Well, a lot of us are starting to think in terms of war, but we all know that Russia didn’t make much headway in Afghanistan. Why? If we started an action, could we do better? If so, why?
Same reasons why America lost in Vietnam.
The USSR as a superpwer easily gained air dominance and bombed the Mujaheddin (the islamic guerilla fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan; I don’t know how they’re spelt in English, that’s my guess). But guerilla troups are always difficult to fight; they use every advantage their knowledge of the landscape offers, they attack surprisingly a small convoy or troup of the occupator’s army, they defeat it and disappear again very quickly in the wilderness where nobody finds them. They are very decentralized, so if you wipe out one base, this hardly affects the entire organization’s capacity, and they focus on surprise operations. Of course they would never be able to defeat the superpower, but they avoid being defeated themselves and they regularly make the enemy suffer relatively small casualties (they would not be able to run a massive offense, but many small surprise raids which sum up). One day the superpower is fed up with this and decides to leave the country.
I don’t see how any reasonable definition of “lose” applies to America’s presence in Vietnam.
America wanted to aid the fledgeling government of South Vietnam after North Vietnam went communist and wanted to unify the country.
This did not happen while we were present.
The government of South Vietnam, given the American shield, still could not get its act together. As much as everyone likes to call the American policy “imperialistic” we didn’t want to occupy South Vietnam and we left.
We were there to keep the Communist forces out. While we were there, we kept the Communist forces out. There is no “win-lose” we just did what we intended to do. SV failed to pick itself up given our military aid, even after rallying public support following the incredible Tet offensive.
Since we never had any intention of occupying SV, and since only our presence kept communism at bay, we left as the entire situation became “not worth it.”
HOWEVER
The Russians were trying to occupy a territory and failed this objective. I think by any reasonable definition of “lose” we can apply that term here.
“Desert” is a big dry expanse of land… “dessert” is the word you’re looking for.
Well, the Russians weren’t trying to occupy a territory so much as support the government of Afghanistan against rebels, the same way we were in Vietnam. The Soviets weren’t trying to annex the country.
Let’s not forget the fact that America supported the rebel forces with weapons and funds, may have also led to the defeat of the russians. Which i find sadly ironic in the light of the events in the past week.
We will have the following advantages if this path must be taken…
-Both the US and Russia will be on the same side. The Taliban will not benefit from arms trade.
-The Taliban are not the original mujahideen that the Soviets fought. In fact the direct lineage of those fighters are now the Northern Alliance which would be on our side.
-If we are wise we will make our goal limited in scope. Wipe out Bin Lauden’s organization and training facilities. Occupation and government building can be left to the Northern Alliance.
-Nations surronding Afghanistan have pledged their support, including Pakistan which is the Taliban’s largest supplier. The Taliban are now cut off and Afghanistan can be invaded from multiple sides.
Before the USSR got a bloody nose on Afghanistan it was the turn of Great Britain. Over the previous 100 years Britain had been engaged in three “Afghan Wars” not coming out very well in any of them. I think a mixture of geography and the character of the Afghan people ensured that it is a country that is impossible to to occupy.
From AOL’s Merriam Webster dictionary:
I haven’t read Hamlet for a long while and don’t recall the specific quote, but I’m willing to bet that the above definition is the intended one and that Shakespeare was not talking about after-dinner sweets.
This has happened to us on more than one occasion. One notable time that springs to mind is our arming of Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. Also, while we didn’t arm the current regime in Iran we helped arm Iran when the Shah was in control.
As to the OP Schnitte’s answer pretty much sums it up. Decentralization, a people quite capable and used to living off the land, difficult terrain, etc., etc… The US did arm the Mujaheddin and the Russian’s began to hate such things as the Stinger missile. I lone guy would pop-up from behind a rock and knock down a helicopter and then the guy would disappear. Do this over and over again and it becomes quite demoralizaing to an army.
Afghanistan was a truly miserable war for the Russians and they can relate just as many horror stories from that war as America can from Vietnam (maybe more). To be fair, the Russians weren’t very nice either…it was brutal in both directions.
Here is an exerpt from an e-mail I recieved that was written by Michael Moore…
What I do know is that all day long I have heard everything about this Bin Laden guy except this one fact – WE created the monster known as Osama bin Laden!
Where did he go to terrorist school? At the CIA!
Don’t take my word for it – I saw a piece on MSNBC
last year that laid it all out. When the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, the CIA trained him and his buddies in how to commits acts of terrorism against the Soviet forces. It worked! The Soviets turned and ran. Bin Laden was
grateful for what we taught him and thought it might
be fun to use those same techniques against us.
Otto, thanks for that correction of a correction … the line is even more wonderfully whitty with that addition to my understanding.
I looked up a few texts online and they all agree with my good man Schnitte and yourself.
Captain, I stand-- then-- corrected. I thought they were trying to occupy it.
One of leaders of the rebel forces supported and financed by the US against Russia was Bin Laden.
The Northern Alliance are a very diverse group united by a common enemy so I strongly suspect the result would be a civil war caused by the void in power.
I agree with JohnnyIsGood - The Northern Alliance is a mess that shares at least partial blame for Afghanistan’s current straits. It was their infighting and squabbling in the wake of the Soviet pull-out, that helped give the Taliban the moral authority and popular backing to oust them. With Ahmed Shah Massoud gone ( if he is ), they’re going to be even more disunited.
They may make reasonable allies of convrnience, but they’re a poor choice to leave running things. Of course if you challenged me to come up with an alternative, I’d have to admit I’d draw a blank.
- Tamerlane
Almost certainly true. But attempts at occupation in Afghanistan have always lead to disaster.
I would just add that the effect of the Stinger missles was very important from a military standpoint. I remember reading that the effect of the Stingers was horrific on the Soviet planes, and allegedly in one day men running around in the rocks shot down a troop transport, 3 cargo planes, and “several” fighters - with no losses to themselves. IIRC, the effect was so powerful that the effect of the Soviet air power was completly negated. The Stinger is a highly effective weapon, and IIRC the Afghan rebels begged and pleaded for the US to supply them with them for years. I can see why.
I am your “good man”? Is this something I can be proud of?
The Soviets actually did a pretty decent job of defending the places they occupied. The Afghanis did an excellent job of making sure they were everywhere the Soviets weren’t.
The Mujahedin was particularly good at ambushing Soviet armored columns. The Soviets didn’t dare travel in any other fashion, except by air. Their classic ambush tactics were reminiscent of Chief Joseph’s tactics against American cavalry in the 19th century. The Afghanis would pick a valley (it’s all valleys in Northern Afghanistan), set up infantry-controlled anti-tank devices and machine guns in difficult to reach areas along the valley walls, and rig a strip of road to be blown in two or more spots.
The column would advance until it reached the foremost charge, then all would be blown simultaneously in order to bisect the column and trap it. Then mortar, anti-tank, and machine gun fire would be sprayed along the length of the column. The most effective counter to this tactic, the Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunship, was effectively neutralized by the threat of Stinger missiles. Neither armor nor infantry were effective in attacking uphill in the rugged terrain. (Afghanistan also has a long-standing tradition of rifle manufacturing and long-range sniping.)
In many cases, the Mujahedin was able to place their weaponry above the angle which Soviet armor weapons could elevate. In one account I recall reading, the Mujahedin opened fire from only one side of the valley. When Soviet tanks backed part way off the road in order to elevate their guns high enough to reach the Afghani positions, the other side of the valley loosed unexpected artillery and anti-tank weapons against the exposed and (somewhat) vulnerable topsides of the Soviet tanks.
The eventual Soviet response was effective long-range artillery support, but this slowed Soviet supply efforts to a crawl as the firebases themselves had to be heavily defended and placed all along a road with overlapping coverage. Those places not covered were still of course disputed territory. In many cases, the Mujahedin attacks caused damage, but led to the almost complete loss of the Afghan units because the Soviets would seal off the valley at the ends and along the ridge lines, trapping them within. This failed to have much effect on the Mujahedin for the reasons Schnitte addressed above.
There are a great many valleys in Afghanistan which do not have roads at all. It is there where you would find Osama bin Laden, if he is foolish enough to remain in that country. He had plenty of time to move on.
It’s been a while now and my memory is getting bad, but weren’t the Soviet troops there to help and protect the left-wing Afghani governement much the same way that the US was in Viet Nam?