Mine comes from my time in the Navy. I was a nuclear submarine junior officer.
I wasn’t a direct witness to every part of this screw up, but I was onboard at the time and read the final incident reports in the aftermath to learn exactly what happened in places I wasn’t there to see.
So we’re heading into a port in the Persian Gulf. It’s the middle of the night and we’re on the surface. We’re ahead of schedule, so we’re going very slowly (about 5 knots) towards the port. On a surfaced submarine, you have an Officer of the Deck (OOD) in charge of the boat (gives the orders to the helm to ‘drive’) on the bridge (with a junior watchstander, the Lookout), which is open-air on top of the Sail (the Sail of a submarine is the big protuberance upwards on top of the hull) of the sub. You also have the Contact Coordination team, which is in the Control Room and consists of the Contact Coordinator (CC), Fire Control technician of the watch (FTOW), and Sonar team – they are responsible, using the periscopes, radar, and sonar (and some other minor electronic systems), for keeping track of all the other ships on the surface to avoid collisions. Providing overall senior guidance and leadership is the Command Duty Officer (CDO), a senior officer watch-station only assigned when the Commanding Officer (CO) needs an uninterrupted night of sleep. In this case, the CDO was the Executive Officer (XO).
A few days before, the Commanding Officer was having a conversation with one of the Department Heads about the officer watchbill (the schedule that delineates which officers will be on watch as OOD, CC, and other watch-stations at all times). The Dept Head expressed concern about this particular night, saying that the assigned OOD (another Dept Head) was not a particularly strong OOD, and the assigned CC was a very junior officer with limited experience, and this would be a more difficult watch in the busy shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf at night – he suggested pairing up a weak OOD with an experienced CC, or vice versa. But the CO wanted his strongest officers to get a good night of sleep before the somewhat challenging evolution of pulling into port the next day, so he vetoed the Dept Head’s concerns.
So back to that night. We’re proceeding in port, on the surface, very slowly. A surfaced submarine is difficult to see at night because of our much smaller profile and reduced height of our Sail and masts. In the Control Room, the CC and the FTOW are alternating time on the periscope – and the FTOW, a junior young man, alerts the CC of a new contact on the horizon. He expresses concern that it may be heading towards us. The CC looks through the periscope at the contact and tells the XO (CDO) – but the XO looks through briefly and brushes it off, saying that the contact is on a parallel course and not heading for us. They inform the OOD but the CDO reports that the contact is of no concern. The radar operator is another very inexperienced watchstander and fails to notice that the contact is getting closer on the radar screen.
Minutes pass. The OOD and Lookout think the contact appears to be closing, and ask the CC and CDO for a recommended new course. They say “stand by”, and continue to look through the periscope. At this point, the OOD could have literally given nearly any order – turn right or left, speed up, or slow down, and that would have probably been enough to avoid a collision. But he did nothing – waiting for a recommendation from the CC and CDO, who for some reason never provided a recommendation. He finally gives an order to turn, but it’s too late – the contact, a 50-thousand-ton Turkish freighter, literally runs over us (waking me up with an incredible clatter and almost hurling me out of my bunk), such that the front of their hull is over the top of the back of ours, with our screw (propeller) tearing gouges out of the skin of the freighter. The officer that climbed up to the bridge to relieve the incompetent OOD later told me that the scene was so bizarre, and the freighter was so enormous, that it took several seconds for his mind to interpret what he was seeing – at first it just looked like some Picasso-esque amalgamation of metal and night-sky.
At this point we are in deadly peril – if the freighter sinks, it will almost certainly bring us down with it, and we have little time to properly rig the ship for submergence. To get us free, a senior enlisted engineering technician suggests that we release the air (and fill with water) in the aft Main Ballast Tanks – a maneuver usually reserved for submerging the ship, in the hope that this will lower the aft-end of the submarine beneath the hull of the freighter and allow us to get free. To aid this, all off-watch personnel are sent to the aft-end of the ship to assist in ballasting (using the weight of all of us, including me, to further push down the ass-end of the boat). This is extremely dangerous – the weight of personnel and the water in the aft Main Ballast Tanks could sink us if not done carefully.
But it works, and we got free.
And a bunch of officers got fired in the aftermath – including the CO, XO, and the OOD at the time. They were mostly hated and the crew was glad to see them go. In my view, the OOD was entirely incompetent, the XO was partially incompetent, and the CO was competent but an asshole with poor people skills.