As Exapno has already explained quite well, Kobal2’s original comment about the “descriptivist tide” was a bit odd. It deserved comment since it appears to be based on the persistent misconception that descriptivists are just the same kind of thing as prescriptivists: it’s just that descriptivists don’t have any solid values, they don’t care about upholding standards, they are laissez faire to the point that “anything goes”.
In fact, descriptivism simply means “doing science”. All of science is descriptivist by definition: a physicist seeks to understand the rules of nature, not to prescribe them; a biologist seeks to understand the process of evolution, not to practice eugenics. In just the same way, descriptivism is the empirical scientific approach to understanding language. Contra wolfpup, all linguists are descriptivists by definition, since they seek to understand language as it is through the evidence of the way people actually speak. A linguist (when engaged in linguistics) does not make value judgments about the way people should be speaking any more than a physicist seeks to tell planets how to orbit.
That’s not to say that we cannot be (descriptivist) linguists and also have subjective value judgments about language. Any linguist can appreciate great literature and recognize terrible writing just like anyone else. But the key is to understand the category difference between a scientific description of language and a stylistic value judgment about clarity or beauty in language. Virtually nobody who calls themselves a prescriptivist understands this category difference and why it’s significant.
What does that mean in practice? It was entertaining to hear that the reversal of meaning in the “bad apple” metaphor is probably attributable to the Osmonds. That’s descriptivist linguistics, and a very cool thing to learn. At the same time, I fully agree with Kobal2’s opinion that the original meaning of the “bad apple” metaphor obviously makes much more sense. Who could disagree? But what makes no sense is to blame a “descriptivist tide” for this change. That’s a category error. As Exapno said with a different simile, it’s like blaming a biologist for the fact that we evolved from damned dirty apes.
There are some value judgments that are so clear that you’d have to be a fool to disagree: that Shakespeare was a great writer, for example. More controversially, someone might claim that Eminem’s output shows similar talent. But both are in the same category - they are value judgments rather than empirical observations. And prescriptivism can be okay when it’s recognized (with due humility, when appropriate) as falling into that category.
And here’s the rub. People who call themselves prescriptivists almost never understand the nature of language well enough to grasp when prescriptivism is appropriate and when it’s not. Kobal2’s opinions about the reversal of the “bad apple” metaphor are sound and logical, and I share them fully. This is a perfectly reasonable form of prescriptivism. But the problem is that prescriptivists frequently express equally strident opinions about completely arbitrary aspects of language. They insist that one way of speaking - invariably the dialect of their own time and place - is right, and the way that certain other people speak is to be decried as wrong.
While Kobal2’s reasoning is logical and reasonable, and the meaning of the “bad apple” metaphor is not arbitrary, prescriptivists will often make similar but bogus arguments based on “logic” or “clarity of communication” simply to seek to impose the arbitrary conventions of their own familiar dialect as “proper” and “correct”.
It’s interesting that nobody has any problem with the idea that (say) Japanese people employ a completely different language to communicate. There might be some senses in which one language is better than the other for certain purposes of communication, but nobody would claim that English is “right” while Japanese is “wrong”. We all recognize that the differences are arbitrary conventions. And in a similar way, nobody has any problem with the existence of differences between American and British English, most of which are similarly understood to be just a matter of arbitrary convention. So we don’t, in principle, have any problem with people in other communities using different conventions in language. It seems to be when we perceive that people are supposed to be speaking our own dialect that the uglier forms of prescriptivism arise, when the prescriptivists start to insist that certain entirely arbitrary variants in grammar or semantics are just wrong.
Sure, most prescriptivism is harmless ignorance. But, even setting aside the question of how much we can really ever influence the development of language through prescription, it’s astonishing how most people fail to recognize the difference between a valid argument based on genuine merit, and pseudo-logical rationalizations to support a familiar form of speech. All prescriptivism is designed to promote the form of speech of prescriptivist’s own time and place, and the differences in the decried inferior forms of speech are often entirely arbitrary. If prescriptivism is genuinely about merit, when has a prescriptivist every advocated a change in the language to something less familiar but superior?