70,000 Afghan soldiers and police officers have died since the US invasion. For a bunch of yellow-bellies a lot of people sure put themselves in harms way.
So perhaps the difference here is that the US pull out was quite quick and the Afghan forces had relied a lot on the support and resources, such that chaos ensued as soon as the Americans withdrew. Note that I am not suggesting that the blame goes entirely on the US; there was widespread corruption and anyone in a position of power in Afghanistan should have been working to build an entirely self-standing military force ASAP.
Just pushing back against the “gutless” rhetoric that I’ve seen elsewhere and hinted at in this thread.
ETA: Like I say, I know this topic in particular was going to fly off on a tangent but felt I needed to respond to this particular narrative.
I agree that I don’t think we can simply call the Afghan troops “gutless.”
The Poles knew from their long history what their nation being conquered would mean. Most Afghans, on the other hand, don’t have much of a national identity, and I’m not sure we could simply impose one in a single generation. Given that tribal village life probably wouldn’t change much for most soldiers regardless of who is in charge in Kabul, what do they have to fight for?
I’m pretty sure you can learn more than one lesson per war.
This should have been learned in the Boer War, the American Civil War, and the Russian-Japanese War, all of which featured machine guns (or gatling guns). The Russians might not have learned that lesson (or did not demonstrate that they had failed to learn that lesson) because I don’t believe the Eastern Front involved trench warfare. Correct me if I’m wrong. But the British fought in the Boer War so they had to know about machine gun warfare.
The lesson was forgotten by the 2001 Afghanistan war. There must have been a least a few Vietnam War vets planning the campaign.
France (and Britain) should have learned the opposite lesson. The United States had given them clear warnings that they would not support an Anglo-French attack on Egypt. But both countries assume that America would support them after the fact. They were surprised when America stood by what it had said and didn’t support them - just as we had warned them.
I don’t know why the present collapse in Afghanistan is being seen as a lesson, except in the most general way. Like to see how the US military would do if it lost its air support and logistics.
Six-Day War: not sure…preemptive warfare can pay off?
That and don’t expose yourself to a strike when you have little to fight back with initially.
Yom Kippur War: surface-to-air missiles are a big deal; the IAF can’t substitute for artillery
Don’t believe your own press releases and be slavisly wedded to a “concept”. Also attrition level in modern wars are likely to be eye-wateringly high.
Vietnam War: Don’t prop up an unpopular regime, and don’t go into war without an actual plan to win.
If what’s militarily necessary is politically impossible, you have lost. War is politics and any General who forgets that deserves to be shot.
Falklands War: Antishipping missiles and fast-attack subs are both extremely effective.
See Yom Kippur about attrition rates.
Bekaa Valley: If an air force runs a good SEAD (suppression of enemy air defense) campaign, it can rule the skies
In the case of Japan, don’t get into a conventional war with an enemy that has 10 times the industrial might when you are an island nation dependent on food and resources from overseas or domestic sources which require ocean transport.
From the 1800’s. In the previous centuries they faced continental opponents with much greater resources than they had but their Navy was always able to keep the enemy at bay.
For a nation with a continental outlook (like Germany, France and the US pre WW2) resources will always tell. For a maritime nation, like Japan and the UK, it depends on whether the fleet can keep SLOCs open.
If the answer is yes, then they can always outlast even the most superior adversaries, (see England v Spain in the 16th century). On the other hand, continental powers have built formidable fleets which have defeated maritime ones, for instance Rome against Carthage, the Ottomons and later the Americans versus the Japanese.
The lesson in any war should be that war is an extension of politics. You can score impressive military victories early and repeatedly, and still lose the war if you fail to come up with a desired political solution. That is a lesson that the United States repeatedly fails to learn.
A general officer sends a bright young staff officer to a week long “lessons learned” symposium on the Vietnam War. When the young officer returns, the general asks him for the top three takeaways from the symposium. He pauses for a moment to consider, and replies, “1. Don’t go into Vietnam. 2. Don’t mess with the Vietnamese. 3. Stay the fuck out of Vietnam.”
I think the powers that be know that, but between cyclical politics and their cozy relationships with the defense industry, the short term is all that matters. The political mess will be someone else’s problem. Ten years after the invasion of Afghanistan, Halliburton’s stock had increased ten-fold, and Bush was happily painting portraits of himself in the bathtub.
Meh, I tend to discount the Halliburton/K-Street conspiracy angle. I don’t think the Pentagon or the White House wanted to invade and occupy Afghanistan – Iraq had been on the Bush admin’s radar long before Afghanistan. But the attacks of September 11 compelled them to invade, particularly when the Taliban essentially shrugged at us when we demanded they turn in the Al Qaida warriors.
Empires (hegemons, if you don’t like that word) find it very easy to invade and occupy, and very difficult to withdraw. Their prestige is on the line. They have to maintain the appearance of strength, and they obsess - perhaps more than they realistically should - over what happens if they are perceived as having “lost” a war. This was true of Britain, France, the USSR, and now us. And it will be true of China, when they reach the apex of their power.
There was once the appeal of the Powell Doctrine: war as a last resort, fought all-out, and always with a plan to get in and out quickly. Sounded good after Korea and Vietnam.
Iraq showed what it really meant: make a slam dunk and walk away from your mess expecting no consequences.
War seems to have hired the same consulting firm as casinos and department stores. Entrants are given as many distractions and enticements to linger as long as possible. And looking ahead at future scarcities, wars fought for diminishing natural resources is a probable outlook. We’re going to Mars this century, but as Virgil understood it, not Elon Musk.
The primary lesson of World War I is that modern warfare requires portable radios and motorized transport.
There were lots of territorial advances in World War I, but the sheer size of armies - vastly larger than anything seen before - made exploiting those advances difficult when you couldn’t coordinate actions in real time.
Canada’s most famous battle is likely the Battle of Vimy Ridge, in April 1917, when four Canadian divisions attacked the German 6th Army at the titular location and blew them off the ridge with heavy casualties; the assault was an absolutely massive success, so much so the Germans held an inquiry as to how their defense could have failed so badly. But the attack could not be exploited; once the Canadians took the ridge, they no longer had the ability to coordinate artillery or air support in real time, or to push even further.
An attack of similar success in, say, 1944 would have been a catastrophe for the Germans, rather than just a disaster. Four divisions overlooking your rearguard areas and supply deports would have continued the attack, capable of doing so because of the ability to ise radios and trucks to keep the troops supplied and coordinated, supported by more artillery fire and air power. They would have swarmed through and found opportunities to cut off adjoined German divisions, the way the U.S. First Army broke through at St. Lo in July 1944. But without the ability to move and speak to other formations rapidly, you just can’t do that.
And this was a lesson that some countries learned much better than others.
I wonder if the key lesson from WWII is that you can’t let your enemies prepare for war while you don’t. You can eventually defeat them if you are stronger/ have more friends (or let your friends defeat them) but so much of it could have been avoided with more preparation.
