What will South Sudanese independence mean for the region?

Great Debates
1

As asked in the title - what will an independent South Sudan mean for the region? For that matter, what will it mean for the people of South Sudan?

For myself, my barely-educated guess is that independence will be remarkably anticlimactic. South Sudan has been effectively (though not legally) independent for years now. It’s landlocked, thus unlikely to become a major trading power. For that matter, it doesn’t even have the internal transportation infrastructure to move goods readily within its own borders - which is also going to be a real problem for effective governance. Finally, literacy rates are low enough that it’s unlikely we’ll see the emergance of a large South Sudanese middle class in the short or medium term.

There’s a chance Khartoum will start a war, of course, but I think that’s unlikely. Not that Bashir would have any moral qualms - the man’s a monster - but because he isn’t in a position to wage a war without bringing the international community down on his neck.

So, as much as it’s nice to see the people of South Sudan will shortly be free forever of their disastrous union with Sudan - I don’t think anything will change very much in the region, and I don’t think things will change very much for the South Sudanese people. The country will continue to be very large, very poor, and very difficult to govern or develop.

Thoughts?

2

I wish I knew. I don’t even know why the thugs in Khartoum are letting the vote go forward - I’d have thought they’d want to hold the country together no matter what. They’ve stooped at nothing to get their way before.

3

The only likely changes are:

  1. South Sudan will get money through some negotiated payment scheme for piping their oil through North Sudan, or major oil companies will invest in South Sudan to build a new pipeline that doesn’t go through there.
  2. Tons of refugees from Darfur will flood the South.
4

Elendil’s Heir:

Isn’t this part of the peace agreement that ended the civil war? Clearly, the war was costing the Khartoum government more than it was willing to continue spending.

5

It may have some long term effects on other African nations. Despite African nations always complaining about the artificial boundaries the European colonial nations drew, the nations always maintained no changes in boundaries.

Eritrea was the first change to an African nation boundaries. If South Sudan does become independent and recognized, it may pave the way for recognition for Somaliland. And if that goes through other areas of Africa may seek to go their own way and become independent.

We already have the semi-precident of Kosovo and unilateral independence so this may also tie into independence movements.

6

I was under the impression that Southern Sudan had some pretty major oil resources. Is that not the case?

7

What about the White Nile?

8

As an student of African development, I’m really not sure what to think about this.

On one hand, it is very clear that the South and the North cannot coexist. There is and always has been nothing to unite them, and by now the whole relationship is hopelessly stained by violence. I am happy to see the people of both sides getting closer to the dream of self-determination.

On the other hand, I worry a lot about the precedence. There are a dozen countries with nearly the exact same North-South divide. There are countless of quite-well-justified independence movements all over Africa. After independence, the new leaders of Africa decided quite consciously to go with the boundaries they had, difficult and arbitrary as they may be. The alternative- squabbling over every resource, infinite ethnic divisions, limitless potential for discontent- was not worth it. There was no way to be “fair” left. So they decided to set out and create new nations, that would have to develop their own new identities in the modern world. It was the only real option. Since then, those boundaries have been sacred (Eritrea has some weak justifications for why it isn’t violating that.)

If we start to question this, we open up a big, big can of worms. Almost every country in Africa has a similar problem. Everyone can justify separating. Will any good come of countries disintegrating piecemeal into small ethnic states? Africa needs more unity, not less. Africa needs more people worrying about how they can make their country work, rather than how they can stop being that country.

Of course I also wonder about South Sudan. It’s problems do not begin and end with the North. It’s poor for dozens of reasons, none of which will get fixed by the split. The underlying problems are still there.

Finally. I worry about the future of Islam in Africa. Right now, most of Islamic Sub-Saharan Africa practices a rather accepting, laid-back form of Islam. Religious radicalism is a fairly new thing in most places. I worry that we are starting to define Africa as a continent with an “Islam problem.” And by defining things, we have a way of making them real. As we start positioning what were formerly thugs and warlords who happened to be Muslim as Islamic fundamentalists, they will rise to the challenge. As we frame Africa’s conflicts in religious terms, they will turn into religious conflicts. The mythical “Al Qaeda in the desert” doesn’t exist yet, but I firmly believe that if you name it, it will come. I worry that the way everyone is positioning these conflicts is simply going to make previously hazy boundaries “real” and significant in a way that they were not before. This is creating a “place” for fundamentalist Islam, and I worry about it.

It does, but oil resources in many cases do not equal development. Indeed, oil can often work against development- it provides strong incentives for corruption, and can allow leaders to buy enough weapons and control that they are no longer accountable to their people. A rich dictator is worse than a poor one.

9

all we can do is guess on and on what will happen, since their is so many possibilities that no absolute context can be reached right now

10

IMO the biggest immediate hot-points comes from intermediate areas like Abyei.

In the case of Abyei: it located on the border, it is oil-rich, both sides want the area, it has a mix of both Southern/Northern peoples, there has been both recent and historical fighting there and it is set for it’s own polls later in the year. However, the polls were delayed due to disagreements on who can vote (since the Arab tribes are nomadic this complicates residency). This is a recipe for violent confrontation; one side (or locals who lost the vote) could deem it legitimate. A skirmish could break out and the north could send in troops to restore order… I haven’t even started to think about issue of freedom of cross-border movement for the various nomadic tribes straddling the border.

Long term…South Sudan might break into complete civil war. This is a (soon-to-be)country that was united in one thing, expelling the Northerner army. There is strong regional/ethnic animosity within this state. What is the power structure? How is power going to be shared? Is it going to be a strictly SPLM show? What other political parties are there? Is this new federal government strong enough to “lay down the law” the next time there is a violent Dinka/Nuer clash? Will it be legitimate enough?

I am reeling from all the angles here. Sooner or later this will turn messy, but the question here is how the main actors (Bashir, Kiir, etc) will deal with these serious and real problems.

11

If South Sudan ends up stable, I think we might begin to see at least some effects from the diaspora – some returning, some sending back hard currency – and that this will be a net small but positive effect on the newly autonomous region/country. This in turn might lead to a lessening of problems like literacy as some of those resources translate to increased educational opportunities.

12

Better than nothing, but woefully inadequate for a national transportation infrastructure.

Thanks for your thoughtful post, even sven. :slight_smile: I agree with a lot of your points - in particular, that a broader movement towards the breakup of African states along ethnic lines could be disastrous. However, I do think there’s an additional nuance here: South Sudan has a much better shot at developing a functional democracy than the North. I wouldn’t say its odds are great - African independence movements traditionally haven’t been all that good at tolerating democratic opposition once in power. But unlike the North, there isn’t a dictatorship yet, there are powerful and organized actors (domestic and international) pushing hard for democracy, and the people are already used to free and fair polls. (As in this referendum.) I think that in some cases, breaking up African states could weaken dictators and strengthen democratic development.

Of course, Eritrea’s a fine counter-example. Ethiopia’s never been a bastion of democratic goodness, but Eritrea is worse in a lot of ways.

13

I’ve always felt that there should be greater unity in Sub-Saharan Africa, but distancing the region from the Arab-Islamic oriented North is a necessary step.

All the complications you point out are real concerns, but so is the threat of dominance from the North.

14

I absolutely believe that democracy is an essential goal, but democracy on it’s own is not a magic bullet. Even if South Sudan manages to put together a democracy, there is no reason believe that will lead to many improvements. Africa is full of reasonably democratic states that are desperately poor, rife with divisions, and riddled with corruption. Indeed in some cases democracy can even make things worse, as a democratically elected dictator has a larger mandate than one that nobody likes.

Nor am I convinced that Western interest is automatically a good thing. There is no question that our interests begin and end in oil, and the government we push for will be whichever one suits our commodity interests best. Remember, we are best buddies with Equatorial Guinea. If South Sudan became like Equatorial Guinea (among the world’s most unjust states) we might object, but probably not too loudly.

I’m not going to say the breakup was a bad thing- time will only tell. But I think this period calls for some solemn examination rather than jubilant celebration. South Sudan has a big project ahead of them, and about a million new ways to go awry.

I also wonder about the rest of Sudan. Sure, the leaders do not deserve much concern, but the people do. What are it’s prospects? How can the North also take control of it’s destiny?

15

I agree with you that democracy is no panacea, and illiberal democracies can be worse than many autocratic states. I should have said that South Sudan has improved its odds at enjoying liberal, constitutional democracy by gaining independence. But as you say, it could still very easily go horribly, nightmarishly wrong.

I do think it’s unlikely that South Sudan will go as badly wrong as Equatorial Guinea, though - in large part, because we have Equatorial Guinea as an example. No one wants that to happen in South Sudan, and it’s likely that assistance in developing the oilfields will be at least partially contingent upon the government taking steps to ensure that doesn’t happen. (Even China, which is famously willing to engage with anybody regardless of political system, would surely prefer working with an honest and functional state to working with an inept kleptocracy). South Sudan’s blank political slate probably affords it some protection from the very worst outcomes.

As for the rest of Sudan - I agree, it’s a shame they still need to live under that bastard Bashir. It’s possible South Sudanese independence will weaken him, but (a) it’s unlikely, and (b) if it did lead to his ouster, he’d probably be replaced by someone equally unpleasant. The problem is that, unlike in South Sudan, there really isn’t much in the way of democratic institutions - there isn’t even a real democratic opposition that would be in any position to govern.

16

I don’t know. When the World Bank funded the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, people were very hopeful about the way the oil revenues were set up to benefit Chad. They had a system to ensure that X percent gets spent on essential social services, and a fund to ease the transition when the oil fields dried up. It was widely celebrated as a new era in African commodity-based economies- one with accountability and systems in place get the money back to the people.

What actually happened is Chad immediately told the World Bank to screw off, declared the military to be an “essential social service” and funneled much of the oil revenue into weapons. Despite all the planning and hope, the pipeline nearly completely failed to improve any ordinary Chadian’s life. Despite all this, France (among others) still provides pretty direct support to the Chadian president- including occasionally playing an active military role in fight off the many coup attempts.

The best intentions in the world can’t change the fact that the guy with the hand on the tap calls the shots, and in the end it’s probably worth it to you to support him no matter how much you don’t like him.

As for China, I’ve come around to see China as a good influence overall. China provides Western Aid with some competition, which increases it’s accountability. And China is willing to do the one thing we never did, and probably the only thing that will help- start businesses. That said, I’m not sure China would rather work with an open democracy. It’s cheaper to pay one kleptocrat off rather than sharing the wealth with an entire country. It’s a lot easier to cut a favorable deal with one big man than a democratic populace.

17

Heh. You know, I actually read about the Chad-Camaroon pipeline in college - that’s precisely the sort of thing I was thinking of when I mentioned the international community insisting upon safeguards before funding oil development. Disappointing to see that this model didn’t work.

I would point out, though, that the failure of the Chadian project raises an interesting point: It can, in fact, be very difficult to do development work contingent upon the consent of one solitary kleptocrat. At least in the medium term, democracies can be more predictable partners - their policies can shift, but very rarely on a dime, and very rarely by surprise.

18

Wait…so now it’s the outside world’s fault if radical Islam rises in Africa? ( And it turns out it’s no longer true that the supposedly destructive post-colonial “artificial borders” created by the West should not be balkanized after all?)

The one common theme among so many liberal Westerners analyzing Africa is that everything is someone else’s fault and the citizens are hapless puppets with no ability to direct their own decisions. My inexpert observation as a recreational student of humankind is that that’s very destructive thinking.

Anyway, back to Sudan: I agree with Orcenio. Who is going to control Abyei, and how will that be decided? At minimum the North is going to use specifics around it as a playing card to leverage control of the oil there. And without those oil revenues, the South loses something like half its income, as I recall.

Nice article in the Financial Times over the weekend about Sudan. It kept waffling between hope and despair, in my opinion.

Were I to make a prediction it would be that petty wars and tyrants and corruption will continue to be the order of the day, along with a substantial dependence on the outside world (which will, in turn, be blamed for not fixing all the problems).

I don’t think China is going to be a kinder and gentler Master than were the European powers. China is in Africa for China. I predict Africa will get the short end of any stick.

I hope my predictions are wrong.

19

Actually, what even sven is saying is pretty darned unremarkable. Consider what happened during the Cold War - lo and behold, wherever the United States backed a national government (even if its wasn’t that ideologically committeed), the Soviets would back an avowedly Marxist insurgency. And, of course, vice-versa. People who want power and aren’t particularly scrupulous about how they get it will play into whatever roles they think are likely to get them backing from powerful outside players.

It’s not implausible that someone who wants to seize power in an African state will think that either radicalizing their people into an Islamist insurgency, or (if already in power) portraying their opponents as Islamists is a fine way to get outside support.

It’s not that it’s the world’s fault - but it’s naive to suggest that what the rest of the world does can’t have a real impact on African politics.

20

Truth is, I can’t figure out exactly what sven is saying, other than that if radical Islam takes root in Africa, it’s the West’s fault for somehow either labeling a thug an Islamic extremist (apparently that makes him really want to become a fervent Muslim extremist) or else nebulously “naming” something into existence.

I object on two counts: First, that calling someone an Islamic extremist somehow makes him one. It’s Being an Islamic extremist that makes him one. But of course when your world-view wants to make excuses for every bad behaviour out there, there must be some sort of blame assigned to the powerful. It can’t just be either the religion or the guy who follows it being an extremist. The second objection I have is the assignment of Africa’s problems to the outside world in general. In Sudan, in particular, the two million dead in their civil wars have been killed by fellow Sudanese, butchering in the name of everything they feel like naming to be sure, but still Sudanese. At some point, eventually, if African nations are to prosper, they are going to have to take responsibility for themselves. I find the attitude that they are permanent victims of history to be very patronizing.