**Destiny Disrupted:
A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes
By Tamim Ansary**
Public Affairs, 2009
390 Pages, US$26.95
ISBN-13: 978-1-58648-606-8
There are several ways to look at the not entirely frictionless interaction of the West with the Islamic world over the past few decades. The most common, perhaps, is Samuel Huntington’s “Class of Civilizations” model. Like most exercises in cultural comparison, it has many merits, but tends to view the cultures in question as static entities. Destiny Disrupted takes a somewhat different approach: the West and the Islamic world are different histories. They look back on different pasts, even when those pasts record many of the same events, and they have different ideas about how the world works and where it is going. According to this book, these systems have bounced off each other often in the past, but without deflecting the historical narrative of either to any important degree. That is, not until the latter 17th century, when Western influence began to seriously interfere with Muslim self-confidence and historical expectations. This disruption sparked movements dedicated to renaissance and reaction (sometimes both in the same movement) that met with a measure of success, but also led to the asymmetric conflicts of the early 21st century.
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The author gives commendable attention to the scientific and intellectual evolution of Abbasid times. This evolution was never entirely divorced from theology, which in the case of Islam meant close attention to the text and ontological status of the Koran. To put a complicated matter very briefly, the period began with an epistemologically optimistic appropriation of Aristotelianism; pure reason and empirical observation were believed capable of producing a high degree of reliable knowledge. This optimism was increasingly called into question by controversy over the interpretation of scripture, notably the issue of the degree to which the statements of the Koran can be applied analogically to address new situations. The dispute is sometimes formulated as the question whether the Koran is Allah’s substance or one of his creatures. The prevailing conclusion was that the Koran was “uncreated,” and so had a higher ontological status than any analysis of it. (Compared to their Muslim analogues, the strictest Christian literalists view the Bible as a collection of helpful hints.) The tradition of philosophical enquiry ended with a skepticism of the power of reason that David Hume might envy. The motive, however, was more like that of Immanuel Kant: to make room for faith by restricting the scope of intellectual critique.
The result was a kind of pious skepticism with a quite postmodern flavor (this is the reviewer’s characterization, not the author’s). In any religion with scriptures, naïve fundamentalism is possible in which the believer clings to the literal interpretation of the text because the text is all he knows. Late classical Islamic thought, however, expressed a fundamentalism that had tried a variety of ways of knowing but found them wanting; it returned to the text, or rather to the traditional interpretations of the text, because the text was the one foundation of certainty remaining. Meanwhile, though pure reason had been found wanting on technical grounds, rational religion had also been increasingly wanting for psychological purposes. There was a great market for religious experience which the emerging Sufi orders met, just at the time the political order was falling to pieces.
So, in at least one interpretation of history (and not necessarily one the author endorses), one might say that the over-refined world of the Abbasids had come to an end for its dissention and impiety, just as the Muslims of the First Community had lost battles when they failed to obey Mohammed. The situation righted itself with the new orthodoxy of the Turkish revival.
History failed to end, however. Suddenly there were Europeans everywhere, as technical experts in the Ottoman lands, as military advisers in Persia, as traders in Moghul India. At first they were not militarily overwhelming, but they did have know-how and financial resources that put venal and foolish Muslim rulers under their influence, and indeed in their power. From this account, it is not at all clear how this happened, which suggests that it is not really clear to most Muslims. Nonetheless, over the course of two centuries, the typical Western-Muslim interaction went from Venetian merchants cadging favors from the Divine Porte in Istanbul to the British holding durbars at Delhi. Why, then did the Muslim world fail to adapt to modernity, or to develop a technological and political revolution of its own?
The author is aware that part of the answer lies in the deep structure of Muslim societies. For instance, Muslim reformers in the 19th century tried to introduce constitutions in Muslim states, but with mixed success. The problem was that the arbitrary nature of Muslim rule was reflected all the way down. Every man could be a whimsical tyrant in his own home if he so chose, subject only to the whim of his superiors, who were subject to the whim of their superiors, and so on up to the sultan (who might, as the saying goes, have a whim of iron). In discussing the technological and commercial conservatism of Muslim societies, the author has a great deal to say about gender roles, the Sufic sanction of artisanal industry, and even the difficulty of adapting to clock time. These are all interesting points, but more attention might have been given to issues such as responsible government and the rule of law.
The fundamentally arbitrary nature of power may, perhaps, be an insistence of Islam itself. This was the point that Benedict XVI was making in the Regensburg Address: Allah may incorporate a text, but apparently not the Logos. If so, this has important consequences not just for politics but also for science. A universe informed by a Supreme Being without Divine Reason would imply whimsical government at the human level and whimsical physics at the natural. One could in fact argue that there is a deep connection in Western thought from Christology to constitutionalism to science. (On the other hand, as the author notes, Muslim apologists have argued that reason is precisely the element that Islam adds to the Abrahamic religions.)
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The point is that the aspects of the West that Muslim reformers wished to graft onto Muslim societies as the world of the Three Empires decayed were not the secularized products of a newly post-Christian West, but were continuous with the ancient traditions of Christendom. That is not the same as saying, for instance, that in order to establish a postal system you first must accept the Filioque Clause. The provenance of the attractive features of modernity does imply, however, that in other societies they may not mean quite what they mean in the West; and that in any case, they cannot be established simply by royal proclamation. The author has a lively sense this indeed proved to be the case. The author takes us through the reform and nationalist movements from the 18th century Wahhabis to the Muslim Brotherhood and Taliban of the 21st. He emphasizes that although Wahhabism represents itself as a return to the unmediated Islam of the First Community, its rejection of tradition is in fact as modern in its own way as 20th-century Baathist technocracy. Among the major streams of reformist thought, our Afghan author clearly roots for the home team represented by Sayyid Jamaluddin-i-Afghan (1836-1897; this book suggests 1895). He was a polyglot polymath who traveled the world preaching a program of modernization on Islamic terms. According to the author, he was feeling his way toward a geostrategic strategy for the Muslim states that anticipated mid-20th-century Third Worldism.
The author suggests that the Islamist eruption that began in the last quarter of the 20th century was quite as much a disruption of the Western historical narrative as the appearance of a newly potent early modern West was to the Three Empires. One can pick on Francis Fukuyama too much, but it is true that the model of history he proposed at the end of the Cold War had singularly little to say about such a development. As things stand, the West keeps talking about freedom and looking for another Cold War to win, while the Islamists preach about decadence and look for another Byzantine emperor to defeat. Both of the world histories these enterprises assume are true, the author suggests. A genuinely universal history that unites them is possible, but the time is not yet.