133 A majority of courts have held that an officer’s mistake of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot provide objectively reasonable grounds for a stop. See United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282 [288-89] (5th Cir.1999) [(because there was a ten-year old appellate opinion on point holding that a damaged tail light could not serve as the basis for a traffic stop, “no well-trained Texas police officer could reasonably believe that white light appearing with red light through a cracked red taillight lens constituted a violation of traffic law”)]; United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274 [279] (5th Cir.1998) [(flashing turn signal without turning or changing lanes is not a violation of Texas law and did not create probable cause for the stop)]; United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 [574-75] (6th Cir.2008) [(officer’s mistaken belief that defendant was not allowed to drive in Tennessee with a Mexican driver’s license did not justify an extended detention)]; United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958 [962] (7th Cir.2006) [(officer’s mistaken belief that using a turn signal while rounding a bend in the road was illegal could not support probable cause for arrest)]; United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736 [741-42] (9th Cir.2001) [(officer’s mistaken belief that a placard hanging from a rearview mirror violated the law could not form the basis for reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop)]; United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092 [1096] (9th Cir.2000) [(officer’s mistaken belief that an out-of-state car lacking a front license plate violated the law did not constitute reasonable suspicion required for a traffic stop)]; United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 [1105-06] (9th Cir.2000) [(officer’s mistaken belief that a registration sticker was required to be visible from the rear of a vehicle did not provide objectively reasonable basis for the stop of the vehicle)]; United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 [1053-54] (10th Cir.2009) [(officer’s mistaken belief about the lawful use of dealer plates did not provide reasonable suspicion to justify detention)]; United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 [1138] (10th Cir.2005) [(holding that the “failure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable”)]; United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139 [1145] (10th Cir.2004) [(Oklahoma traffic law regarding use of fog lights did not provide trooper with objectively justifiable basis for the stop)]; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 [1280] (11th Cir.2003) [(officer’s mistaken belief that law required an inside rear-view mirror cannot provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop)]. See also People v. Ramirez, 140 Cal. App.4th 849 [854], 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 [816] (2006) [(a suspicion founded on a mistake of law cannot constitute the reasonable basis for a lawful traffic stop)]; Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284 [298-99] (Fla.2007) [(small crack in lower right windshield did not render defendant’s vehicle unsafe or provide a particularized and objective basis for the stop)]; Martin v. Kan. Dep’t of Rev., 285 Kan. 625 [639], 176 P.3d 938 [948] (2008) [(officer misunderstood and misapplied ordinance regarding how many rear brake lights on a vehicle had to be functioning and thereby lacked constitutional authority for the stop)]; State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818 [823-24] (Minn.2004) [(officer’s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic stop)]; State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575 [578-79] (Minn.1997) [(officer’s mistaken belief that defendant’s motorcycle had three 134 headlamps did not provide an objective legal basis for the stop)]; State v. Kilmer, 741 N.W.2d 607 [611-12] (Minn. App.2007) [(a mistaken interpretation of the law cannot provide the requisite objective basis for suspecting a motorist of criminal activity even if the officer believes, in good faith, that the driving conduct that prompted the stop was illegal)]; Couldery v. State, 890 So.2d 959 [965-66] (Miss.App.2004) [(officer had no reasonable basis to believe that defendant committed a traffic offense by driving in left lane of traffic and, therefore, lacked a reasonable basis for the stop)]; State v. Lacasella, 2002 MT 326 [¶ 32], 313 Mont. 185 [195], 60 P.3d 975 [982] (2002) [(because license plate was taped to windshield, officer did not have particularized suspicion to conduct stop)]; Byer v. Jackson, 241 App.Div.2d 943 [944-45], 661 N.Y.S.2d 336 [338] (1997) [(traffic laws did not require motorist to signal a turn from a private driveway and officer’s good faith belief that there was a violation of the traffic laws did not provide reasonable suspicion to justify the stop)]; State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311 [319] (Tenn. 2006) [(where motorist was not obstructing traffic, officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a stop)]; State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19 [37], 757 A.2d 1017 [1029] (2000) [(where rear license plate was properly illuminated, the State failed to articulate a reasonable and articulable basis for the stop)]; State v. Longcore, 226 Wis.2d 1 [9], 594 N.W.2d 412 [416] (1999) [(when an officer relates facts to a specific offense, it must be an offense; a lawful stop cannot be predicated upon a mistake of law)].
Although the Eighth Circuit has taken the minority position [see United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “a misunderstanding of traffic laws, if reasonable, need not invalidate a stop made on that basis”)], it is not alone in this view. See United States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355 [1359], 376 U.S.App.D.C. 235 [239] (D.C.Cir.2007) [(even though officers erroneously believed license plate had to be affixed to the front bumper, the license plate was on the dashboard and not affixed to the front of the car as required by Maryland law, and stop was objectively reasonable)]. See also Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7 [10-11], 959 S.W.2d 32 [34] (1998) [(officer reasonably, but erroneously, believed license plate was required to display expiration stickers)]; People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal.3d 822 [839], 180 Cal.Rptr. 617 [626-27], 640 P.2d 753 [762-63] (1982) [(although detention was illegal because curfew law had not been violated, a robbery victim’s testimony was admissible)]; People v. Glick, 203 Cal.App.3d 796 [803], 250 Cal.Rptr. 315 [319] (1988) [(officer’s stop of New Jersey vehicle was reasonable even though based on officer’s erroneous understanding of New Jersey registration laws)]; Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773 [774-75], 671 S.E.2d 484 [485] (2008) [(officer erroneously believed it was illegal to stop in the middle of a residential street, but a statute made it illegal to park in the middle of a two-way roadway, which provided a sound basis for the officer’s stop)]; State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119 [125], 982 P.2d 954 [960] (1999) [(even allowing for reasonable mistakes of law by police, stop could not be upheld)]; Harrison v. State, 800 So.2d 1134 [1139] (Miss.2001) [(in addressing validity of probable cause in light of a mistake of law, if probable cause is based on good faith and a reasonable basis, then it is valid)];* DeChene v. Smallwood, 226 Va. 475 [479], 311 S.E.2d 749 [751] (1984) [(arrest resulting *135 from mistake in law should be judged by same test as one stemming from mistake in fact; that is, whether the arresting officer acted in good faith and with probable cause)]. **