They are intelligent, but not experienced. Their pattern indicates two-dimensional thinking.
This leads us to a more general observation: the Nazis really weren’t bad at spying. You just don’t hear very much about their successes because they weren’t widely publicized in the former Allied states.
For the most part, the Nazis are only credited for things that they were obviously very good at, and the Allies weren’t - like building rockets and jets.
Thank you, Mr. Spock.
There were some German successes in military intelligence.
They knew the deployment of the military forces of some of the target countries they invaded. Poland, Norway, the low countries. They knew the way that the French-Anglo forces would respond to the invasion of Belgium. Admittedly, they miscalculated the size of the Soviet military, and it’s ability to recover from staggering looses. But otherwise, their military victories relied on good intelligence on what they were up against.
Prior to the war, the Germans had some success with agents/provocateurs in neighboring countries, like Austria, or the Sudetenlands. These agents help keep the host country governments a tiny bit off balance, it seems to me.
Their secret police (which I consider to be an endevour that falls within the “espionage” or covert field of activities), the Gestapo, was very successful in keeping Germany itself a dangerous place to be for anti-Hitler people (foreign or domestic) to try and conduct activities. While the Gestapo seemed to be a good counter-intelligence organisation, I think it’s because even Hitler (whose thinking was partially influenced by his military experience in WW1) saw the need to protect his position in power from attacks from within.
They seemed much weaker in the more subtle, “stealing secrets or technology” type of espionage. Their attempt to smuggle a sabotage team into the U.S. seemes almost farcical. (A Laurel and Hardy movie!)
Maybe it is because a lot of things the Nazi governments approaches to policy seemed to be along the mindset of a more military(linear?) style, or approach, to solving problems, and not a social or unconventional one. A lot of the economic policies were intended to support rearmament and a strong military, and social policies were about mobilizing or uniting the masses to strengthen the state, for example.
They completely failed to notice Harrison Ford sneaking into Berlin to rescue Sean Connery. That was pretty weak.
There were a lot of anti-Nazi people in German Intelligence. The Lucy spy ring is alleged to have some top people in it. When the deputy head of the Abwher is plotting to kill Hitler, you shouldn’t expect the performance of the organization to be top-of-the-line.
Canaris was also far from Hitler-friendly.
One possible reason was the way that the chain of command operated in Nazi Germany.
People were afraid to report any kind of failure to their superiors. Successes were rewarded and failures were punished. As a result, many people would do most anything to avoid reporting a failure. It was very similar to societies that killed messengers who brought bad news. The trouble with that is that messengers would only report good news and so certain events were never made known to the high command and they had to pay dearly for that.
I think that even if they had to lie, they would prefer to do that in order to avoid reporting a failure. I remember seeing one discussion about how the Nazi chain of command operated and I recall there were several cases where people swept failures under the carpet and so they were just not reported.
You really can’t overlook the fact that Canaris and many of his chief lieutenants were actively anti-Nazi and took several steps to thwart them. One of the Abwehr’s greatest successes was totally flipping an entire British network in the Netherlands - much like the Double Cross system in England.
Everything I’ve read points at the idea that the Abwehr was deliberately less effective than it could have been, due to the resistance-esque efforts of Canaris and Oster.
So not really incompetence, as sabotage from the highest levels and intentionally prioritizing the wrong information, etc…
Patrick McGoohan’s character in “Ice Station Zebra.”
The Germans were very good at gathering both geographic and structural intelligence in countries prior to invasion.
They made very good maps and assessments of strategic importance in Britain, in fact they are so good that they form a valuable resource for local historians which may be looking at the development of British cities - I have seen several such maps online.
They also took a great deal of trouble to identify individuals who might be sympathetic to their cause, and also those who might be an obstacle.
They were very bad at reconnaissance, for example, they never managed to get aerial photo’s of London for several years, and this was especially critical when assessing the effects of bombing or of V1 flying bombs. They were also deceived by what aerial photos taken prior to the Battle of El Alamein.
The patterns of thought of German military intelligence were recognised by the allies who used this to allow the Germans what they expected or wanted to see.
A good part of it may have been that this guy fucked them up so badly intelligencewise: Joan or Juan Pujol Garcia, a Spaniard who based himself in Lisbon and fed the Nazis a stream of misinformation from a spy network that existed entirely in his imagination.
There is a wonderful documentary on him: Garbo the Spy (2009). He was code-named Garbo because one of his handlers considered him the greatest actor in the world.
From the second link above: **His masterwork was to inform them that the Allies would fake a landing at Normandy to lure the German army there, and then unleash Patton’s surprise attack at Calais. They believed him. The fiction worked so well that the Nazis never were up to strength at Normandy, and the fabled Panzer division, while en route there, was diverted to Calais instead.
By this point, the Allies were working closely with Garcia. Three hours before the D-Day attack was timed to begin, Eisenhower personally authorized Garcia to tip off the Nazis, reckoning they wouldn’t have time for troop movements. In a stroke of luck, when Garcia’s message arrived, the Nazi communications center was unstaffed, and so when they discovered his timely warning hours later, he looked even more reliable.
Incredibly, weeks after the invasion, he continued to convince them the real target was elsewhere. When they asked why the attack at Calais never came, he explained: “They had such unexpected success at Normandy, they decided to cancel it.” The Nazis continued to believe Garcia to the end, and he became the only man decorated by both sides in World War II.**
If you were a higher-up in the Nazi intelligence and you understood that Hitler was going to doom the German people to lose the war and to almost destroy the country, it just may be that you would want to thwart him from any success that you could.
The only problem with that is the Allies never established any way to reward Germans who did that and if it was well known that the Allies would do everything they could to reward you and protect you, there just may have been a whole lot more thwarting going on.
I almost forgot the Englandspiel (England Game):
And gave rise to an important U.S. Supreme Court decision, oft-cited since 9-11: Ex parte Quirin - Wikipedia
I saw that! Fascinating movie.
Yes, Canaris cordially hated Hitler. Later, it seems he had the Abwehr more or less stall. We have also found out that Canaris was close friends with Franco, and apparently played a large part in keeping Spain from entering WWII on the side of the Axis. Not only did this save Spain, there is a slight chance that could have changed WWII into a Axis victory.
One of the strangest: somehow the exact dividing line between the planned postwar Western and Soviet occupation zones became widely known to the Germans. Late in the war, a huge exodus began as people fled the soon-to-be-Soviet zone. Some of the hardest fighting by German units at the end of the war occurred while holding bridges and corridors open for civilians fleeing westward.
I’ve read that one of Adm. Canaris’ relatives – wife, maybe? received pension money from the Allies long after the war. Can’t find a cite at the moment.
Another Axis spying success: Rommel was reading the situation reports posted by the American Attache in Cairo.
Well, to many Jews, Canaris is a bit of a hero, there’s even a move to have him made a “righteous gentile” . But the West Germans refused to have his SS assassins and torturers convicted, which in effect ratified Canaris’ conviction as a 'traitor" even tho he was actually one of the few Good Germans and a* true* patriot.
And the Allies knew he was about to be executed and could have rescued him.
In general, German technological successes tended to do them less good than the Western Allies’ technical successes - and spying is an example.
The Western Allies put successful effort into computing (Enigma decoding), minaturized radar, and the nuclear program.
The Germans put successful effort into rocketry and jet aircraft.
The difference is that, of the three big tech breakthroughs of the Allies, two were achieved early enough to have serious war-affecting potential. Nukes, rockets and jets all came too late. In any event, rockets without nukes wasn’t really war-changing tech anyway.