“In the run up to the war, Halder — in an attempt to avoid what they were certain would be a catastrophic war for Germany — was the main actor in a plot with several other generals in the Wehrmacht and Abwehr to remove Hitler from power. A plot was put in place, ready to go at Halder’s command, which would be given if Hitler gave the order to proceed with the planned invasion. The plot included a plan to kill Hitler and say “he died trying to escape” (they all agreed he would be too dangerous to keep alive).[1] However, on 29 September Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler’s demands, and the British and French surrendered the largely German populated Czech region of Sudetenland to Germany, with Hitler promising to stop there. (Which promise Hitler broke the following spring.) Halder put an immediate stop to the coup attempt, only hours away from reality, as peace had been preserved – for the moment. Chamberlain’s appeasement at Munich meant the end of the plot, which shook Halder to the core and left him weeping according to Halder’s former adjutant, Burkhard Mueler-Hildebrand.[2] There would be no war with France and England over the Sudetenland. Hitler’s popularity reached an all-time high. A coup then was not possible, nor desirable. The catastrophe Halder and the other generals feared was averted. On 1 October German troops entered the Sudetenland.”
The plan for war with Russia was Operation Dropshot. I shouldn’t think the citizens of the USA would stand another war so soon after WWII.
There is another thread here asking if any new information will likely come out regarding WW2. There are rumors that Stalin offered a truce when the Germans seemed to be winning, where he would have ceded Ukraine to Germany.
I’ve never seen any official documentation of this, but from what I remember it was supposedly sent via Bulgaria or Sweden. Proof of such an offer would be a pretty big deal for WW2 buffs.
But I think after Stalingrad everyone including Hitler knew they couldn’t win. The best they could hope for was to make it nasty enough that the allies would get tired and offer a truce. I remember reading a quote in I think one of Albert Speer’s books, where he talked of some of the higher ups trying to persuade Hitler into negotiating in 1943 and Hitler said “all our bridges are burnt”.
Same thing applies to the Japanese. The defense of Iwo Jima, Okinawa etc after it was obvious they couldn’t win was an attempt to make it painful enough that the allies would just quit and give them an out.
Operation UNTHINKABLE was Churchill’s study for it here.
Despitw the wikipedia article, the book I read when it was declassified involved B-29s and nuclear weapons. What was Brittan going to use?
I think they were going to export haggis.
The German military was fairly accurate in notifying next of kin that their relative had been killed in action (or was missing, or captured), nearly until the end. So while the Nazi propaganda didn’t release total casualty numbers, individual Germans would have been hearing from many friends & relatives about the loss of their sons. Anyone thinking about how common that was would have been able to see that the war was not going well for Germany. But most people probably avoided thinking about such things.
It was largely a paper exercise in which the Chiefs of Staff reported that the risks would be very high and the chances of success uncertain, especially as the Japanese war was still going on.
I guess Patton wasn’t the only guy who wanted to fight Russia
That would seem to presuppose that the average German had access to fair and balanced news about the state of the war.
Quite possibly the Nazi leadership would have had a more accurate and honest view of where things were at, even if all their underlings were lying to them day in and out about how things were going simply because they’d still have factual information about how many troops there were, where.
I’m guessing a garbled reference to the detailed discussion of the nuances of wartime German newspaper announcements of births, marriages and deaths, laying out exactly what was and what wasn’t being said, by Victor Klemperer in his postwar The Language of the Third Reich, a book largely distilled from his now-better-known diaries, recorded as an unusually privileged Jew lying as low as possible in Germany throughout the war.
I’ve always been fascinated by the experience of German civilians during the war… imagine the experience of some 10-year-old kid in 1930 or so, who goes from “my country is kind of sad because we lost a war a while ago” to “hey, who’s that guy with the mustache I keep hearing about” to “wow, those guys took power quickly” to “hey, the pride is back!” to “yeah, we just occupied a bunch of places with no fighting! Hurray!” to “OMG another war” to “suck it, France!” to “suck it, Russia! We’re right outside Moscow” to “hmm, I don’t seem to be hearing as many reports of great victories vs. the asiatic hordes as I did recently” to “hey, what happened to those nice people who used to sell me books, were they Jews or something?” to “I’m lucky I have flat feet so I didn’t get conscripted” to “oh crap we’re losing” to “hey, now my country has been split in two, plus it turns out we were history’s greatest monsters this whole time” to “yay, Americans and British for saving Berlin via airlift!”.
Anyone interested in WWII needs to read The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy by Adam Tooze. It is a detailed treatment of the economics of Nazi Germany from the pre-Nazi era up until the end of the war. Inter alia he mentions that senior figures in the Germany body politic started committing suicide, knowing that the war was lost, after Germany failed to collapse Soviet Russia in late autumn 1941. Essentially the fact that war was lost became evident in the battle for Smolensk - the very fact the Russians were still fighting effectively (if not victoriously) meant certain defeat for the Germans. The November/December failure of Typhoon and the catastrophic defeat and retreat before Moscow sealed it.
The Germans needed the Russians to collapse after ~6 weeks like the Poles and French had. Once they were 500km in - the limit of their supply lines - and had not defeated Russia, that was that.
I also think that senior nazis started thinking of possible post-war residence places…like Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Tooze’s book is excellent-it shows hoew nazi Germany was actually on the brink of financial collapse. The Nazis thought that extracting raw materials from Russia would pay for their war-it didn’t, because mass starvation was breaking out, and they hadn’t the transport to get the stuff to Germany anyway.
One of the ‘what ifs’ in this question is “What if the Germans had taken Moscow?” Would a decapitation of the USSR have made a difference? Maybe, maybe not, but I suspect not. I think that from my admittedly limited knowledge on the subject that Stalin already knew he wasn’t going to face an assault from the East, and was in the process of moving troops westward. The reinforcements were already on their way, if not already in place.
An important thing to note is that the mythical “stab in the back” of World War One was so ingrained in the Nazi dogma, and the minds of the German people as a whole, that no-one in power would dare to admit that defeat was possible or suggest negotiations, lest they be accused of repeating the actions of the November Traitors. The result was one of those pathetic situations where everyone knows the truth, but everyone pretends to believe the official line.
The idea that we might start fighting the Soviets was more than a rumor; there had already been some creaking and groaning of the alliance, and at the end of the war,there were contingency plans for fighting the Soviets in Germany, with up to 100,000 ex-Wehrmacht soldiers.
The big thing wasn’t so much that it was the seat of government, but rather that it was literally the hub of the Soviet rail, highway and communications networks. Capturing Moscow would have repercussions way beyond just making the government move to Kuibyshev (which they did anyway in late 1941).
Just want to note this is the Operation Unthinkable mentioned in post #44.
Maybe Tooze succeeds with the economics, but he fails in the history.
Defining a military “senior figure” as Colonel General or Field Marshall (or equivalent), Air Force CG Udet may be alone as an autumn 1941 suicide, and the only other I can think of for the whole war is FM Model in 1945 (Rommel’s forced suicide was really a kind of execution). If there were any besides Udet in 1941-42 I would like to know some names.
Defining a civilian “senior figure” at least as someone reporting directly to someone reporting directly to Hitler, it is reasonable to assume that the Gaulieter were not more or less prone to suicide than any other. There were about 45 Gaulieter in office 1941-42, and per Wiki none of them committed suicide during that period. If there were any non- Gaulieter civilian senior figure suicides in 1941-42 I would like to know some names.
Tooze does not know what he is talking about. Literally no one in the world thought that German defeat was certain as of the late August German victory at Smolensk, more than halfway to Moscow with many weeks of reasonably good weather to be expected.
Typhoon was undoubtedly a failure and the Germans were undoubtedly defeated in the Battle of Moscow, but few if any Germans then gave up hope of winning the war, and of course the results of Typhoon and Moscow do not constitute evidence of a German suicide epidemic.
In retrospect it is reasonable to argue that the Germans could never have defeated the USSR no matter what they did. But literally no one in the world thought they had to finish the job in six weeks.