What would have been required to win in Vietnam?

I heard that the Tet Offensive was a military failure but political success, as it scared the US citizens back home into thinking we were not in the dominant position that the politicians claimed we were in. Support turned against the war and we lost.

Is it really that simple though?

If the perception of the war hadn’t turned, would we have just been a few months or perhaps a couple more years away from military victory?

And if so, would we expect a modern-day Vietnam to look similar to a modern-day Taiwan? Or would the situation still be complex postwar?

We would still be there defending a line defined by a ceasefire like we are in South Korea. That was the only “victory” possible unless we were willing to take on China and Russia. For Vietnam the best possible outcome was for foreign powers to get out even though there was a blood bath after we left. There were no good options.

Since there’s no simple factual answer to this, let’s move it to Great Debates.

Colibri
General Questions Moderator

Side question; I know that the military always has a plan for nuking almost literally any location in any scenario. But how seriously did we ever think about nuking the north?

If the media hadn’t falsely portrayed the Tet Offensive (a Viet Cong defeat) as a Viet Cong victory, and then the United States pressed forward with unrestrained, overwhelming conventional means, the North’s back could have been broken.

IIRC there was a plan in place to use nuclear weapons on VM positions in DBP in order to relieve the beseiged French forces in…1954?

Later on during US involvement, I seem to recall that Nixon sought options for nuclear strikes to end the war quickly, but he and Kissinger ultimately rejected the idea for fear of escalation with the USSR and PRC.

But that’s coming out of my ass. I’ll see if I have time this afternoon to do some more research.

While the US lost the war, it won the peace. Today, Vietnam is one of the most pro-American countries in Asia.

Cite?

That begs the question; you assume that an “unrestrained, overwhelming conventional” operation was feasible or even possible.

You’ve got this wrong: prior to Tet US politicians and generals had been selling the US public the line that we could see the light at the end of the tunnel, that the enemy was being defeated and that the end wasn’t that far off. General Westmoreland, the commander of MACV made the unfortunate claim:

Little over two months after stating the communists were incapable of mounting a major offensive, they launched, by surprise, the largest and most coordinated offensive of the war so far, and in the aftermath Westmoreland was asking for 100,000 more men to be sent to Vietnam in addition to the 550,000 already there. Tet didn’t scare US citizens into thinking we weren’t in the dominant position that we were in, while militarily a failure it rather brazenly demonstrated that the dominant position the US public was being told we had was entirely untrue. The US was not months away from winning the war; it wasn’t a couple of years away from winning the war. It was nowhere near winning the war, and US public perceptions one way or the other were not going to change that basic fact. What Tet did for US public perceptions was reveal that the narrative being sold that the end of the war was months or a couple of years away was a lie.

The only way the South Vietnamese government was going to remain in power was with a US army fighting an unwinnable war to keep it in power. The war was not going to end until Saigon fell, and Saigon was going to fall within a couple of years of the US leaving. The US could have stayed in Vietnam another decade and the end result would have been the same. The entire US strategy for the war was one of attrition with the assumption that there would be a cost in casualties that we could inflict upon the VC/NVA that they would not be able to tolerate and which would break them. As a professor of mine, a retired Marine captain who spent two tours in Vietnam said though, attrition isn’t a strategy; it’s the absence of a strategy.

What an odd interpretation of “winning.” In your definition, the US could have never gotten involved and it would still have “won the peace.” :dubious:

I’m currently reading Embers of War and the first half of the book details how Ho Chi Minh initially sought US assistance in gaining independence from the French (in fact, Ho Chi Minh attempted to meet with Woodrow Wilson as early as 1919 at Versailles). The US could easily have backed the Viet Minh, but we were hoodwinked by the French, who, in a political stroke of genius, turned the issue of colonial independence (which the US initially supported after WWII) into one that the paranoid American population was more easily manipulated by: the threat of global communism.

The American decision not to back Ho Chi Minh is even more notable because there were questions early on (even from Joseph Stalin) as to whether he was a bona fide communist or whether he was a nationalist taking advantage of a popular movement in order to gain independence from the French. In an alternate world the US could have backed the nationalist movement and prevented the war.

A completely different mindset and political reality. Basically, you’d need to define what winning actually was, then come up with a plan of action and strategy/tactics to move towards that goal. Is having a unified Vietnam the goal and definition of victory? How about having a politically stable and economically successful South Vietnam a la South Korea? What WAS the goal, exactly? No idea…and, that’s the problem. The folks at the time didn’t really have one, instead they were reacting and making things up as they went along. Which is why we failed on all levels, despite basically winning all the military battles.

Tet was a military disaster for the North Vietnamese. Pretty much every historian is going to tell you that. It destroyed much of what the North Vietnamese had been building wrt their local (in the south) military capabilities and cadres in one stroke and would have set them back a decade or more militarily.

Except…that it was a huge political victory, especially wrt the US. For years the US public had been told that victory was in sight and the North Vietnamese and home grown Viet Cong were on the brink of losing. And then Tet happens all over South Vietnam. It was a total shock to the American public (as it was to the military and South Vietnamese military/public), and it really drove home to the American public that the war was ‘un-winnable’. The thing about war, especially war where a democracy such as the US is involved, is that public perception is everything. The US public doesn’t like long, drawn out wars where the goals are nebulous and victory is undefined. What the US public likes is the first Gulf War, where there are clearly defined goals (and bad guys), there is a build up and the war is pretty much over by Christmas. We will do something like Gulf War II and put up with it for a time, but eventually public confidence goes down if there is no end in sight. And that point was reached when Tet shocked our collective system.

No way. We’d have just ground on for year after year. Again, it’s all about defining goals and what victory actually means, and we never did that. Had Tet never happened, it would have been a slow, gradual decay of confidence instead of a shock, but in the end I doubt we’d have won in Vietnam, since what winning meant was never defined. At best what we’d have done was to stave off a Vietnamese unification in a similar manner to what we have in Korea today, with a North Vietnam being, perhaps, the same sort of perpetual festering sore that North Korea is. I suppose that would be winning at some level, but honestly what actually happened is probably closer to victory than that would have been.

Doubtful, though South Korea is certainly an admirable model for what could have been. The trouble was the South Vietnamese government and system were extremely corrupt, and they would have basically needed to have a popular uprising that overthrew that system and brought in a truly representative and non-corrupt government to replace it. Not sure that would have or could have happened with how things were, especially with the North Vietnamese and Soviets and Chinese feeding a perpetual insurgency.

Yeah, but then the US would have made enemies of the French which would have been devastating to… um… something or other, certainly.

You’re professor is right. It wasn’t a strategy. However, it wasn’t the military that came up with that non-strategy. That non-strategy came from the WH. The military carry out the WH objectives to the best of their ability.

In the beginning, the Truman WH loaned money to France so they could buy U.S. weapons in order to retake control of their lost colony. The Eisenhower WH then sent 900 “advisors” to help the South. The Kennedy WH upped the number of “advisors” to some 17,000 and looked the other way when those “advisors” actually engaged in combat missions along side the ARVN. Both sides then settled into a it’s-not-a-REAL-war of attrition.

I believe that if the U.S. military had not fought under the politically controlled rules of a Korean non-war-style conflict and had fought under WWII-style objectives, North Vietnam would have been easily beaten and the U.S. would have been at war with China.

Vietnam was a civil war. Equipment and actual advisors are all that the U.S. should have supplied.

In my opinion: not a chance.

“Victory” would have required nothing short of planting the Stars and Stripes firmly in Hanoi and then praying that China doesn’t get involved like it did in Korea.

What was necessary for ‘victory’ was a competent, popular, South Vietnamese government.
Everything else is mere detail.

My father sat on alert after the election, with nukes on his plane to deliver in case Nixon and Kissinger would have gone for one of those options. He neglected to turn in his gold visor when he left the Air Force (the gold visor would supposedly protect the eye from the nuclear flash). Example here of what we have: Flightgear On-Line, the website for the collector of military flightgear

So one bit of anonymous anecdotal support of your post!

As for winning Vietnam - we didn’t fight a war, we fought a police action. So all of our great strengths were never really leveraged (control of the air, sea, ability to destroy most anything from a distance, etc.). Of course, we also didn’t want to kick off WWIII either. So when we shot (back?) at a Soviet transport in Hanoi Harbor - we held a military trial. Covered and discussed in Thud Ridge and Going Downtown by the recently deceased Jack Broughton.

I am NOT saying we could have won (without a different definition of winning), but that we did not fight to control.

Coulda fooled us :rolleyes:

It was already a bit late for that, China was already in Hanoi, and unlike Korea in 1950 this time China had the bomb. ~320,000 Chinese troops served in North Vietnam in construction and anti-aircraft units. From China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69, (warning, .pdf):

We would have had to conquer North Viet Nam, not just try to kick them out of South Viet Nam. Or we could have done what we promised, and supplied arms to the South Vietnamese after we pulled out.

But we didn’t, so we got the boat people and the killing fields and Pol Pot.

Regards,
Shodan

Exactly, some people seem to think in this thread that it was the US military who needed to win the war in Vietnam, it wasn’t, it was the ARVN and the Southern Vietnamese leadership who needed to win it.

When the US went in full scale in '65, the ARVN were on the verge of collapse, this being after nearly a decade of training and advice by the US.