Letters from American Jews who moved there have said so. But don’t take their word for it. The following is an extensive summary of “the West Bank Story” from The Siege, a book written by an Irishman, Conor Cruise O’Brien (1986).
After the 1967 war, Jordan (Hussein) entered into a tacit adversarial partnership with Israel re the West Bank. At first, Hussein tried to work with the PLO ensconced in the East Bank. In 1973, Hussein was constrained to join with Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War against Israel. Arabs everywhere were elated by the war, seen as proving Israel’s vulnerability. The Arab Summit at Rabat in 1974 recognized the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Hussein was obliged to subscribe to this.
In early 1975, Jordan declared that merger of the two banks. To some, the eclipse of Hussein in the West Bank was complete. Exit Hussein. Enter the PLO. However, although the PLO controlled the rhetoric of West Bank politics, Hussein still had authority, quietly exercised, over many of the pragmatic aspects. The salaries of West Bank officials were paid by Jordan.
Under Israel rule after the 1967 war, between 1968 and 1980, the GNP of the West Bank increased at an average rate of 12 percent pa; the per capita GNP also increased by 10%. West Bank agriculture benefited greatl;y from the dependency. The total value of West Bank agricultural production rose from 114 million Israeli pounds in 1968 to 350 million in 1972.
West Bank Arabs began to commute to Israel to work. At the time this book was written, the percentage was 29-49 (depending upon whose figures you believe). These commuters said they preferred to commute because the Arab contractors have to be reminded 4 or 5 times to pay them. In both the West Bank and Gaza, inhabitants of refugee camps were fully employed in Israel, while retaining their refugee status and benefits (under the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East). Access to work in Israel made a dramatic difference to life in Gaza, in particular. A carnival scene reported by a TV journalist follows. To the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza, as to the Arabs of Israel proper, Jewish rule brought a significant degree of economic progress, better material conditions - including a 15 percent annual increase in wages - and benefits in the spheres of public health and education.
As the years of occupation lengthened, controversy over the West Bank came to be increasingly dominated by the question of the Jewish settlements. It was widely held that all such settlements were contrary to international law and the Geneva Convention, concerning the military government of terrirotry occupied in war. Israel responded that this was not equivalent to military occupation of a part of the territory of a sovereign state, since Jordanian sovereignty in the territory had never been internationally recognized.
The basic idea, during the years of Labor predominance over the West Bank - 1967-1977 - was one of limited but quite large-scale settlement, for strategic purposes. The “Allon Plan” was never officially adopted, but it became the basis for the settlements. This Plan proposed the incorporation into Israel of a strip 12-15 km wide along the western bank of the Jordan river and the western shores of the Dead Sea. (In this whole zone, the Arab population was quite small - about 20,000.) In this zone, rural and urban settlements were to be erected according to security necessities, as well as in East Jerusalem. The other main aspect of the Allon Plan was to avoid the permanent acquisition by Israel of large blocks of land densely populated by Arabs. The densely populated Arab areas were closed to Jewish settlement during this period (1967-1977). Begin and his Herut (later part of Likud) opposed withdrawal from any of the territories of Palestine conquered in the 1967 war.
In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Arab armies - to general astonishment - had achieved strategic surprise. The occupied territories gave Israel room for maneuver, and allowed it time to recover from the surprise. If Israel did not have those occupied territories, Hussein (who kept out of the 1973 war because of Israel’s strong positions along the Jordan) might have joined in the fray, and the strong Egyptian forces moving out of Sinai might have taken the IDF by surprise in the Negev insteaad of on the Suez canal. To many Israelis, it was this occupation that saved Israel in 1973 from military defeat, followed by the extermination of the Jewish population.
After the Yom Kippur War, many Israelis were not inclined to listen to anything the Labor politicians said. The Labor leaders were held responsible for the near defeat. Begin and his followers now had the public ear, and they resisted the return of any part of the occupied territories. Three events of 1974 deepened the sense of siege. In May, fedayeen kidnapped 90 Israeli school children at Ma’alot. In the subsequent rescue operation by Israeli forces, 20 of them were killed. The organizers were well-known Palestinian “moderates” who had been in dialogue with Israeli doves. In October, the Arab Summit at Rabat recognized the PLO - the confederation of fedayeen groupings - as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. And on November 13, Arafat, head of the PLO, received a standing ovation when he addressed the UN.
That’s the end of my summary, which discloses that the settlements were in sparsely populated places, until at least 1974, when the Likud took over the Israel government. The author then describes the Gush Emunim, a group of Jews who believed in squatting illegally in Arab-populated territory. It was the near defeat of Israel by the 1973 War combined with the kidnapping of the school children by “moderates” that was the cause of the hawkish ascendancy. So, at least for the first 10 years, the settlements were in sparsely populated areas, and if it weren’t for those settlements there probably would not be a Jewish Israel today.