“Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.” – Arthur Schopenhauer
I think that’s still the best assessment of the issue. If you intend for ‘freedom’ to mean the freedom to do what you will, the freedom from coercion, from duress prompting you to do against your will, then you have free will in that sense – most arguments for compatibilism (that I know) are in some way of this kind; however, if you intend for ‘freedom’ to mean something which is not determined by prior cause, something’s being left to a choice that itself is free, i.e. not merely a consequence of some decision procedure (for instance: chocolate tastes better to me than broccoli, so I’ll eat broccoli), then you run into problems.
Most people intuitively feel their will to be free, however, which means the idea ought to be given at least some consideration; though, looking at things in a slightly more detailed way, it seems almost like there’s not much grounds for this belief, as most things going on in our heads are decidedly unfree – for instance, you don’t get a choice whether or not you laugh at something you find funny; circumstances do play a role, however, and if you expect a joke, you might prime yourself in such a way as to be able to keep a straight face, but in general, you simply either laugh or not. Dreams are similar – you don’t decide on their contents (lucid ones excepted), and often enough, your own actions in them will feel distinctly unfree. Thoughts, even: you don’t choose a thought to think before you think it – how would that be possible, after all? --, thinking just kind of happens. Sexual (or even non-sexual) attraction, favourite meals or colours, what music you like, even whether you believe in a god or not – the list of decidedly unfree choices ‘forced upon us’ seems to go on and on; those instances where choices actually are the product of deliberation (Am I going to have another beer? Will I really submit these ramblings?) almost seem negligible in comparison. And even then, you can watch yourself weighing up the relative merits of both alternatives up against each other – I’d really like another beer; I’ve got to get up early in the morning – to reach a decision. That’s not freedom, that’s an algorithm!
So, not only does free will seem logically a bit inconsistent; it turns out, after having a good, hard look, we’ve got precious little reason to suspect we had it in the first place!
Sorry for rambling, by the way, but I had no choice; I am going to get another beer, though.