It might have been politically impossible for Madison to have given Canada back once it was in US possession, though, no matter his intentions and no matter what was obtained in return. Americans would have fought and bled for it and won it, and might well have insisted on keeping it even if it meant fighting more.
Keep in mind the legality/constitutionality of purchasing the Louisiana Territory was hotly debated by Americans at the time, as well. A lot of people in the United States would not want to bring Canada into the fold, for many of the same reasons that many people in the United States bitterly opposed bringing Texas into the Union after its independence from Mexico.
Additionally, it should be (again) kept in mind that the goal of both sides in the War of 1812 was to quickly enter peace negotiations. Obviously the British wanted to have as much territory as possible going into the negotiations so that they negotiated from a position of strength. The Americans sought to have all of Canada so they could have a commanding position in peace negotiations. By and large both sides didn’t really enter peace negotiations with significant advantages.
The Americans early losses in the West had mostly been reversed by the time negotiations started in Ghent, and attempts to take advantage of the changing fortunes in the West mostly resulted in false-starts. For example America took Fort Erie but eventually abandoned it after fighting off a Canadian siege due to logistical woes. A fairly large British force attempted to invade New York, but was defeated at Plattsburgh (this force was made up of soldiers who had been sent to North America after the successful conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.)
The famous British incursion that resulted in the burning of Washington delivered a huge morale blow, but they did not have the resources to take Baltimore and ultimately they withdrew without having any strategic gains.
All of this ultimately meant that the British really held nothing to their advantage going in to Ghent, and nor did the Americans. It should also be noted that the whole reason battles like New Orleans and Plattsburgh were happening and why they were important is because it was not at all uncommon in this era for peace negotiations to take a very long time. British commanders in North America were aware that successfully taking territory in New York, or seizing New Orleans, was news that could potentially get back to Europe before the treaty negotiations were finalized. Such military successes in this era often lead to one side successfully getting territorial or financial concessions in peace negotiations. Of course negotiations were over by the time the Battle of New Orleans was fought, the Battle of Plattsburgh took place over three months prior to the signing of the Treaty of Ghent and is certainly historically important because a British victory there would have probably prolonged the war for many more years as the British would demand territorial concessions and the Americans probably would keep fighting to avoid making said concessions.
It would have been a lot more likely (and easier) for the American’s to give back parts of Canada than for the British to have given back New Orleans, had they captured it.
-XT
Maybe, that sounds awfully fantasy-esque, though. Madison would have only been one party to the negotiations, and I actually don’t think the British would have signed a peace treaty that ceded Canada to the United States. In the real historical timeline, an early successful invasion of Canada actually may have been to the long term detriment of the United States because it would have lead to the British Empire bringing far greater force to bear against the United States.
Talking about what might have happened ad hoc after a successful invasion of Canada is pure speculation, though. All we know for sure from the historical record is that annexation of Canada was never an American war aim, any more than deposing Saddam Hussein was an American war aim in the Persian Gulf War. Just because a lot of people rattle sabers about something, that doesn’t make it a war aim–the people who actually were in charge of the war effort never had it as a war aim, so it wasn’t one.
Not originally, no, but wars do take on a dynamic of their own. Aims can evolve far beyond anybody’s original intent.
I disagree. While I have not read you Madison book, I accept your summary that Madison had formulated some plan to use the annexation of Canada as a bargaining chip. This does not change the reality - that plenty of Americans had other ideas, that these ideas were publicly stated, and that they were the real motivation for men risking their lives and reputations in this invasion scheme.
After all, if Canada was merely to be handed back, all of those in Canada who supported the invasion (and there were in fact many) were set up to be comprehensively betrayed.
Here is an article concerning the issue:
As Thomas Jefferson (last I heard, no “Canadian Patriot”) famously wrote:
[Emphasis added]
The “final expulsion of England from the American continent”. THAT is what was PUBLICLY stated, by a leading founding father of the American nation and former president.
How can it be a matter of “Canadian mythology” that the intent of the invasion was annexation, when the US invaded Canada with leading Americans publicly stating that their goal was “the aquisition of Canada” and “the final expulsion of England”? Nothing there about HANDING IT BACK I note!
It may have been the case that President Madison had other plans, but they were not publicly proclaimed; the “annexation” plan, in contrast, was. Of necessity, as otherwise it would have been difficult if not impossible to drum up any enthusiasm for the invasion on either side of the border - by American idealists or by their Canadian sympathizers!
Well, in terms of Madison’s war aims I’d say they went like this:
1812: Quickly conquer Canada, sue for peace, get what he wants in exchange for giving Canada back.
1813: End the War without having to make any concessions to the British.
Once it became obvious Canada wasn’t a fat turkey waiting to be plucked effortlessly by American militia, I think the political leadership simply wanted to navigate out of the war without suffering a loss.
So I’ve seen no evidence that annexation was a goal at the outset and I certainly haven’t seen any evidence it became a goal *during[/i ]the war, when the “easy” invasion turned out to be virtually impossible.
More contemporary quotes from Jefferson:
How is this not “evidence”?
Yet more:
http://www.jstor.org/pss/20173101
1812 proclamations to Canadians by invading generals - much said about annexation, nothing said about the “bargaining chip” theory.
I’d say it was a draw, as it was ended in terms remarkably similar to those both sides could have had before it started, if they’d been prepared to be more sensible.
Few people here have ever heard of 1812, or if they have, the burning of a small number of public buildings in Washington is all they’ve heard. The war was only ever a peripheral concern here and it was soon forgotten.
You’ll find the following citations instructional:
The Causes of the War of 1812 - Reginald Horsman
The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict - Donald R. Hickey
The Republic in Peril: 1812 - Roger H. Brown
And finally, and significantly:
Burt notes that even the British Foreign Minister at the time openly stated that acquisition of Canada as a permanent annexation was never on the table of American strategy.
I admire your dredging up the Jefferson quote, you’re putting a few good swings in but unfortunately it doesn’t change the fact that the war aims of the public are irrelevant. The United States was and is a Republic, not a direct democracy, the political leaders are the ones who craft war strategy and they are the ones who establish military goals, not the general public. And certainly not Thomas Jefferson, who, if he had had his way would have seen the United States enter the War of 1812 without any of the heavy frigates which proved so effective at single ship encounters with the Royal Navy.
If you note one of my earlier posts I actually already addressed the issue of Jefferson’s opinion, from my post (#37):
Essentially I argued then and now that Jefferson said a lot of crazy stuff throughout his life. Jefferson had as much influence on U.S. war strategy development in 1812 as George W. Bush has on Obama’s decision making in regards to Afghanistan in 2009.
From my Hickey cite (and I’m not sure how much of this I can quote, since it is from a copy righted work, apologies if I inadvertently violate any board rules):
Carefully read the second paragraph and Henry Clay’s words. Those were public words spoken by the Speaker of the House, resoundingly rejecting the idea that annexing Canada was the reason for the War of 1812 or even a goal of the War. Henry Clay was the driving force behind the War Hawks, he was the man, of the Congress known as the “War Congress” who was the most hawkish of all his contemporaries. His words, spoken publicly at that time can be seen as a very strong indication that the goal of using Canada as a bargaining chip was very much in the public record even at the time of the war.
Now, it certainly may be the case that the masses didn’t closely follow the newspapers of the day and were not politically sophisticated enough to be aware of this–much as is the case in 2009. However, the record clearly indicates it was publicly acknowledged that the goal of the war was to seize Canada to force the British to the bargaining table.
You should be aware the work you just cited is written by Reginald Horsman, who in another book of his writes this:
Horsman is not a historian who believes annexation of Canada was an American war aim in the War of 1812.
Your own cited quote belies your claim.
Your claim is:
Your citation, in contrast, states:
While it goes on to claim:
The reality is - it simply is not so clean-cut. Different politicians gave different spins on what it was that they really wanted.
Fact is that the “maritime issues” were simply more credible to certain interests - namely, the new England states - than territorial expansion, pure and simple. However, the War Hawks mostly looked on the “maritime interests” as an excuse for their real goals - territorial expansion. That included annexation of Canada and there is a plethora of evidence to prove it - from the statement you quoted, through Thomas Jefferson, through the contemporary proclamations of (hopefully) victorious invading American generals.
The notion that the invasion of Canada was intended merely to redress maritime concerns clearly must be nonsense, because as we all know those concerns were moot by the time the invasion occurred; and while we would expect a certain amount of lag time (this was 1812 after all), how can “maritime concerns” alone have sustaned several more years of war?
Fact is that wars, and the war of 1812 in particular, often have more than one “aim”. It strains credulity to believe that the only aim of the war was maritime grievances (redressed before the war started). Not when significant figures of the American establishment are clamouring for annexation, significant minorities in Canada itself are welcomming annexation.
Just think for a moment what would have happened if the Americans succeeded in their invasion, sweeping aside the british regulars and militia opposed to them.
The Americans now own Canada. The Brits have no base to land troops. Canadian sympathizers (and there were many, United Empire Loyalists aside) take key positions in the colonial government and agitate for statehood. Those like Jefferson who have been agitating for annexation are triumphant. American arms - gloriously vindicated. The whole continent - now American.
And you are saying, with a straigh face, that the President of the United States is going to hand it all back to Britian to redress maritime grievances that were redressed before the war begain?
You are missing my reason for citing the article. I am citing it as a handy way of collecting citations concerning the proclamations made by invading US generals, not for the opinions of the authour generally.
In short, I am citing primary, not secondary, evidence.
The proclamations all indicate what the Americans wanted the Canadians to believe was the “point” of the invasion. They did not state “Canadians, do not be alarmed, our occupation is purely temporary - we are invading as a “bargaining chip” with the brits”.
Rather, they all, without exception, state that the Americans are here to continue the good work of the Revolution and turf the nasty Brits off the continent.
Uh, what’s the difference?
My favorite proclamation was Smyth’s at Niagra:
… he failed to add “… at least, until President Madison decides to give it back to him”. 
What’s the difference between “Texas” and “the USA”?
In the Acts of Union of 1707, England and Scotland merged to form the United Kingdom of Great Britain (Wales, incidentally, was part of England). In 1801, Ireland was added and the nation became the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. After most of Ireland became independent, the 1927 Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act the nation was renamed the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That’s the nation’s name today but recent political devolution has given some autonomous political control back to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Anyway, putting it simply, all English are British but not all British are English.
Oh well, I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree. I will say that if you do an exhaustive survey of the history out there you will note the conclusions of all major historians who have written about the War of 1812 in the last ~100 years or so is that annexation of Canada was never a serious goal of the American leadership.
Well, aside from one period of time–during the administration of Thomas Jefferson. For most of Jefferson’s Presidency America had been engaged in saber-rattling with the British, and Jefferson strongly desired to drive the British out of North America. However by and large Jefferson’s feelings on the British weren’t really all that mainstream. Jefferson was always more sympathetic to the French than the British, and always longed for a more French-centric focus in European affairs. However New England had strong ties to the British, and even the Southern planter class by and large wanted to maintain good trading relations with the British. Even Henry Clay’s camp, which felt that the British were hindering westward expansion via agitation of American Indians wasn’t really as anti-British as Jefferson.
Jefferson’s administration was the period in which it was widely believed an American invasion would result in Canada becoming a new state and a happy part of the United States.
Edited to add: The reason Jefferson never pulled the trigger was in large part because the Secretary of the Treasury (Albert Gallatin) analyzed the finances of the United States and reported that the war would be impossible to fund. Incidentally Gallatin was still the SecTreasury in Madison’s administration and he was a strong influence in advocating for the limited goal of temporarily taking Canada versus attempting to conquer it on a permanent basis.
The driving force behind America starting the War of 1812 was maritime, and thus the primary goal was to resolve those maritime issues. When you have Henry Clay, the leader of the War Hawks, arguing that Canada is just a means to an end, and when you have no evidence whatsoever supporting the idea that Madison wanted to annex Canada all you really have left is popular sentiments. You can consider “popular sentiments” a “war aim” as much as you want, but to do so essentially makes the term meaningless.
I don’t disagree that when you look at all the factions and all the citizens of a state, you will find many different reasons for different people advocating warfare. I actually go in depth about how that was the case in my first post in this thread (#37.) However, when you’re talking about the “war aims” you can really only look at the leadership of the country. Everything else is more or less meaningless.
I’ve never contested that individuals in the United States wanted to annex Canada, however I maintain the people who were actually leading the U.S. war effort did not have that as a goal. If you can find evidence to support the notion that James Madison had as part of his strategy for the War of 1812 annexation of Canada, then please share it. If not, all you have is the sentiment of people who were not in the driver’s seat. There’s no reason to keep bringing up citations for that since I am quite sure I’ve never denied that “individual Americans” wanted to annex Canada.
If you look at most wars, you will find that the public often has many different reasons for supporting a war. However typically the leadership of a state has a few narrow goals in times of war and that’s all that is really worth analyzing, the rest of it is just fluff and patriotic drivel.
No, you have not denied individual americans wished to annex canada. What you have said - risibly - is as follows:
This is clearly untrue - there is much basis for such a view; including of course actual preclamations issued by the Americans aimed squarely at the Canadians concerned.
I prefer to base my opinions of history on primary and not secondary sources. Look to what was actually said, and by whom, and the likely reasons for saying it.
The point, as you must be well aware, is that there were serious differences of opinion over going to war with the brits. The “maritime states” of New England were not at all enthused about the war. The leaders of the War Hawks were desperate to justify their position. What better way, than to assert that the real reason for annexation was to serve maritime interests?
You are seemingly willing to take these folks at their word, even though what they say makes no sense. You are also willing to dismiss those actually calling for annexation as “patriotic drivel” - even though that is what the US was willing for outsiders (namely Canadians) to hear considering their own motives.
You narrow the inquiry unduly when you, on the one hand, point out that the US was extremely decentralized and the views of the various regions must be taken into account - and on the other insist that only the (ostensible) views of President Madison must be accounted for in analyzing war aims. In a country like the US was in 1812, that simply will not do. It was not a presidential dictatorship and the views of persons not the President mattered.
In short, you are moving the goalposts to suit a predetermined thesis.
Again I ask: is it at all likely, or even possible, for the US to have given up Canada to achieve goals already achieved before the war started if the invasion had been as successful as was hoped?
Your position requires an unequivocal “yes”. It is not realistic.