What if? - Battle of Jutland

[septimus]

I know zero about the Battle of Jutland but by chance happen to be reading a Wiki article on signals intelligence where that Battle is mentioned. I’ve underlined the part which seemed almost like a “punchline.”

In contrast, battles have been lost, or not fought, when senior commanders asked the traffic analysts and direction finders the wrong question. In World War I, someone at the admiralty knew a little too much detail about SIGINT without fully understanding it. He asked the analysts where call sign “DK” was located, which was that used by the German commander when in harbour.[2]. The analysts answered his question precisely, telling him that it was “in the Jade River”. Unfortunately the High Seas Fleet commander used a different identifier when at sea, going so far as to transfer the same wireless operator ashore so the messages from the harbour would sound the same. The misinformation was passed to Jellicoe commanding the British fleet, who acted accordingly and proceeded at a slower speed to preserve fuel. The battle of Jutland was eventually fought but its lateness in the day allowed the enemy to escape.

Jellicoe’s faith in cryptographic intelligence was also shaken by a decrypted report that placed the German cruiser SMS Regensburg near him, during the Battle of Jutland. It turned out that the navigator on the Ravensburg was off by 10 miles (16 km) in his position calculation. During Jutland, there was limited use of direction finding on fleet vessels, but most information came from shore stations. A whole string of messages were intercepted during the night indicating with high reliability how the German fleet intended to make good its escape, but the brief summary which was passed to Jellicoe failed to convince him of its accuracy in light of the other failures during the day.

[Jackmannii]

Communications seems to have been a real sticking point as far as naval actions were concerned. Accounts of Jutland make it sound very confused, especially at night with various fleet elements bumping into each other and no one knowing for sure what was going on (radar would have helped, but there wasn’t any). So I wonder if even a decisive, bold (reckless?) Beatty would have been able to get everyone together for a final assault on the High Seas Fleet at the right time.

[Cicero]

If the scouts (the battle cruisers) had kept the Grand Fleet informed of what the hell was going on, there may have been no night action. Of course it wasn’t confined to the battle cruisers, if Boyle on the Malaya had informed the Iron Duke of the HSF passing to the rear of the Grand Fleet Jellicoe may have been able to force a morning action (presuming he didn’t want to risk a night action).

[Sailboat]

@Lumpy

I thought the German fleet was what kept the British from launching an invasion of Germany by sea. Could Germany have relied solely on minefields and coastal batteries?

I think the major factor deterring the Brits from amphibious landings in Germany proper is the same one that deterred Eisenhower from trying it. Germany doesn’t have much coastline exposed to the North Sea, and what is there generally sucks for amphibious invaders. It’s just not a very vulnerable spot, and it’s easy to mass defenders in strong positions there, and because it’s not a large area, you can’t make a large landing elsewhere, catching the defenders by surprise.

That said, the whole area was heavily mined and patrolled by excellent fast torpedo boats. An amphibious invasion would have been a nightmare (whether it would have been a worse nightmare than, say, the Battle of the Somme, will be left to the reader’s imagination).

[Little_Nemo]

@Sailboat

whether it would have been a worse nightmare than, say, the Battle of the Somme, will be left to the reader’s imagination

A historical factoid: the British had more men killed in the first three days of the Battle of the Somme than they had in the entire twenty years of the Napoleonic Wars.

[Sailboat]

@Little_Nemo

A historical factoid: the British had more men killed in the first three days of the Battle of the Somme than they had in the entire twenty years of the Napoleonic Wars.

I was recently watching some BBC item with modern actors re-enacting the prelude to the Somme. Knowing what we know now, waiting for the whistles to blow was all but unbearable. That’s one of those moments in time I’d be drawn to if time travel were possible. Of course I wouldn’t actually be able to prevent it – no one person could have stopped that system, that giant machine, from making that inevitable, fatal mistake. If only someone could have.

[Cicero]

I know it is a bit off topic (well, a lot) but the Somme was a battle that Haig did not want to fight. He was forced into the timing and the place to take the pressure of the French at Verdun. I am no apologist for Haig, but I think he cops a lot of blame here that is not entirely warranted.

As for the loss of life, it was pointed out that when a single U boat sank the Hogue, Cressey and Aboukir in the one afternoon, the British lost more men than Nelson lost at Trafalgar.