The battle of the Jutland is to my knowledge the grand daddy of old-school dreadnought sea actions. No radar, no guided weapons (torpedoes had to be pre-set, no changing course after launching them) no airstrikes. Just guys with mechanical calculators doing math really quickly while other men use winches and muscles to load 12-14 inch shells.
But were there any battles fought this way before the Jutland? After the advent of HMS Dreadnought, but before Skaggerak?
There was one other naval battle, with pre-dreadnought vessels, that springs to mind; the Battle of Tsushima.
Russians on their way from the East of Russia, to participate in the Russo-Japanese war were engaged in another battle, that might not be up your alley, the Dogger Bank incident .
:smack: Meant to say too, they used pre-dreadnoughts, but the Japanese used them in the way later battleships would be used, lots of big guns, firing at long rang.
Yeah, Tsushima fits the bill. It was pre-dreadnought but post black-powder. I’d like to see the computers they used for calculating firing solutions. Probably very specialized slide-rule- type instruments.
Stationed at Tsingtao, China (hence the excellent pilsner type beer brewed there), the squadron was engaged by forces of the Royal Navy in two battles, Coronel (German victory) and Falkland Islands (British victory).
The squadron consisted of modern (but obviously still pre-dreadnought) armoured cruisers, with the British force at the Falklands battle led by the dreadnought battlecruisers HMS Invincible and HMS Inflexible.
I bought a couple books on this topic this last year. Some of the math is above my high school level algebra, but it is interesting reading about some of the challenges these folks had to overcome.
basically, the combat ranges had increased (by 1910) to a distance where you had to “lead” the target. (Shot traveling at 2000ft/min takes 15 seconds to travel 10000 yards, and a ship could travel 500 feet in that time.) This means you had to accurately predict the targets speed, course, distance, in relation to your own steaming and rolling. These mechanical aids were to help try to eliminate some of the mental gymnastics (which would be subject to combat stress) on the part of the fire control officer.
I have always wondered at the German behavior in the (unequal) contest. Von Spee’s light cruisers ( 8"guns) were bearing down on the Falklands islands-intent on a bit of pillage (they planned to shell the port of Stanley). Then, they spotted the British task force (Adm. Sturdee’s battleships, armed with 12" guns). So, the Germans reversed course, bu their doom was sealed (the British battleships were faster by about 5 knots). To my mind, the Germans should have attacked the British fleet (before they could get steam up); or (failing that) they should have scattered-with each ship taking a different course;perhaps a few would have escaped. As it were, Von Spee’s orce was persued by the British, and all but one ship were sunk. The British had spectacularly bad shooting-they fired off over 1200 shells, achieving about a 1% hit rate-but sank all but one of the enemy.
The big gun, in 1905, far outranged the ability to accurately hit with it. At the turn of the century, battlefleet gunnery practice was held at around 3000 to 5000 yards.
As torpedo range and accuracy improved, the battle ranges had to be pushed further and further out.
The Battles at the Falklands Islands, Dogger Bank, and Jutland were held at ranges (15k yards) that would have been thought incredible a mere 10 years earlier.
I’ve seen that mentioned as a side effect of the coriolis effect and the British gunners forgetting they were in the southern hemisphere, any truth to this?
How about the battles of Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba in the Spanish-American War? Or the battle of the Yalu River in 1894? The Chinese had two battleships in that action.
Of all the forces in the two Spanish-American War battles, only the Americans had battleships, and only at Santiago de Cuba.
The first Battle of Yalu River was an unmitigated disaster for the Chinese. The Japanese did not have any battleships, but the Chinese were undone by their own incompetence, inexperience and corruption. They managed to chase off the Japanese, but at the expense of greater loss of ships and life.
As noted, the Germans didn’t know that faster battle cruisers would be pursuing them. They were aware that a big gun ship was in port since it fired on their advance group (the ship in question turned out to be an old, beached pre-dreadnought, HMS Canopus) but not of the key members of the British squadron.
Had they attacked the port it’s been theorized they could have created havoc and done considerable damage before the British could have gotten out to engage them, but that’s essentially hindsight talking.
WW II featured more big-gun combats than we remember. I often see assertions that battleships “never fought each other” in WW II, as if the Bismarck never sailed or something. The naval fighting off Guadalcanal featured some real hammer-and-tongs gun duels, mostly at night; although much of that was conducted by cruisers and destroyers, there was pair of culminating battleship actions in November.
I mean, after his sinking of Adm. Cradock’s pathetic force, the British were out for revenge…but the South Atlantic is a big place-did Von Spee have any idea of who was after him?
As I said, he would have been better off to have bombarded Port Stanley while the British were in harbor-he might have managed to sink a few of the enemy.
I don’t know anything about the physical layout there. But specifically, if he rushed the harbor, could he have met the British coming out and perhaps sunk one across the channel or harbor mouth and bottled up the big battlecruisers? It seems like a long shot, but not as long as the running defeat in which he ultimately found himself.