The examples aren’t all in point, because Czechoslovakia wasn’t formed by the union of a Czech State and a Slovak State; it was carved out the Hungarian part of Austria.
The Russian example is a bit closer. What had been Russia in 1916 had by 1920 become Finland, Poland and the USSR. Guess which one was regarded for legal purposes as the successor state to Imperial Russia?
It will still be settled by fudge and not unilaterally by Westminster as you seem to think!
The queen doesn’t have a realm of Scotland. The only revelant realm here is the UK. When an independent sovereign Scottish entity comes into being, she may become it’s Queen, or she may not. That’s a matter yet to be decided, and almost certainly one that will be discussed between the Scottish and rump-UK governments, and addressed explicitly in whatever constituitional instruments effect Scottish independence. But, until she becomes Queen of Scotland, she’s not Queen of Scotland.
Well Scotland, if it leaves, will have left even more slowly, though hopefully less acrimoniously. The lack of acrimony might make it more likely that she will become Queen of Scotland, but it doesn’t change the fact that she won’t automatically be queen of whatever sovereign entity emerges in Scotland. She may or may not become Queen in that entity, but both the Scottish and UK governments will need to agree before that can happen.
It will be by agreement. And the terms on which a part of the UK secedes from the UK are very much a UK matter on which UK ministers will advise the Queen of the UK.
I cannot believe how blinkered you are.
If Scotland Leaves its political union with England that is simple. This revokes the Treaty of Union 1707, a treaty agreed by both parliaments.
This does not affect the Union of Crowns in 1603 when the persons being monarch of Scotland and of England became one person rather than two in the person of James VI of Scotland. QEII is his legal successor in the whole of the realm of the United Kingdom, and hnece she is Sovereign not only de jure, but also de facto throughout the realm. It is also a legal fact that in England (and rump UK) QEII is sovereign, but historically in Scotland the people were always Sovereign with the Monarch supported by the people.
If her opinion is sought by Westminster and Holyrood, I cannot imagine her sleighting Scotland by insisting that it goes through some further king-making process that does not apply to Rump UK.
I will again here try to retreat from any definite statement and note that I expect the usual constitutional fudge rather than legal niceties to decide the day!
Far more interesting is what happens if the person called to the Palace is PM Milliband? The loss of Scottish MPs would be more than likely to lead to a change of Government. Suppose a Labour administration started to backslide on pledges to respect a Yes vote in order to maintain its Government. Supposing Salmond then petitioned the Queen to intervene!
UDS is 95% correct in all of this. My only quibble is that Scotland did not cease to exist as a political entity or as a nation; the KINGDOM of Scotland ceased to exist. Scottish law, for instance, still applies in Scotland, and English law in England and Wales. The border is the same as it was in 1707. As far as the monarchy goes, UDS is totally correct. There was some discussion of these points around 1746.
I don’t think his (her?) points are particularly Anglocentric.
I think this really breaks down among Catholic/Protestant lines. In my experience, historically Catholic areas still harbor a visceral dislike of the UK and/or England, which they view as triumphalist oppressors who need to be taught a lesson, while Protestants don’t carry such baggage around at all. So I think one would find that people in France, Spain, Ireland, Quebec, etc. will be mostly cheering on the breakup of the UK.
So, So wrong in the case of Scotland. If anything the cookie crumbles the other way. In broad general terms, Catholic Scots are more likely to be Labour supporting for generations by a large margin whereas the SNP is a recent phenomena and because of its history (Early on it was seen as a second conservative party) inherited most of the Conservative previously moderately unionist vote. The majority religion in Scotland is No Religion and these are largely protestant (once a catholic always a catholic- people identify for longer.)
"In 1999 majorities of each of Scotland’s three key religious constituencies preferred a system of devolved government: just 21% of Church of Scotland identifiers backed independence, 34% of Catholics, and 31% of those of no religion. While this may have indicated a Protestant antipathy towards independence (though not, notably, devolution) it hardly suggested a Catholic fear of shifting powers to Scotland. Indeed Catholics were actually the religious sub-group most likely to support an independent Scotland in 1999.
“This remains true in 2012: 30% of Catholics support independence, as compared to 26% amongst those of no religion, and 17% amongst Church of Scotland identifiers. And Catholics are comparatively relaxed about the prospects of Scottish independence: just 16% were ‘very worried’, significantly less than amongst Church of Scotland identifiers (26%).”
"However, examining the 2012 data on constitutional preference more carefully tells a different story: when we take age and gender into account the apparent religious gap in attitudes towards independence disappears. The gap is simply a consequence of the different experiences of secularisation. Since the 1960s the mainstream Protestant Churches have failed to retain (let alone recruit) young people. Over two or three generations, then, the profile of Scotland’s Presbyterians has been markedly, and progressively, ageing. As a result while 40% of those aged over 65 say they are Church of Scotland, only 10% of those in their 30s, and just 5% of those aged 18-29 do so. These age differences are even more marked amongst women than they are amongst men. In contrast the age profile of Catholicism, which has resisted secularisation more successfully, lies much closer to that of the general population while, as we might expect, those of no religion have a disproportionately young profile.
“It is these differences, rather than religious affiliation itself, that explains the apparent ‘religious’ differences on support for independence. In other words, those modest differences we can find between Catholics and Church of Scotland identifiers in their attitudes towards independence are not due to Protestantism or Catholicism, nor to history, heritage, or religious politics. It springs largely from the simple fact that Presbyterians are, on average, older, and older people of all religious persuasions are more likely to be opposed to independence. Tall tales always merit closer inspection. They do not always bear close scrutiny.”
http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2013/08/tall-tales-religion-and-scottish-independence/
So some small bias with those still identifying with the Church of Scotland, but most of the No Religion will be lapsed Protestants.
What it indicates is that strong unionists have probably remained with the kirk, because of their conservative views, and probably are the majority of the remaining tory vote!
Yup. Scotland, as a sovereign state, ceased to exist in 1707. So did England. Which is why they cannot now agree to revoke the Articles of Union between them.
Both Scotland and England continued to exist (and still continue to exist) as nations - i.e. as communities united and defined by factors such as common descent, language, culture, history, occupation of the same territory, so as to form a distinct people.
Similarly, Scotland and England continued to exist after 1707 (and exist to this day) as territorially-defined entities of legal significance. But the territories are defined, and their legal significance established, by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, exercising the authority of the crown of the UK. Which is why the present Scottish Parliament is established, and its powers determined, by a Westminster statute (specifically, the Scotland Act 1998).
It’s precisely because Scotland is a nation that the question of whether it should be a sovereign state is a live political issue. Nationalism, as a political position, is essentially the belief that a nation has an inherent right to self-determination through the establishment of a sovereign state - and, some nationalists would argue, a moral or political duty to exercise that right.
Just to add to that, there are basically two models for acquiring independence from the UK:
The legitimist model, in which independence is conferred by one or more excises of UK legal authority. The process can be spread out over a long time, and completed in stages (e.g. Canada, Australia) or it can happen all at once.
The revolutionary model, in which local political institutions simply assert and seize power without regard for legitimacy under UK law, or UK-conferred local law (e.g. the US).
“Revolutionary” doesn’t necessarily imply bloodshed; just a legal revolution; the assertion of a new fundamental basis for legality which does not derive its legitimacy from any UK authority.
Ireland provides an example of a former British possession which initially acquired substantial independence through the legitimist model (but with bloodshed) before completing the job through the revolutionary model (but without bloodshed). In 1937 a Constitution was enacted by the people by popular referendum, without any Act of Parliament (either the Free State parliament or the Westminster Parliament) purporting to confer legal effect on the will of the people, so expressed. Judges, government ministers, etc, swore to accept the new Constituion and, on that basis, remained in office. By this measure de Valera satisfied his republican conscience and gave the Irish state a political and legal foundation which was not derived from, or granted by, Westminster.
If Scottish nationalists share the same sentiment they can do something similar. So far, though, they have stuck to the legitimist route.
I guess if the vote for independence is passed, work will begin on writing a Scottish Constitution.
What? The Scots clearly have self determination within the UK, as evidenced by the independence referendum itself.
Of course that is desirable but not necessary before independence.
Not while Westminster has a veto.
Except for little things like energy policy, defence, foreign policy, taxation, welfare …
First of all, the referendum is purely advisory. A vote in favour of independence will be noted, politically, but legally it will not be sufficient to establish a sovereign Scottish state. Legally, in fact, it won’t have any effect at all. And I don’t think independence is constituted by the right to conduct non-binding referenda.
Secondly, the Union doesn’t guarantee Scotland the right to hold even non-binding referenda of this kind. This referendum is permitted by an Order-in-Council made in Westminster, by the UK authorities. Having to get permission to do something is pretty much the opposite of being guaranteed the right to do it.
Thirdly, even if the Scots did have self-determination within the UK, “self-determination within the UK” is plainly materially different from unqualified self-determination.
Work will begin on negotiating independence from the UK. An affirmative vote in the referendum is not itself effective to create a Scottish state, and it doesn’t legally bind the UK government to grant or concede Scottish independence. It creates a pretty strong political pressure to do so, but there will need to be discussion and agreeme on a lot of mattes of detail, and the UK will (at the very least) undoubtedly withhold final assent to independence until these matters have been resolved to its satisfaction. Some of these matters have constitutional implications for the Scottish state, so drafting a constitution can’t be completed until these negotiations have been resolved.
Pjen suggests that a Scottish constitution is “desireable but not necessary before independence”. In reality, if Scotland takes the legitimist route to independence, then Scotland will at least have an interim constitution (not necessarily called “the Scottish Constitution”) from the moment of independence, because there is going to be some legislative instrument by Westminster which creates (or “constitutes”) a sovereign Scottish entity. That instrument, by definition, is the constitution of the sovereign Scottish state. Of course as a constitution it may not endure very long; once independent, Scotland could give itself an entirely new and different constitution. But in practice I would expect a Scottish constitution to be largely settled, by agreement with the UK government, before independence, and to be in place from independence, and not to be radically amended or replaced for a reasonable while.
Anglocentric colonial thinking again.
The United Nations favours self determination for nations.
As the UK has called the Referendum after the Scottish people elected a majority government in favour of independence in 2010, it would be very difficult to back track from a vote for Independence. Apart from the likelihood of civil disobedience and possible real disorder, there is the standing of the UK in the world.
Legally Westminster could say no (if it would cause the downfall of a Labour Government say) but politically it would be a hard act to carry out without major problems.
I suspect that your thinking on this matter is largely driven by a desire to frustrate the will of the Scottish people should they vote for independence.
You completely misread me. I’m a keen supporter of Scottish independence, and I would be very happy to see the Scottish people take the revolutionary (but non-violent) route to independence, as opposed to the legitimist route.
But, realistically, I don’t think they will. If there is an affirmative vote in the referendum (as to which, to be honest, I am not optimistic) the Scottish government will negotiate with the UK government for the granting of independence on agreed terms. I agree with you that the political imperative to grant independence will be irresistible, but that won’t prevent the UK government from seeking to protect the interests and influence of rump-UK in the independence negotiations, and driving the hardest bargain it can, given its bargaining position.
I expect independence to be effected by legitimist means - specifically, an agreement between the Scottish and UK governments, given legal force by an Act of the Westminster Parliament - much as it has been for nearly all former UK possessions.
Whether a later Scottish government will “do a de Valera” and introduce a new grundnorm for Scottish statehood founded on the will of the people rather than the assent of Westminster remains to be seen. FWIW I would welcome that, but there is no reason why my wishes in the matter should carry any weight with future Scottish governments.