Edward L. Dreyer in China at War, 1901-1949 ( 1995, Longman Group Limited ), claims that Matsui was indeed out of the command loop at that point and had no involvement. He pins responsibility instead on Asaka, his fellow Lieutenant-Generals, Yanagawa Heisuke and Nakajima Kesago and Major-General Suzuki Teiichi. And he states flat-out that the troops were egged on in an attempt to intimidate Chiang and his government to come to terms.
BrainGlutton, I’m going to tackle some of the reasons I see for this. Some caveats, first: I may be wrong, and I imagine that our Dopers from Japan will have a better handle on things than I do.
I think, first and foremost, is that it’s nearly impossible to overstate the effect of the reverence certain segments of the Japanese population have for the idea of a military aristocracy. As others have pointed out, the far right wing of the Japanese political spectrum have invested staggering amounts of political capital into what appears to many Westerners as nearly ancestor worship of all their famous military service members.
While the deniers that other posters have mentioned are infuriating, I think that the most illustrative act is/was the inclusion of Togo and several other executed war criminals into the Yasukuni Shrine.
Adding to the problem is that while this faction of the Japanese government is claimed (With justification, I believe.) to be not completely representative of the Japanese population’s attitudes as a whole, it has had a signifigant effect on the design and approval of texts for teaching history in the Japanese schools. Which then leaves many Japanese people without a specific interest in history with a somewhat skewed view of their own history.*
But that’s only some of the mechanisms for why war crime denial is such a strong aspect in Japanese culture. It doesn’t offer a real answer for why these groups feel so strongly about keeping their history ‘pure.’
I think that part of it is due to how Japan reacted to being opened to the west, going back to at least the Meiji era, and earlier. For a number of reasons the Japanese government and social institutions invested a lot of effort into fostering a self-reinforcing idea that Japanese people are special, and that their unique instutions are better than those of the rest of the world - even in the face of some daunting examples of foreign prowess.
Though I’ll admit that the cause and effects there could be argued to be the reverse, too.
*I’m well aware that most nations’ elementary education, especially in the US, is going to hit the high points only, leaving a lot of ambiguity on the cutting room floor, so to speak. I am of the opinion that the Japanese example sets a local ‘high water mark’ for this sort of behavior, but it’s far from unique to Japan.
My uncle was out in Burma, according to him the British were not that interested in taking prisoners - flame throwers were effective.
Actually, my uncle and aunt’s generation seemed to consider the Japanese utter swine.
In wartime, all parties tend to behave pretty badly, afterwards there is a tendency to re-write history.
20 years ago, in Singapore, I was told that Sing was occupied by Japanese officered, Japanese speaking, Korean raised regiments. I’ve no idea whether it is true, but it is quite convenient.
One of the most touching scenes I’ve ever seen was seeing an elderly Japanese guy bowing before a war memorial in Sing.
I suppose what I’m getting at is that it is possibly better not to rake over the past, since empirically people don’t seem to learn from history, maybe picking scabs is not that productive.
But please note China Guy’s post above on Chang and her book. Chang’s work has it’s share of detractors - so for example David Askew rather acerbic comment:
The first major monograph on Nanjing to be published in English after Hsū was the problematic work by Iris Chang (1997), The Rape of Nanking, a work that can only be described as frequently fabricated and/or fictitious.
My apologies, the Mainichi article was about the arrest. The actual bomb-throwing took place last year, and is the same incident referenced in the Japan Times article.
I think what Tom says is right on. There is a difference between planned systematic evil and local spontaneous evil. As noted by other posters, while Hirohito was made aware of the various atrocities, and probably should have been made responsible for that, there is a difference between planning things and going along with them. Hence, I can’t agree with ralph124’s claim that that Hirohito and Hitler were equally guilty.
For the question concerning Japan’s perception of it’s guilt, there are a number of factors which must be considered. As noted above, MaCarthur made a choice of keeping the emperor in place to better control the country. That’s a huge topic in and of itself, so I’m going to not go into the merit and demerits here.
However, as a direct consequence, there is a lessened sense of personal responsibility for the war. Hell, if the emperor was mislead by the government and the generals, then what could the average Joe have done? This wasn’t the primary consideration for the American occupation force, but this was result of American policy. No one wants to take responsibility for horrible things, and anyone would take the chance to run away. Again, that doesn’t excuse people, but if I were in the same circumstance, I could see how I would take the same out.
I’d be interested in a cite for a substantial, tangible and measurable benefit that has been indisputedly derived by Germany as a direct result of their acknowledgment of their “war-guilt,” whatever that is.
Hirohito was chief of state of Japan. Any and all military decisions had to be approved by him. Fortunately for his post-war reputation, most of the transcripts of the meetings of the Army and navy (with the Imperial staff) were destroyed. Could Hirohito have done anything? Yes-had he any strong revulsion (toward the massacres in China) he could have resigned and brought the government down.
Emperor Hirohito was, as you said, head of state, but he wasn’t the head of government. While he did have influence in the making of decisions, and probably knew (and didn’t care much) about some of the atrocities the Japanese Army commited, the Showa Emperor didn’t micromanage every element of the war.
The main problem I see with Japan refusing to recognize their actions in the past is the old “those who do not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it.”