Who 'won' the War of 1812 (again)

[Martin_Hyde]

@Malthus

No, you have not denied individual americans wished to annex canada. What you have said - risibly - is as follows:

Ah, so I gather you must be Canadian and are suffering from a damaged ego if that is what has you up in arms.

I’m well aware that up north there has long been a very different impression of the War of 1812 (down here it mostly unknown.) However, I should add that it is not only American historians that align with my views. A.L. Burt shared the view that annexation of Canada was never a goal of the American leadership, and he was born and educated in Canada and later moved to the United States where he was a Professor of History at the University of Minnesota. Additionally he served as the President of the Canadian Historical Association. I find it unlikely he would intentionally distort the past concerning his own country.

Here is a passage from Burt’s work on the matter, in which he examines the claim that a desire to conquer Canada is what fueled the declaration of war against Britain. Note that he also explains the aforementioned Randolph’s comments about the conquest of Canada (in actuality Randolph opposed the war entirely–he was essentially making the same claim that you are, that the war had nothing to do with maritime claims but instead was a deceptive means to try and conquer Canada. Burt refutes both Randolph’s claim as well as the thesis that this was in fact the American war aim.)

@A.L. Burt

The conquest of Canada was frequently mentioned in the debates, but the suggestion that it was desirable for its own sake was made so rarely that a reader of the debates might miss it if he did not look for it. Randolph’s words which have been quoted above should not be taken at their face value. This Virginian stood out from among his fellow members of the House as the most persistent opponent of war. He denounced it eloquently, at great length, and often. If he really believed that the effective cause of the pressure for war was agrarian cupidity, rather than maritime grievances, we might expect to find that he directed his invective at this dishonorable motive again and again. But he did not. His words which have been so aptly used to support this thesis constitute only a short passage in a long speech delivered six months before the war, and there is hardly an echo of them in the records of his many other speeches during these six months. In the reports of what was said by all the other speakers who opposed war, there is equally little to support the startling charge he flung at the warmongers in December, 1811. Evidently it was not considered to have much point.

This conclusion is confirmed by a careful reading of Foster’s letters.

…

This concept of the war dominated the discussions in Congress, and it was not the product of the “War Hawks.” Erskine had described it before their party was hatched. 97 It was simple, logical, and honorable. Britain had injured the United States on the high seas, where she was invincible. To challenge her there would be to court defeat. Britain had a thousand warships; the United States had not a single ship-of-the-line and only a half dozen frigates. A swarm of American privateers might prey upon British commerce, but a few heavy vessels of the Royal Navy might bombard American cities and even capture American ports. The only way to make Britain submit was to strike her where she was vulnerable–in the provinces adjoining on the north. Quebec might be too hard a nut to crack, but the United States could easily overrun the two Canadas right down to that fortress, and Quebec without the country back of it would be of little value to Britain. The small attention paid to Halifax is explained by the plain fact that it was beyond the American reach. The prevailing thought was that the United States was potentially supreme on land, as Britain was actually supreme on the sea. Each country had its own element, though only one had used it; and Britain would cease from her oppression at sea rather than lose her share of the land. If the worst came to the worst and, as one senator pointed out, Britain should get possession of New York and New Orleans, they could be recovered by an exchange of conquests.98 The conquest of Canada was anticipated as the seizure of a hostage rather than as the capture of a prize.

Note that Burt, is writing based on the Annals of Congress, as direct and primary a source as you can get. These were the men who actually decided to go to war, and the annals record their deliberations.

I prefer to base my opinions of history on primary and not secondary sources. Look to what was actually said, and by whom, and the likely reasons for saying it.

The point, as you must be well aware, is that there were serious differences of opinion over going to war with the brits. The “maritime states” of New England were not at all enthused about the war. The leaders of the War Hawks were desperate to justify their position. What better way, than to assert that the real reason for annexation was to serve maritime interests?

I find it interesting that you place so much importance on “primary sources”, when your only primary sources are from people not in the decision maker’s seat. We know what Madison said, we know what Henry Clay said–we know their exact words. I guess in your world that means less than the words of a general on the front lines, a man who is not in charge of overall American war strategy.

You are seemingly willing to take these folks at their word, even though what they say makes no sense. You are also willing to dismiss those actually calling for annexation as “patriotic drivel” - even though that is what the US was willing for outsiders (namely Canadians) to hear considering their own motives.

From all that I have read, the only people in a decision making position who were openly discussing Canadian conquest were individual congressmen and senators who were leveling the accusation that the War Hawks “true” motives was conquest of Canada and not gaining redress for wrongs committed against U.S. maritime interests. Then, as it is now, I’ve seen no evidence this was the “true” motivation of the War Hawks or Madison. I’d be supremely interested to see any evidence, from primary or secondary sources, showing this. All I’ve really seen is again, comments from individuals not in any way connected to the decision making.

If the crux of the argument is American war aims, then the only reasonable way to determine American war aims is to look at what the stated war aims were as laid out by the men who actually started and/or ran the war. You can essentially ascribe any war aim to any war if “war aim” just means “something that some people in said country wanted.” I imagine some Americans wanted to see Japan wiped off the face of the earth after Pearl Harbor. The fact that Japan was not in fact wiped off the face of the earth would, under your definition of “war aims”, suggest America “failed” to achieve a war aim. That’s ludicrous, because “complete annihilation” is exactly the kind of stupid desire you’ll see from a rowdy, over–zealous citizen but not the realistic and reasoned war aims you tend to see from the actual decision makers. For that reason only the war aims of decision makers should be taken into account, otherwise you open the floor to any absurd desire held by any person when it comes to analyzing the war aims of belligerent states.

You narrow the inquiry unduly when you, on the one hand, point out that the US was extremely decentralized and the views of the various regions must be taken into account - and on the other insist that only the (ostensible) views of President Madison must be accounted for in analyzing war aims. In a country like the US was in 1812, that simply will not do. It was not a presidential dictatorship and the views of persons not the President mattered.

I was pointing out how decentralized the United States was in order to point out how unrealistic it was to claim that supplying American Indians in Alabama with arms was somehow connected with preventing America from attacking Canada. I was attempting to explain how by and large American westward expansion was primarily individual-driven, with the U.S. Army only rarely becoming involved until after significant amounts of settling had already happened. Essentially it was the opposite of how most great conquests happened, in which a conquering army destroys the enemy in the field and then slowly displaces its people. With American expansion our people displaced those that were already living there, in part because of vast technological superiority, and then when things became too difficult the armies would come in to suppress harassment of American settlements.

In short, you are moving the goalposts to suit a predetermined thesis.

Not quite, I explained that there were many different reasons behind the support of an attack on British interests. However, the varied reasons of a country cannot be held to constitute “war aims” otherwise I could point to any major conflict in the last ~500 years and argue that a given state “lost” because of failing to achieve some aim that was never an aim for any of the war leadership of that state.

[As another quick example–was the “failure” of the United States to grab all of Germany before the Soviets a “failure of a U.S. war aim.” Or even more absurdly, was the “failure” of the United States to push the Soviets out of all of eastern europe a “failure” of a United States war aim? Of course not, because the leadership of the United States never wanted those things, regardless of what big mouthed generals or particularly bellicose individuals may have wanted at the time.]

Again I ask: is it at all likely, or even possible, for the US to have given up Canada to achieve goals already achieved before the war started if the invasion had been as successful as was hoped?

Your position requires an unequivocal “yes”. It is not realistic.

Not at all. Even if the U.S., in this fictional world, would have kept Canada instead of used it as a bargaining chip, that doesn’t mean it was an original war aim. If I’m walking to the store to buy orange juice but find a brown paper bag filled with money I’ll probably happily pocket my windfall. That doesn’t mean it was the original intent of my walk. Nor would my failure to find said bag constitute a “failure” of my original goals.

[Spoke]

@Martin_Hyde

I was pointing out how decentralized the United States was in order to point out how unrealistic it was to claim that supplying American Indians in Alabama with arms was somehow connected with preventing America from attacking Canada.

Exactly so, and the Creek uprising in Alabama was put down largely by using local militia called up by the governors of neighboring Georgia and Tennessee.

[Malthus]

@Martin_Hyde

Ah, so I gather you must be Canadian and are suffering from a damaged ego if that is what has you up in arms.

Heh, very funny.

May I impute that you are an American and it is your damaged ego over a lost war that has you up in arms?

Or perhaps we can drop this line, and concentrate on the facts?

I’m well aware that up north there has long been a very different impression of the War of 1812 (down here it mostly unknown.) However, I should add that it is not only American historians that align with my views. A.L. Burt shared the view that annexation of Canada was never a goal of the American leadership, and he was born and educated in Canada and later moved to the United States where he was a Professor of History at the University of Minnesota. Additionally he served as the President of the Canadian Historical Association. I find it unlikely he would intentionally distort the past concerning his own country.

Unlike you, I do not view the question as a nationalist pissing contest (the fact that you do explains much).

Thus, it is completely immaterial to me what the nationality of various historians commenting on the issue may be.

Here is a passage from Burt’s work on the matter, in which he examines the claim that a desire to conquer Canada is what fueled the declaration of war against Britain. Note that he also explains the aforementioned Randolph’s comments about the conquest of Canada (in actuality Randolph opposed the war entirely–he was essentially making the same claim that you are, that the war had nothing to do with maritime claims but instead was a deceptive means to try and conquer Canada. Burt refutes both Randolph’s claim as well as the thesis that this was in fact the American war aim.)

That’s exactly it - the question is, does one trust the “War Hawks” or the anti-war politicians?

What Burt (and you) fail to see, is that there is no good reason to trust the War Hawks on this matter, and plently of good reasons not to.

Naturally, the supporters of the war are likely to trumpet the maritime grivances - a pure territorial grab is a dishonourable motive for the war, and one which would yet further alienate the New England states.

Remember that this was an age in which such things as honour mattered, more so than today. Every underhanded self-interested move must be cloaked in patriotic bullshit.

Where we differ, is that you are willing to take that bull at face value - even when contradicted by reason.

Why on earth would an invasion designed as a “barganing chip” to force a certain goal be carried on - after that goal was already achieved? Inertia? Or because there was other goals yet to be achieved?

The latter makes sense and the former does not. QED.

Note that Burt, is writing based on the Annals of Congress, as direct and primary a source as you can get. These were the men who actually decided to go to war, and the annals record their deliberations.

Of course. Where we differ is on whether or not to take those pushing for war at their word.

I find it interesting that you place so much importance on “primary sources”, when your only primary sources are from people not in the decision maker’s seat. We know what Madison said, we know what Henry Clay said–we know their exact words. I guess in your world that means less than the words of a general on the front lines, a man who is not in charge of overall American war strategy.

The words are not in doubt; where they contradict one another, the issue is which one is lying (intentionally or no).

You would have it that the messages issues by the leading generals of the invasion were “patriotic bombast” and the statements by politicians in the Congressional record are the truth. To my mind, that’s too simple.

More likely both are "bombast’ but with this difference: the generals in the field do not have to appease a fractious congress that is extremely dubious about the war and its motives.

From all that I have read, the only people in a decision making position who were openly discussing Canadian conquest were individual congressmen and senators who were leveling the accusation that the War Hawks “true” motives was conquest of Canada and not gaining redress for wrongs committed against U.S. maritime interests.

That’s not true and you know it - you are conveniently forgetting the former President, who was hardly a critic of the war!

Then, as it is now, I’ve seen no evidence this was the “true” motivation of the War Hawks or Madison. I’d be supremely interested to see any evidence, from primary or secondary sources, showing this. All I’ve really seen is again, comments from individuals not in any way connected to the decision making.

There is plenty of secondary sources that state this, and I have not bothered to reproduce them so far, as few of them are archived online.

Most of them state the obvious - that the invasion of Canada served twin motives, the ostensible one of being the best theatre to fight the Brits in (as you know, feeling was that the Brits were vulnerable on land and invincible at sea). The defeat of the Brits could indeed serve as a “bargaining chip” just as Madison said. However, there was also the notion that the conquest of Canada could “complete the revolution” and make the entire continent American. That was the “best case” scenario, and naturally enough those pressing for war did not trumpet this - because it would appear a dishonourable motive for war-making, and also because it would alarm the New England states who were unhappy with the war to the point of threatening succession.

The fact that the invasion was carried on after the maritime greivances that allegedly were the cause were redressed indicates that there were, indeed, other motives at work; otherwise, I suppose your thesis is that the war was entirely pointless, which seems a rather difficult assertion to make!

If the crux of the argument is American war aims, then the only reasonable way to determine American war aims is to look at what the stated war aims were as laid out by the men who actually started and/or ran the war. You can essentially ascribe any war aim to any war if “war aim” just means “something that some people in said country wanted.” I imagine some Americans wanted to see Japan wiped off the face of the earth after Pearl Harbor. The fact that Japan was not in fact wiped off the face of the earth would, under your definition of “war aims”, suggest America “failed” to achieve a war aim. That’s ludicrous, because “complete annihilation” is exactly the kind of stupid desire you’ll see from a rowdy, over–zealous citizen but not the realistic and reasoned war aims you tend to see from the actual decision makers. For that reason only the war aims of decision makers should be taken into account, otherwise you open the floor to any absurd desire held by any person when it comes to analyzing the war aims of belligerent states.

I deny your “slippery slope” argument. It is true that you have to measure an alleged war aim against the test of absurdity.

Here, we have an invasion. Politicians both critical to the war (such as Randolph) and who support the war (Jefferson) are convinced that the “real” purpose is annexation. The generals in the field issue proclamations announcing that the purpose is … annexation. The politicians in the build-up to war swear up and down that the real purpose is to pressure the Brits to resolve certain grievances - grievances that (inconveniently enough) are in fact resolved before the invasion begain.

Which is more absurd - claiming that yes, annexation was in point of fact one of the aims … or claiming that it wasn’t?

The latter does not pass the test. The fact that the grievances were resolved removes any point to taking Canada as a “bargaining chip”. Are we to assume that the US was willing to spend the lives of its soldiers and its treasure for nothing?

I was pointing out how decentralized the United States was in order to point out how unrealistic it was to claim that supplying American Indians in Alabama with arms was somehow connected with preventing America from attacking Canada. I was attempting to explain how by and large American westward expansion was primarily individual-driven, with the U.S. Army only rarely becoming involved until after significant amounts of settling had already happened. Essentially it was the opposite of how most great conquests happened, in which a conquering army destroys the enemy in the field and then slowly displaces its people. With American expansion our people displaced those that were already living there, in part because of vast technological superiority, and then when things became too difficult the armies would come in to suppress harassment of American settlements.

The point is that having a number of strategic threats makes sense because it could destract US interests politically, and thus militarily. Such a distraction may succeed if powerful enough, or fail if too weak.

Not quite, I explained that there were many different reasons behind the support of an attack on British interests. However, the varied reasons of a country cannot be held to constitute “war aims” otherwise I could point to any major conflict in the last ~500 years and argue that a given state “lost” because of failing to achieve some aim that was never an aim for any of the war leadership of that state.

Again with the slippery slope.

It is hardly in the same league to claim that an invading army busy issuing proclamations announcing annexation has at omne of its aims annexation.

Not at all. Even if the U.S., in this fictional world, would have kept Canada instead of used it as a bargaining chip, that doesn’t mean it was an original war aim. If I’m walking to the store to buy orange juice but find a brown paper bag filled with money I’ll probably happily pocket my windfall. That doesn’t mean it was the original intent of my walk. Nor would my failure to find said bag constitute a “failure” of my original goals.

Not a good analogy to invading a country.

[Martin_Hyde]

@Malthus

Heh, very funny.

May I impute that you are an American and it is your damaged ego over a lost war that has you up in arms?

I’m not the one who calls accepted historical fact “risible.” I’ll restate yet again that all the cited historians in this thread agree with me. I’ll also remind you this isn’t High School forensics so there’s no need to decry that as an “appeal to authority” any more than you needed to decry my other arguments as “slippery slope.” Don’t confuse a message board for formal debate. What I will say is I’ve brought a set of cited facts and I’ve yet to see you refute them with anything other than opinions and quotes from people who were not decision makers in the War of 1812.

Or perhaps we can drop this line, and concentrate on the facts?

The facts seem to be this:

Martin Hyde’s facts: Both primary and secondary sources explaining the motivations for starting the War of 1812, additionally reasons as to why the conquest of Canada was not Madison’s intentions.

Malthus’ facts: An opinion that the War Hawks were liars; an opinion not shared by historians, respected historians, who devoted much time out of their lives to the study of this war. Including historians who we have no reason to believe are jingoistic Americans looking to change the “facts” of the War of 1812.

Your opinion isn’t totally unreasonable, what it is however is totally without factual support.

Unlike you, I do not view the question as a nationalist pissing contest (the fact that you do explains much).

Thus, it is completely immaterial to me what the nationality of various historians commenting on the issue may be.

It also appears to be completely immaterial what the conclusions of various historians happens to be. I’ll admit that when it comes to history reasonable people can disagree, but I’ll also say that I’m going with the guys who have done much more leg work than me and you on this one.

That’s exactly it - the question is, does one trust the “War Hawks” or the anti-war politicians?

I generally think the War Hawks were jingoistic types and that explains a large portion of their support for the war. I think that the western War Hawks like Henry Clay advocated so strongly for war because they believed their own propaganda. Namely, that the British were actively doing quite a lot to incite American Indian attacks against western American settlements and that they were active in supplying American Indians with war materials. Later analysis of the history shows very little evidence of this. Note however that historians don’t dismiss this idea out of hand–they concede that any efforts to arm the American Indians would have been clandestine (think Iran-Contra of the early 1800s), so the British would have not wanted it to be openly known.

That being said, we don’t have any evidence that the British were doing much to incite American Indian attacks. I do believe that many westerners including Henry Clay strongly believed this was happening and I think Henry Clay thought war with Britain would bring an end to this and open up further expansion with less difficulty.

I think both Henry Clay and Calhoun were enraged over issues like impressment and the Orders in Council. I think that was a function of nationalism and not necessarily anything else.

Calhoun (and by extension, the South) is an interesting case. Their raw commodities production relied extensively on continental European demand. Tobacco and cotton from the South often were traded through Britain to the continent. While much American tobacco and Cotton passed through Great Britain, it was continental demand that was the primary driver of Southern profit. For this reason the Southerners had a very strong incentive to desire an ability to directly trade with the continent. Direct trade with Britain did not have much value during the Napoleonic wars because Britain was not trading with the continent (at least not openly), and thus there wasn’t much money to be made there.

Of all the parties, the South and Calhoun probably had the most serious concerns when it came to the maritime issues.

What about New England? That’s an interesting case, yes, New England was very impacted by maritime issues and New England’s livelihood was based off of shipping. What must be understood though, is the smuggling tradition of New England shipping firms and the men who owned them. New England didn’t like the hassles that came about from the Orders in Council, but they were more than willing to smuggle goods. They realized that America only had a few major ports and that it would not be very difficult for the British to blockade them (if you note the dramatic drop off in American revenue from trade during the War of 1812 you see how true this was.) The New Englanders were content to keep smuggling until the Napoleonic wars were over. In some ways the fact that what they were doing involved smuggling actually meant they had larger profit margins per pound of goods shipped (but a lower volume of trade in total.)

Southerners only saw that it got more expensive for their products to get to market, and that they were shipping smaller amounts. They wanted that to end. New England also generally, of course, wanted the Orders in Council to end–but at the same time they had more of a direct connection with what was going on. Many of them (especially in Boston) had lived through direct British blockades before and weren’t necessarily wanting to do so again. Finally, the capital investments that stood to be lost (the ships themselves) were owned by New England shipping magnates, not the Southern gentry. The shipping leaders of Boston weren’t all too anxious to see a dramatic increase in shipping losses.

What Burt (and you) fail to see, is that there is no good reason to trust the War Hawks on this matter, and plently of good reasons not to.

What I do know is that Calhoun and the leaders of New England had no real reason to desire a conquest of Canada. I’m not actually sure what Henry Clay felt he had to gain by a conquest of Canada, either. That’s why I question if that was his “secret” motive.

Thomas Jefferson desired conquest of Canada, but Jefferson was an idealist, and in many ways was never very realistic. Henry Clay and Calhoun were not realistic either (they both stupidly thought Canada would fall quickly and Britain would be forced to the negotiating table within a year), but in all my readings I’ve never seen anything to suggest that the bent of Clay, Calhoun, or for that matter Madison was desirous of Canadian annexation.

I guess you could probably quote Thomas Jefferson again, but I still don’t see the point. Unless we have some evidence of an actual decision maker wanting Canadian conquest I just simply won’t be persuaded otherwise. It also is not because I have a blind trust of Henry Clay, or Calhoun. But simply because history tends to dredge up the facts and I’ve never seen any evidence dredged up before or since the War of 1812 that strongly supports the thesis of Canadian annexation as a “secret motive” of the war.

Why on earth would an invasion designed as a “barganing chip” to force a certain goal be carried on - after that goal was already achieved? Inertia? Or because there was other goals yet to be achieved?

The war had already been declared by the time Madison received word that the Orders in Council were being repealed.

That’s not true and you know it - you are conveniently forgetting the former President, who was hardly a critic of the war!

Former president != decision maker.

The fact that the invasion was carried on after the maritime greivances that allegedly were the cause were redressed indicates that there were, indeed, other motives at work; otherwise, I suppose your thesis is that the war was entirely pointless, which seems a rather difficult assertion to make!

The war was entirely pointless. I think that is the consensus view of most historians, actually.

I’ll simply conclude by saying that while your theory of annexation isn’t ludicrous–it is totally unsupported by the facts. Everything else is just window dressing of an unsupported argument.