Human intelligence collection
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Types of Intelligence Officers
Since they must avoid the attention of the government in the country in which they operate, intelligence officers cannot simply hang out shingles advertising their willingness to pay cash for secrets. They require what in intelligence jargon is called “cover” – that is, a plausible reason for being in the country, visible means of financial support, a pretext for meeting people with access to sensitive information, and so forth.3
In current U.S. parlance, a distinction is made between "official’ and “nonofficial” cover. Official cover refers to disguising an intelligence officer as a diplomat or some other kind of governmental official who would ordinarily be posted abroad. Nonofficial cover refers to any other type of disguise – as a businessman, journalist, tourist, etc. – that could explain why the officer is in the host country. A nonofficial cover officer may also disguise his nationality and pretend to be from a country other than the one whose intelligence officer he is.4 If the host country is one that routinely accepts immigrants, the officer can enter under that guise.
The use of official cover has several advantages. Most obviously, it can provide the intelligence officer with diplomatic immunity. If his espionage activities are detected, international law limits the host government to declaring him persona non grata and expelling him from the country.
In addition, posting as a diplomat improves the intelligence officer’s access to some potential sources; as a diplomat, he would, without raising suspicion, meet with host-government officials in the course of his ordinary business, as well as with other countries’ diplomats stationed in the same capital. Indeed, since other countries will also use official cover for their intelligence officers, he will have “innocent” opportunities for meeting them as well.5
Also, stationing intelligence agents in an embassy under official cover guarantees that if a national of the host country approaches the embassy with sensitive materials of an offer to provide them, the matter can be handled by an intelligence professional. In this sense, the existence of official cover intelligence officers eases attempts by host-country nationals to make contact with the intelligence service; such positions serve as useful and perhaps necessary “mailboxes,” especially in countries that strictly regulate or prohibit their nationals’ travel to or communication with the outside world.6
Finally, official cover has certain administrative conveniences. The officer can be paid, and other personnel matters can be handled, through regular government channels, and secure communication with the intelligence service’s headquarters can be conveniently maintained through the intelligence “station” (the group of intelligence officers under official cover).7
At the same time, however, official cover has several drawbacks. Most importantly, because of the relatively small number of officials posted to a given host country, that country’s counterintelligence service may be able to determine, fairly precisely, which “diplomats” are intelligence officers and which are not. This may be done by the obvious, if laborious, methods of maintaining surveillance on each official and noting his or her movements and contacts, tapping telephones, bugging apartments, and so forth. The practice of hiring nationals of the host country to work in embassies in various support capacities probably facilitates such surveillance, especially in those countries where it must be assumed that anyone allowed to work in a foreign embassy has agreed to cooperate with the host country’s intelligence service.8 In addition, simpler and less expensive methods may be able to accomplish the same goal. For example, materials published by a country might be used to trace the careers of its foreign service officers and thus identify patterns that indicate an intelligence connection.
Furthermore, while official cover may provide easy access to some potential sources (primarily other diplomats and officials of host-country national security bureaucracies), it may hinder access to others who might be hesitant to deal with foreign officials, either in general or with those from a particular country. In any case, potential recruits are immediately put on notice that they are dealing with an official of a foreign government, and that may make them more cautious. In addition, if diplomatic relations are broken off, as might happen in case of an intense crisis or war – when good intelligence may be most necessary – official-cover officers must leave the country, thereby disrupting the operation of any networks of sources they had established.9
The advantages and disadvantages of nonofficial cover are, for the most part, the obverse of the considerations already discussed. on the one hand, since they pose as members of a variety of professions and strata of society, nonofficial-cover officials (NOCs) can have access to a different, and perhaps wider, spectrum of potential sources. Similarly, they can pose as (or, indeed, be) nationals of the country to which they are posted or of some third country. Obscuring the connection with the government for which they work may help them make contact with potential sources and gain access to information. If diplomatic relations are broken off, they may be able to remain and continue to operate. In general, NOCs should also be much harder for the host government to identify.
On the other hand, nonofficial cover suffers from many disadvantages. The expense and administrative difficulty involved in providing nonofficial cover is much greater than in the case of official cover. One method is to persuade a corporation or other private organization to allow an intelligence officer to pose as a member of its staff. Alternatively, the officers may themselves establish businesses or engage in activities that provide plausible explanations for their presence in the target country. The drawback here is that this may not only be expensive but require the intelligence officer to devote a great deal of time to his or her “cover” activity if the cover is to be persuasive, which reduces the time and effort the officer can spend on the primary task of intelligence collection.10 Communications are likely to be more difficult, since an NOC cannot make regular use of the embassy’s communications facilities without raising some of the very suspicions that nonofficial cover is intended to avoid.
One well-known and particularly successful NOC was Richard Sorge, a German citizen and correspondent for a leading German newspaper who spied for Soviet military intelligence in China and Japan from the 1930s until his arrest in the fall of 1941. His close relationship with the staff of the German embassy in Tokyo, including the ambassador, gave him extraordinary access to information about German and Japanese war plans. Shortly before his arrest, Sorge reported to Moscow the critical information that “the Soviet Far East can be considered safe from Japanese attack.” According to Sorge’s report, Japan had decided not to attack the Soviet Union; instead it would strike south and east in the Pacific against the United States and the British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia. Reassured by Sorge’s reporting, Stalin felt free to transfer hundreds of thousands of troops from the Far East to Moscow, where they would help stop the German advance in the winter of 1941-42. In retrospect, halting the Wehrmacht outside Moscow was to be a critical turning point in the war.11
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