Meant no disrespect, suh.
I was preparing to write a joke about how General Arthur MacArthur, senior, (grandfather of Douglas MacArthur), had he been in charge of the Union Army, would have aggressively advanced all through Texas, then been thrown back to the Mason-Dixon line by a massive Mexican counteroffensive, but it turns out Arthur senior wasn’t a military man, though his son and grandson were decorated generals.
It’s a good OP. Lee was famous for his ballsy, over the top, impossible, and absurd victories from inferior numbers. How would he have commanded from a position of strength?
I dare to say that he may have not done so well and could have possibly committed many of the blunders that the Union commanders did commit (Union attack at Fredericksburg=Lee’s Pickett’s Charge Attack)
He came from the same generation, though not class (West Point literally), as Grant, Sherman, and Thomas. Lee did not understand Total War. Grant and the others did, but it was a lesson lost until well into WWI. I’m not sure why European observers even showed up, as they didn’t learn anything.
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Grant was not the Army Commander during the Overland Campaign; it was Meade and that did cause a lot of problems
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The end result of the Overland Campaign was Lee pinned to Petesberg defending Richmond with his army not capable of much more except hanging on; yes I know about Early operations, but the fact is except for the odd spoilers, Lee’s ability to do anything but hold on wass destroyed.
And Lee never did anything likes Grants Vicksburg campaign, or even Chantanooga.
Sherman didn’t try to avoid Johnston, and didn’t need to. He attrited Johnston’s army quite effectively as a secondary goal. The Georgia campaign was about cutting off the Confederacy west of his line of march and ending the rebellion there, along with intimidating what remained of it. Johnston remained engaged with Sherman while on the retreat all the way to Savannah and up into North Carolina.
Good point about Grant understanding that Lee’s army was the objective, not Confederate territory, or he’d have taken Richmond much earlier than he did. But I’d suggest that the CSA’s only real chances to take Washington were earlier in the war - it was well-defended by the time Lee got anywhere near.
Or he did, and abhorred it rather than embrace it. He never had the forces to engage in it over a widespread area, anyway.
Looks like good reading for you here, Bryan. And here’s a better summary of Montreal’s role as the slave regime’s “second most important center of power in the Confederate organization, after their capital of Richmond in Virginia.” Fears of reprisal for proto-Canada’s pro-slaver role were, after all, one of the primary impeti for the formation of the Dominion, right?
Perhaps a more productive discussion might be not about some odd what-if about an experienced field commander being assigned to a small special-forces outfit in a rebel base, but about how the war would have proceeded if Britain and its colonies had not supported slavery with everything short of formal diplomatic recognition, instead of providing them with a land base in Canada and a blockade-running base in Bermuda. But that would be a different thread, and if it sincerely interests you at all, you can go start one.
I’m not sure what you mean by this. What, in particular, did Lee not understand that Grant did?
In any event, like an earlier poster said, Lee didn’t have the numerical strength to do anything like Grant did, so we really don’t know what Lee would have done from a position of strength.
I assume he meant Lee didn’t engage in infrastructure destruction, i.e. torching cities and “Sherman’s neckties” (i.e. deliberate destruction of railway lines). It might be noble and glorious and whatnot to face your enemy on the battlefield, but it turns out you actually win by disrupting his supply lines.
Grant was pulling the strings. Meade didn’t cover himself with glory, but it was Grant who ordered all of those frontal assaults.
Yes, but that was the strategic result. In purely tactical terms Lee never lost one of those major engagements and he surely bled the Union ( in an absolute, not relative sense ) more than he was bled. Which was all I was talking about.
Chancellorsville? Granted Lee never achieved as much from his tactical victories as Grant did. But I’ve already conceded that Grant was a better strategist ;). And you could argue that Lee was up against weak opposition and I wouldn’t really disagree. But Hooker was probably not much worse than Bragg.
Again, I’m not saying that Lee was a better general than Grant. IMHO he was not. I just don’t think Lee was obviously or easily outclassed as a tactician - that was Lee’s one decent strength.
That’s more accurate than what I said.
ETA: And it wouldn’t have done him any good, fighting on the defensive. His cavalry tore up its share of Union rail lines, though.
I agree with this assessment, despite the somewhat confusing construction “Granted Lee…” 
And the Hooker=Bragg comparison is interesting to think about – both started bold moves into enemy territory that stalled when the respective commanders ran out of ideas and found themselves passively awaiting attack.
Regarding the OP, I think Lee would indeed have won the war faster for the Union. Lincoln focused a lot of effort on trying to get his generals to advance against enemy weakness; Lee would have advanced against strength or weakness.
That said, it’s my feeling that a significant portion of the Southern mystique comes from the knowledge of enemy positions their cavalry advantage gave them. I think it’s illuminating to consider how quickly Confederate effectiveness and even willingness to take risks diminished whenever they lost the cavalry advantage. Lee’s worst moment, Pickett’s Charge, occurred expressly because he refused to maneuver around the flank while Stuart was unavailable, and specifically said as much when pressed by Longstreet (yes, Stuart had just returned before the charge itself, but at that point was unable to scout out the flank in time). And after the ascendancy of Federal cavalry, Lee never again took the offensive.
Meanwhile, Federal commanders operating during the period when their cavalry was routinely outclassed frequently stumbled, made wild guesses and poor estimates of troop strength and position, and missed opportunities. Later in the war, with much better scouting, they spent less time pondering unknowns and mounted several effective penetrations into Confederate territory.
Hence, Lee with Federal scouting might have been considerably less daring and aggressive than he was with his real-life early-war cavalry advantage.
I was in high school when I visited Gettysburg. They had a diorama of the battle and, during the lead up to Pickett’s Charge I got caught up in the moment and said, aloud, “Where the hell is Stuart? WHERE THE HELL IS STUART?” Much like Gen’l Lee, I suppose.
Chaperon wondered at the size of the trees in the cemetery. “They’re well fertilized,” I said.
Daughter considered attending the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Gettysburg. To me that’s still Seminary Ridge.
And that field is a long damned mile to cross. I don’t blame Pickett for doing his duty. God damn Bobby Lee for ordering it.
I never get over that feeling when I look at the copse of trees on Cemetery Hill from where Pickett began. Just to WALK it on a hot day you are a little spent. That’s without having your comrades blown to pieces beside you.
I had a buddy who had never been to Gettysburg take a trip up one weekend. His assessment upon returning: “What the fuck was Lee thinking!”
jtgain: Several years ago a historian named Thomas Carhart wrote a book entitled Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg and Why It Failed. He contends that Lee intended to have Stuart attack from the rear at the same time as Pickett’s charge as part of a three-pronged plan to destroy the Union forces. He maintains a small force under George Custer ruined this plan by delaying Stuart too long in a fierce cavalry battle and left Pickett hanging dry. According to Carhart’s book, Lee concealed the truth to protect Stuart’s reputation and prevent demoralization at home.
James McPherson, author of *The Battle Cry of Freedom *seems to endorse Carhart’s ideas, but they have been savaged by other historians. Forces under Custer did engage Stuart, though, so maybe Carhart was right. If so, that would explain why Lee, one of the greatest tacticians in American history, ordered such a charge.
There’s at least some truth to it. In 1863, the Union cavalry was put into a separate corp in the East, and started smacking the Confeds around the block. Custer was a ballsy son-of-a-gun, and himself stopped several Confederate attacks. Even without that, it’s unlikely that Lee’s attack would have worked. In fact, only a certain Union general’s crazy insistance on advancing to the high ground and nearly cutting himself of from the rest of the army gave Lee much of a chance.
Part of the reason Lee ordered the attack was that he seems to have believed his own press. The South by this time started to think he and his soldiers were invincible (forgetting the defensive advantages, the soul-crushing incompetence of McClellan, and all of the bloody defeats they suffered). Truth be told, Lee put himself in a no-win situation and imagined he could simply obliterate anything the North put into the field. He’s lucky that Meade didn’t have more time to adjust to the army, or he’d probably have been harried all the way back to Richmond and the war would have been over a year earlier. Lee’s strategic position was painfully vulnerable.
That was the contention back 40 years ago at the museum. And Custer captured my home of Charlottesville, VA. Popinjay wasn’t completely useless.
There’s an alternate history / time travel short story by George Alec Effinger, Everything but Honor, where Lee did fight for the Union, resulting in a swift and relatively bloodless victory, and the protagonist’s attempts to alter history which ended in disaster for him.