style, and describes hoplite defeats as potentially quite destructive of human life (although I agree “annihilate” is not what either historian means) and makes the point that “seasonal” was one of the factors making it decisive (the deisre to settle the war before planting time dispersed the soldiery)…pretty much the exact opposite of the analysis you quote from Wikipedia. It’s one of the central themes of the book, and quite heavily emphasized.
It could be wrong, mind you, but that’s what he’s trying to say.
Yes, the Swiss pike formations were only anti-cavalry as a byproduct. They used almost constant mobility to drive a mass of pikemen against any formation that would stand before them, often with startlingly effective results. Though shieldless, it was very phalanx-like. Mainly it was the development of effective missile weapons that negated this tactic.
Tight massed formations, with shields, if not spears, can be seen to be effective today, in riot police tactics. But they only work against foes without effective missile weapons.
That is interesting how the two sources are so different. I’ll lean towards Hanson’s conclusion for now.
In squaring the circle of VDH & Keegan, remember:
In the heyday of hoplite warfare pre-Peloponnesian War, Greek hoplite armies were formed for a brief period. They marched out, fought hard for an afternoon, and whichever army broke ranks first lost. They were bloody and horrifying at the moment, but they were short, and decisive-- you lost the battle, you lost the “war”.
When the Peloponnesian War shows up, you only have a small number of “classical” hoplite battles. Land-power Sparta just couldn’t force sea-power Athens to give battle. Still, even during those few battles, while none were decisive insofar as they won or lost the war that day, they featured the same pattern: short bloody clash, one line breaks and flees, casualties inflicted during the rout.
The phalanx was incredibly powerful, but also incredibly brittle. Once the line broke, that was pretty much it for the day. The difference between the pre-war days and the war itself is that the powers involved didn’t take the battles as decisive-- they were just a day’s work, more or less. As Hanson writes, during the war far more Greeks died in “non-traditional” warfare-- sieges, sea battles, light infantry/cavalry actions, plagues-- than did in hoplite battle.
An easy way to think of the hoplite during the Peloponnesian War is to think of them as the dreadnoughts during World War I-- the ultimate weapon, but one so valuable that you just couldn’t risk using (and possibly) losing them.
I seem to remember that the Greeks were very fond of the whole ‘leading from the front’ concept. If that’s the case then losing just the front row of your 16-row phalanx would take a pretty heavy toll on the guys who thought continuing the war would be a Neat Idea.
I’m not so sure that is correct. IIRC correctly the stereotypical phalanx was a spear-armed formation where every man used his shield to protect his left half and the right half of the man next to him, with a lot of pushing and shoving from the rear ranks to generate brute force, and no movement between ranks - very mutually dependent and pretty hopeless for close-up scrimmaging. Swords were mainly for emergency use. As davekhps says, it was very brittle and hard to re-form if it got disrupted.
The Roman formation was a sword-armed formation where each man was pretty much self-sufficient, usually with enough room to have some movement. Ranks were usually not in physical contact, and a key part of the drill was retreating/advancing through other ranks to put fresh soldiers into combat. Spears were used to disrupt the enemy prior to giving them a good close-range swording. It was very flexible and far more elastic in combat.
More specifically, a small patch of level ground suitable for phalanxing on surrounded by broken terrain to prevent flanking or withdrawal out of shock range - typical greek valley terrain, as you say.
If they were for some reason prevented from engaging on advantageous terms. When competent light units were able to engage phalanxes from distance, they tore them to pieces, as one would expect.
Front, back, sides doesn’t really make much difference. If the terrain allows avoidance of shock action, unsupported heavy infantry facing light units is usually in a world of hurt. Spartolus, Sphacteria, Aegitium etc. showed that phalangite without light screening forces could be pecked to death, just as Carrhae showed that Roman legions could not withstand an endless rain of arrows.