…all of whom were being paid by the Nazis! 27 completely bogus spies, including the “widow” of one “spy” being paid a pension.
My favorite bit was Garbo’s bogus reports being encrypted, transmitted to Spain, decoded, re-encrypted with an Enigma and being re-transmitted to Berlin. Which provided a huge quantity of plaintext for decryption.
He was the greatest bullshit artist who ever lived.
BTW, he started in Lisbon, but the bulk of his work was in England with Tommy Harris.
Yes, Joan or Juan Pujol Garcia is my hero. You can take you Audie Murphys and your George Pattons and all your other war heroes. They’re okay. But Joan or Juan Pujol Garcia is who I’d like to be. And then just sort of disappear after it’s all over, leaving the legend behind.
As I understand it there was no CIA at the start of WW2, nor at the time of US involvement in WW2. The US had effectively zero extra-US capability.
‘Allied’ intelligence was British Intelligence, with a lot of help from mainland Europeans who made it to the UK, and also from those who remained in their home countries in some resistance capacity.
Bletchley Park, for example, was home to a number of important European mathematicians.
There was no CIA, but that didn’t mean the US didn’t have any intelligence capability. Even today the CIA is just one of the civilian branches of the US intelligence community. Each of the military services had its own intelligence branch (SIS in the Army and OP-20-G in the Navy, respectively). It’s true that the US had no (MI-6 style) permanent human intelligence establishment with a mandate that allowed it to operate overseas, which was rectified by the formation of OSS during the war.
I shudder to think what would have happened if this had been attempted; in 1942 most American army units were still training in the continental US and the Brits were still struggling in Asia and Africa. In early 1943 the Germans gave the US a baptism of fire at Kasserine Pass.
Say what? The CIA’s predecessor, the OSS, had some impressive successes, in both Asia and against the Nazis - operating Fritz Kolbe (one of the unsung moral German heroes during the war) who among other things aided D-Day and passed on info about the V1s and V2s and the ME262.
Fritz Kolbe does sound an interesting character, and of value from early 1944.
I can understand why he was important to a newly established OSS, though I’m not sure what his overall contribution might have been given the range and depth of information available from a range of other sources.
Germany proper was surrounded by annexed states with a cross local population and long borders, which makes getting agents in and out easier, plus the agents would have local resource to hand (hiding places, repairs etc).
Getting German agents into Britain would have been harder, and you don’t have the same support from the locals which means the German agents would have been much more isolated and less effective.
From what I’ve read, Britain had a 100% success rate finding German agents - either turning them into double agents or executing them. This might be history being written by the victors, but the apparent effectiveness and size of the Garbo/Arabel network meant that they gave up trying to place any more agents once it was running.
German intelligence was “crap” because it was staffed from the start of the war by Germans who despised the Nazis and generally wanted to thwart the war effort.
They were extremely smart as to how they were acting and didn’t arouse suspicion until the end of the war.
This was the Abwehr.
The Sicherheitsdienst (SS Intelligence) was initially not as effective as the Abwehr as it was a new office. However later in the war it was highly effective.
Reinhard Gehlen and his organization was at least as good as collecting info on the Soviet Union as the Soviets were on Germany.
Yep, the British would have been lost without Kolbe telling them what they already knew from x number of sources. On the other hand, he validated the OSS.
There was also a lot of “empire building” within the Abwehr and SS/SD/Gestapo. Moreso under Himmler’s organizations. Which lead to pessimistic reports being creatively misfiled or under emphasized. The more subordinates one has in one’s “empire”, there’s more people to be blamed for failures.
*“As a bureaucrat in Adolf Hitler’s foreign ministry, he smuggled 2,600 secret Nazi documents to American intelligence in Switzerland from 1943 onwards, continuing his task undetected until the war ended.”
“No other German damaged the Nazi regime to such an extent. Kolbe supplied the Americans with vital information about where the Germans expected the allies to land in Normandy, crucial facts about the Nazi V1 and V2 rockets and Japanese military plans in south-east Asia. He even exposed a butler working in the British embassy in Istanbul as a German spy.”*
BrokenBriton did say “… there was no CIA at the start of WW2, nor at the time of US involvement in WW2.” I see from Wikipedia that the OSS wasn’t formed until mid-1942. Before that, the link doesn’t seem to think much of US intelligence capabilities.
Just to mention, my uncle, whom I’ve referred to on the Board before, was OSS. Stationed in London and working under the legendary Hollywood film director John Ford. My uncle was sometimes flown behind enemy lines to take aerial photos. Mostly he was involved in film development, I think. He was among the very first to see the photos from the liberated concentration camps and never had any patience with Holocaust deniers. (My father and his siblings all grew up in Hollywood, and my uncle had already worked with movie studios as a camera expert before the war.)
Theoretically, shouldn’t that mean there was possibly a German spy so good he wasn’t detected?
It seems unlikely, of course - we know how WWII turned out and the lack of significant engagements won by the Germans thanks to information which could have only come from UK-based espionage etc.
Also keep in mind that the German military and other government agencies were usually able to destroy their sensible files and archives before they could fall into the hands of the enemy. A notable exception was the aforementioned Reinhard Gehlen: