In fact, while rail was a typical target, the Brits explicitly devoted rare resources–the Tallboy and Grand Slam bombs–for specific rail targets.
I have not argued any position. Various comments have been posted that are not aligned well with facts and I have pointed out where they have diverged while noting there are other areas where we have, as yet, incomplete information.
We are in agreement here then.
You’re correct, my mistake. You presented the point, but did not advocate for or against it.
Others though did so. My offer of refutation stands, as it applies to them instead of you.
One. One jailbreak. Operation Jericho, in which a prison holding resistance members in Amiens was attacked. Of some 700 prisoners, 100 were killed. 250 escaped, but most were recaptured. In spite of those rather dismal numbers, it was viewed as an amazing success, precisely because of how non-precision the bombing of the day was.
Mosquitoes did routinely engage in pinpoint attacks, with targets such as V1 launch sites, but to say that they could take out specific buildings while leaving surrounding ones standing “with ease” is a significant overstatement.
No, not one. Operation Carthage was another. You are correct thought that I should have said “a couple” and not “several”, as it seems that the Mosquito bombing run I was thinking of where they specifically took out guard towers was the Amiens raid.
The claim that was being disputed was that carpet bombing would be required.
Also, as the recon photos of Auschwitz confirm, the crematoria were not next to the barracks in any case.
Operation Carthage wasn’t a jailbreak. It was an attack on the Gestapo headquarters in Copenhagen with the hopes of destroying their files. The structure was used to torture prisoners, but the attack didn’t aim to bust any prisoners out (nor did it). 86 schoolchildren in a nearby school were also killed in the attack when the third wave mistook the school that a Mosquito from a prior wave had crashed into as their target.
These are not exactly supporting your point that precision attacks could be carried out “with ease”. And these are the two most famous precision attacks of the war.
Upon further review, I see 18 prisoners did escape after the Copenhagen raid, while 8 were killed in the bombing. Nevertheless, jailbreak wasn’t the objective of the raid - messing with the Gestapo was.
The two are not mutually exclusive. There was indeed little military profit to bombing the camps. While the Germans may have expended resources in rebuilding the capacity, they may not have and all you would have done was to save lives of some Jews … and prevented the Germans from wasting their resources in killing them - as has been pointed out by some here. The perception at that point in the war was that bombing civilians had more profit. The only reason to seriously consider such an action would be if you cared about reducing the extent of the genocide as something to care about in and of itself. There is no evidence that those in charge even seriously considered the option or that those making those decisions cared about the genocide other than a positive (in that it was the Germans expending resources on that which did not help them win the war) and ample evidence (see the S.S. St. Louis, for example) that they did not care about these lives.
Yes, I am positive that that is true.
My understanding is that, yes, that was indeed one of the objectives.
Yes they are. The first had planed take out specific guard towers and then lob their bombs with enough precision that the wall was brought down and a large number of people were able to escape. The attack was precise and accomplished its objective.
The second took out a gestapo building while allowing several prisoners trapped in it to escape (I’ve seen quite a few tallies that put the count way above 12 escapees). The fact that they also bombed another building because they mistook a Mosquito on fire for a signal flare doesn’t change the fact that the bombing was carried out with specificity and precision.
I seldom agree with Der Trihs on much of anything, but he’s not wrong about what was happening in the US last century, though it’s anyone’s guess if we would have taken things as far as Germany did. Eugenics had a popular following in the US before WWII - resulting in the forced sterlization of 60,000 Americans - before Hitler made the whole thing embarassing to be associated with, and we did imprison Japanese Americans “for their safety” during the war. These things are facts, not opinions.
A little off topic, but it seems to me, that both the RAF and USAAF bomber command staff agonized over what targets to hit. The USAAF tried “surgical” strikes on strategic German industries (like ball bearings-the "Schweinfurt raids), or electric plants. Likewise, the RAF tried taking out the Ruhr dams (the “dambusters”). Neither of these targeted efforts worked, because the precision wasn’t available.
Myquestion: late in the war, both air forces tried attacking railhead and rail transist centers-would this (if enacted early in the war) have worked? Everything in Germany went by rail-if we were able to disable the railyards at major German cities, we might have shortened the war.
Of course, “Bomber” harris thought that burning down the cities was the way to go-this (as it turned out) was not effective, and led to big losses.
Um, my impression was that both of the raids you named were successful, in terms of precision - the targets aimed at were destroyed or severely damaged.
The problem, in both cases, was not lack of “precision”, but rather high losses to the attackers, in particular from daylight precision bombing beyond the range of fighter escorts.
Maybe it’s a semantic issue, but I find it difficult to call either Regensburg or Schweinfurt “precision” raids. From Malthus’ cites, the former involved 146 bombers, of which “126 dropped 298.75 tons of bombs”. A total of “60 bombers lost and many more damaged beyond economical repair”, but this is irrelevant to the point. Similarly, the Schweinfurt raid involved 230 bombers, of which “183 bombers dropped 424.3 tons of bombs”. Losses were equivalently catastrophic, but again that’s not the point.
It seems to me that calling either of these “precision” raids was more propaganda than reality, with the only rationalization being that the targets were factories rather than entire cities. One might expect that more than 700 tons of high explosives, delivered in a “precise” manner to discrete and well defined factory installations (not hardened targets, but common buildings and shops), would be expected to pretty much remove them from existence. But while Regensburg received “heavy damage”, “the Schweinfurt raid had been a failure. The excellent results at Regensburg were small consolation for the loss of 60 B-17s. The results of the bombing were exaggerated, and the high losses were well disguised in after-mission reports.” And even there, much of the damage was caused by secondary fires ignited by incendiaries. Such would have no parallel if the targets were railway bridges, let alone selected structures in a death camp.
As for the Dambusters, these were indeed highly precise but highly specialized attacks that involved unique equipment and intensive training. And for all that, only 2 out of the 3 dams targeted were actually destroyed. Again, there is no parallel between skipping bombs and an attack on railways or crematoria.
I can admit the possibility that a small, well trained strike force might be able to inflict heavy damage on a single selected target, like a bridge. It might take several tries, but given the will, and acceptance of whatever losses might be sustained, the result could be achieved. And if that bridge led to, say, Buchenwald, then that camp itself would surely see a curtailment of incoming prisoners for as long as the bridge remained unrepaired. But given the nature of railroads, I don’t see that it would be impossible or even extraordinarily difficult to redirect those prisoners bound for Buchenwald to any of the other hundreds of available camps. Nor do I see any reason to believe that Buchenwald itself would need to reduce its extermination schedule for prisoners already within its walls. Likely the bridge would be repaired long before they ran out of on-hand people to kill.
At any rate, none of these examples convinces me that the Allies had any great facility for precision air strikes of the kind or the repeatability necessary to significantly interrupt the Nazi death machine.
To my mind, the Allies could have seriously disrupted Death Camp operations, albeit at a high cost. Requiring precision strikes that did not cause heavy casualties to the death camp inmates is probably setting the bar too high; after all, the people already in the camps were mostly condemned to death already - risking their deaths to smash the mechanisms of death in the camps was a price that I’m pretty sure the Allies would be willing to pay: after all, they did not hesitate to risk French civilian lives in the bombing campaign prior to Normandy.
Ideally, the Allies would wish to smash the death camps, not for the benefit of the inmates therein (mostly already too late for them), but to slow the flow of prisioners into the camps - in short, for the benefit of those not already in the camps. Certainly, the Nazis could have killed vast numbers of civilians the old-fashioned way, but the effort would be slower.
To my mind, as previously stated, simple motive was lacking. The camps were a net military negative for the Nazis; in military terms, a distracting folly.
In the case of the ball bearing industry, it is true, many plants were destroyed…but this was not a “knock out blow” as was hoped…the Germans were able to replace the losses with imports from Sweden, and other sources.
The Ruhr dams were repaired, and the effort seems to be not worth the losses.
As i say, had the railroad years and terminals been targeted, perhaps the RAF and USAAF would have had better success.
The question of whether certain operations were worth the cost in terms of results is certainly worth asking.
The issue on the table though is whether the results were technically possible.
The live issue I suppose is what is meant by ‘results’. If the mission was to destroy the crematoria/gas chamber complexes without risk of collateral deaths, that may not have been possible - but the Americans at least thought it was; it was certainly possible to destroy the complexes if one was willing to risk civilian deaths, and risk aircrews in daylight raids.
Again I think we are pretty much in agreement. Motivation certainly was lacking. It was war, lots of people were dying, victims of genocide and many other innocents among them. There was no specific motivation to “save” any of them in particular, only to “end the war” thus saving whoever might be left. Decision making was highly pragmatic, sacrifices were being made everywhere, and the ends often justified the means. If the Nazis were dumb enough to massacre their own, hey, it kept them busy and expended valuable resources. As you say, a net loss for them.
I won’t repeat my objections to the possible efficacy of precision bombing of railway bridges / tunnels except to say I don’t think it could have had significant effect on death camp operations.
As for precision bombing of the camps themselves, that too I think is an impossible dream. Carpet bombing them, on the other hand, with effectively total destruction including of the infrastructure of death, could have been achieved, at some level of loss. Surely some camps, by virtue of location if nothing else, would be heavily defended (the Nazis after all would miss no opportunity to shoot down Allied aircraft, regardless of their target) while others perhaps not so much. The actual level of loss can only be guessed, but given the number of camps and the levels of loss of Allied aircraft in bombing missions in general, it would be hard to argue it to be anything less than considerable.
And this to achieve a goal that could only be measured by negation—how many Jews and other ‘undesirables’ would then fail to be murdered by the Nazis directly due to the deliberate murder by Allied bombing of how many other Jews and undesirables? I just don’t see this as an equation that could have been solved in favor of either alternative, even if the Allies had full knowledge of the situation and an abiding desire to interfere with it. And had they, I suspect historians today would still be questioning the wisdom of bombing captive enemies and victims of the Reich in hopes of preventing additional captivity and victimization.