In Moore v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 95 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 531, 505 A.2d 1366 (1986), appeal denied, 516 Pa. 619, 531 A.2d 1121 (1987), the board recommitted the petitioner because he sent threatening letters and made threatening telephone calls while on parole. The petitioner in Moore contended that the letters and telephone calls constituted mere threats, and not “assaultive behavior,” because he never acted on those threats.
This court determined that “assaultive behavior” included “a willful offer with force or violence to do hurt to another.” Moore, 95 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 535 n. 4, 505 A.2d at 1367 n. 4. Moreover, in affirming the board’s recommittal order, this court stated that:
We fail to see how petitioner's conduct could be defined as anything but assaultive in nature. The letters and telephone calls contain repeated statements that the victim was going to be slashed, mutilated, and brutally raped. Such conduct would clearly evoke a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm in any individual. Whether or not the conduct would fall into the definition of "assault" under the Crimes Code is not definitive of the issue herein involved. (Emphasis added.)
Moore, 95 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 535, 505 A.2d at 1367.
On the other hand, the court in General Machine Corp. v. Feldman, 352 Pa.Superior Ct. 180, 507 A.2d 831 (1986), determined that a conditional threat of violence did not constitute an “assault.” In that case, an attorney refused to return a client’s file and made physical threats to the client if he attempted to recover the file. The client then brought suit against the attorney for assault, and the court stated that:
The court below dismissed this count noting that [the attorney's] threatening words alone were insufficient to place [the client] in reasonable apprehension of physical injury or offensive touching. After careful review of this matter, we agree with the trial court that the alleged threat here was conditional and thus did not reflect a present purpose to do harm. According to our supreme court's decision in Cucinotti v. Ortmann, "HN6Go to this Headnote in the case.threatening words alone are insufficient to put a person into reasonable apprehension of physical injury of offensive touching; rather, the actor must be in a position to carry out threats immediately and must take some affirmative action to do so."
General Machine, 352 Pa.Superior Ct. at 185, 507 A.2d at 833-34. (Citations omitted.)
Although Dunkleberger’s statement may be considered a conditional threat under the general definition of “assault,” we conclude that his statement fits HN7Go to this Headnote in the case.the “assaultive behavior” definition under § 37.4(5)(iii) because his statement constituted “a willful offer with force or violence to do hurt to another.” Moore.
Unlike in General Machine, where the outcome of the conditional threat depended upon the client’s action to recover his file, Dunkleberger stated that he would kill Reber if anything happened to their unborn child. Thus, according to the statement, events beyond Reber’s control could have triggered violence from Dunkleberger.