Will Taiwan declare independence? Will China invade? Will (should) we intervene?

[XT]

@rfgdxm

I am quite aware Taiwan is an island. My assumption is that with the huge Chinese military, they could launch an attack that would be unstoppable by Taiwan. And the PRC could do this faster than the US could get sufficient naval forces in the area to prevent it. The US would have to take Taiwan back from the Chinese.

Well, since you claim to be aware of the fact that Taiwan is an island, does your assumption include some kind of magical teleport machine to move that vast army across the sea to Taiwan also? If not, exactly HOW is China supposed to ‘launch an attack that would be unstoppable by Taiwan’ (I’m not even going to get into the vast technological difference between what Taiwan’s military has and what China would be using…that will only make it worse so we’ll just stick with numbers only)??

Even assuming China could just sail (or fly) across unopposed, do you have any idea what moving a large army requires logistically?? China simply doesn’t HAVE the transport to move but a very small fraction of that vast force to Taiwan…so having several million men under arms (in theory) really doesn’t help them much in launching irresistable attacks against an island. Look at WWII with Nazi Germany and Britian for examples if you still don’t get it.

Also, afaik, the US ALWAYS has a carrier group near Taiwan (and units ON Taiwan of course)…not to mention air units in South Korea and Japan. I think the US can move the forces we’d need to defend Taiwan (i.e. our Navy) into the area faster than you seem to think they can…and all this is assuming the Chinese could ready a massive amphibious invasion in total secrecy, something that is HIGHLY unlikely. Besides which, the Taiwanese won’t exactly be a push over on their own.

All of this is moot of course, as none of its likely to happen. But you seem to be laboring under several misunderstandings about WHY China hasn’t invaded Taiwan and won’t invade it now. Its not political (i.e it wasn’t because they thought the rest of the world would be mad with them, because they would lose trade, etc)…simply put its because they CAN’T invade. They physically do not have the capability now or in the past TOO successfully invade Taiwan, not with the US supporting Taiwan (which we would reguardless of what rjungs fantasy machine is spinning out). Its POSSIBLE that 20 or 30 years down the pike China COULD successfully invade Taiwan if they keep building up their capability…but then, if they get to the point they can do it its probably because they have successfully made the transition to full capitalism, in which case they probably won’t even want too anymore…and Taiwan may be more than happy to re-join anyway (i.e. if China is an economic powerhouse surpassing Taiwan, they would probably fall over themselves to rejoin).

-XT

[Little_Nemo]

I have to disagree with you, XT, on your confidence of the Taiwanese military. They are undeniably a professional force, but they are looking the wrong way down a 60-1 population disparity. Taiwan’s own defense ministers have acknowledged that in a direct conflict with China without international support they would be overwhelmed within a month. Their plan is to hold on long enough to be reinforced by their allies.

[rfgdxm]

@Little Nemo

I have to disagree with you, XT, on your confidence of the Taiwanese military. They are undeniably a professional force, but they are looking the wrong way down a 60-1 population disparity. Taiwan’s own defense ministers have acknowledged that in a direct conflict with China without international support they would be overwhelmed within a month. Their plan is to hold on long enough to be reinforced by their allies.

This is my presumption. China isn’t that weak militarily. Taiwan is no match. They would be depending on the US to go to war on their behalf with China.

[Little_Nemo]

And they can depend on the United States to go to war on their behalf. We would do so. Nor is it a one way street - Taiwanese troops fought alongside Americans in Korea and Vietnam.

[Ryan_Liam]

@rfgdxm

This is my presumption. China isn’t that weak militarily. Taiwan is no match. They would be depending on the US to go to war on their behalf with China.

No China isn’t weak militarily, yet the Vietnamese in 1979, kicked their ass when they lead an incursion into their territory. Also, what makes you think Chinese troops wouldn’t defect en masse to democratic/more freedom enshrined Taiwan?

[ralph124c]

Taiwan invests billions in mainland china. Taiwanese businessmen regulary fly back and forth to the mainland. Capital from Taiwan is vital to enable the Chinese economy to grow. So why would the Chinese be so foolish as to attack the golden goose? The only reason that the Chinese make periodic noises about taiwan, is to keep wayward provinces like Sinkiang, Tibet, and the Amur regions in line. Face it, if you live in one of these places, you know the money all goes to Beijing and the coastal provinces. There would be quite a bit of support (in these provinces) to secede, and the Chinese govt. wants to nip that in the bud!

[XT]

@Little Nemo

I have to disagree with you, XT, on your confidence of the Taiwanese military. They are undeniably a professional force, but they are looking the wrong way down a 60-1 population disparity. Taiwan’s own defense ministers have acknowledged that in a direct conflict with China without international support they would be overwhelmed within a month. Their plan is to hold on long enough to be reinforced by their allies.

The problem here is that China has no way of getting the bulk of its military TO Taiwan to fight. Certainly if they could get them all there they could crush Taiwan easily…and if Taiwan attempted to invade China (madness) they would evaporate like water on a hot griddle. However, as with Britian in WWII, Taiwan is on an island…and to get there, the Chinese have to A) Gain complete air superiority in the straight, and B) Have enough transport to land enough troops so that they aren’t simply tossed back into the sea, and C) Find enough transport for logistics to keep their invasion going long enough to completely defeat Taiwans army. They are unlikely to be able to achieve any of those things…so having a massive army that could crush Taiwans army in minutes is moot if they can’t get it over to Taiwan TOO crush them. Again, sort of like the UK and Germany in WWII…if Germany could GET its army to Britian in sufficient strength its all over but the screaming. Its the getting there thats tough.

China has a lot of equipment, men, etc…quantity. But much of it is knockoffs of older soviet equipment (much like what Iraq had in the first gulf war if memory serves). Taiwan has a smaller number, but its all top shelf equipment…quality. Much of it is imported directly from the US as well as Israel I think. Its the main reason there IS a standoff. Even with US support in the form of naval and air assets its the Taiwanese that will be doing the bulk of the fighting.

As to what Taiwan’s defense ministers are saying, I’d need to see some quotes in context to see what exactly they mean. Every analysis I’ve ever seen (admittedly I haven’t looked at this closely in years) of this situation points to the very low probability that China could successfully invade Taiwan through a direct assault. They COULD stage a major air/sea battle in the straights which would hurt Taiwan…but the Chinese would take staggering losses (mostly due to its small navy combined with its mostly outdated fighters…they are still using Mig 21’s last I heard for the bulk of their airforce, though admittedly they DO have some quite modern fighters). And of course, the US almost always has a carrier task group in the area so its moot anyway…if China attacked the US WOULD respond despite what rjung says. It would be a very short though vicious battle.

@rfgdxm

This is my presumption. China isn’t that weak militarily. Taiwan is no match. They would be depending on the US to go to war on their behalf with China.

I think a lot of people are overrating Chinas military CAPABILITIES and underrating Taiwans…especially in the situation that exists (i.e. Taiwan is on an island, has a modern and very capable airforce, coast guard, etc…all of which the Chinese would need to get through first before they could even land on Taiwan…where Taiwan has the advantage of numbers because China doesn’t have the capability of landing several hundred thousand men and supporting them).

Just for drill (as the hijack about an actual war between China and Taiwan/US is more interesting than the boring reality of no war) here are some things I dug up in a quick search:

Ground Forces and Tanks

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is moving toward an overall reduction and reorganization of personnel and equipment with the goal of creating a more modern and mobile army. In 2000, the total estimated personnel strength of the Chinese military is 2.5 million, of which 1.8 million are in service with the PLA (ground forces). The ground forces are divided into 7 military regions with 27 military districts. Within the 7 military regions lie 21 Group Armies, each containing about 60,000 personnel. The Group Armies contain among them 44 infantry divisions, 13 infantry brigades, 10 armored divisions, 12 armored brigades, 5 artillery divisions, 20 artillery brigades, and 7 helicopter regiments. In addition, 5 infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 1 armored brigade, 1 artillery division, 3 artillery brigades, and 3 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) brigades are independent elements of the PLA not assigned to any specific Group Army. There are also three airborne divisions, which are manned by the PLAAF. 5

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China’s tank inventory has numbered around 10,000 for three decades. IDDS estimates the size of China’s tank force as of 1 January 2000 at 10,100. Over the past 30 years, most Soviet World War II-vintage tanks (the T-34/85 and the IS-2) have been retired. Initially, these were replaced with large numbers of Soviet T-54/-55s and Chinese-produced versions of the T-54/-55 (Types 59/69/79). Of these, the Type 59 was the most common, with over 8,000 built for the PLA. Production of the Type 59 began in the late 1950s and probably continued into the early 1980s. The subsequent models, Type 69 and Type 79, made their first public appearances in 1982 and 1984, respectively; but despite being produced nearly 30 years after the original Type 59, they were not much more capable than their predecessor.

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In 1988, the Type 80 was ready for production. The Type 80 represented China’s first major break from the original T-54/-55 design. It features a computerized fire-control system, a laser range-finder, a gun stabilizer, better suspension and power plant, and night-fighting equipment. The tank currently in production is the Type 85-II/III, which was introduced in the early 1990s as a further development of the Type 80. In addition to the Type 80’s electronic and power plant improvements, the Type 85 has an automatic loading system, which reduces the crew to from 4 to 3. The most recent design to come out of China is the Type 90-II, first revealed in late 1991, which resembles the Russian T-72 and is believed to be similar in performance. The Type 90-II has yet to enter full production, and it is not expected to do so in the near future for PLA service. 7

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The active Chinese tank inventory may be smaller than the 10,100 holdings estimated by IDDS. With production having started before 1960, many of the 6,000 Type 59s still in service could be over 40 years old. Many are probably not operational due to poor construction and maintenance. In fact, China’s history of poor maintenance may also put into question the operational status of some of its newer equipment as well. In any event, as a product of the new Chinese military strategy and the higher tank cost per unit, China seems to be replacing older systems on a less than one-for-one basis, moving slowly towards a much smaller, and somewhat more modern force. China may eventually mass produce the Type 90-II, instead of the Type 85-II/-III, for replacing the bulk of its older tanks. Alternatively, China may be working on an even more advanced tank model, which would further reduce the gap in technical capabilities compared with Western tank designs.

Air Forces and Combat Aircraft

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force, PLAAF, currently possesses about 4,350 aircraft, of which the majority are combat aircraft. IDDS estimates that the inventory of Chinese combat aircraft on 1 January 2000 includes the following: 1900 J-6/MiG-19 (all roles and models: fighter, reconnaissance, trainer); 720 J-7/MiG-21 (all roles and models: fighter, reconnaissance, trainer); 222 J-8I/II/III; 55 J-11/Su-27SK; 440 Q-5 (modified MiG-19); 307 H-5/Il-28; and 142 H-6/Tu-16. 8 Small numbers of JH-7s (fewer than 12) and K-8s (10-15) may also be in service. Of these aircraft, the great majority (J-6 and J-7) are of types which began to be deployed before 1972 (See Chart 2.) With the exception of 10 Il-76s, the airlift capabilities of the Chinese Airforce are limited to old Soviet tactical airlift planes built under license or reversed-engineered in China, such as the Y-5/An-2, Y-7/An-24, and Y-8/An-12.

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Much confusion exists as to the direction China will take in the future regarding combat aircraft acquisition. The Chinese government has made a priority of the development of a local aerospace industry capable of producing technologically advanced aircraft. However, the results produced by the Chinese aircraft industry to date have not been promising. Despite decades of work, the only original combat aircraft to be designed and produced in China are the J-8 and JH-7, both of which took so long to develop that by the time they entered service, they were already obsolete by Western standards. The newer J-10, which has been in development for twenty years, probably won’t enter service for another five years.

…

China is by no means unique in this respect. Except for the five largest industrial arms producers (the USA, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany), other countries that have attempted to produce indigenously designed combat aircraft, such as Israel, South Africa, India, Taiwan, and South Korea, have abandoned these efforts and returned to importing systems from one of the five main producers. The basic reason is that the economies of scale required to finance research, development, and production of all the systems and sub-systems that make up today’s frontline combat aircraft are not available to smaller industrial countries nor to large developing countries with smaller GNPs and smaller industrial bases. (In fact, for this reason, Russia is lagging increasingly behind the West in most areas of military technology.) 9

As a result of the inability of the Chinese aircraft industry to produce indigenously designed, technologically advanced combat aircraft, the Chinese government has partially reversed its policy of relying on domestic arms production and has renewed imports of combat aircraft from Russia—specifically, Su-27s and Su-30s—in small numbers. Over the next decade, China will produce Su-27s, with the Chinese designation J-11, under license from Russia. Up to 200 Su-27s may be built, but the total may be curtailed if China obtains licensing rights to the Su-30, which offers several technological advances over the Su-27. China currently plans to buy 30–60 Su-30MKs. 10 In addition, China will continue to pursue its own aviation projects. Production of the latest model of the J-8 will continue in small batches. The JH-7 may also be produced in greater numbers, if PLAAF or PLAN can find a role for the aircraft in their inventories. The J-10 is scheduled to enter service around 2005 with initial reports of expected production up to 300 aircraft (depending in part on the progress of the Su-27 program). In any case, the J-10 and the J-11/Su-27 are expected to form the mainstay of the Chinese Air Force in the early 21st century.

Naval Vessels

Submarines: China embarked on a large submarine building program in the 1960s, which tapered-off in the late 1980s, which included many diesel-electric patrol submarines and some nuclear powered submarines. Many of the diesel-electric submarines from that construction period are now in reserve. Recently, construction and acquisition of new submarines has begun to intensify. In the near future, China’s submarine fleet is expected to be smaller, but more modern. (See Chart 3.)

…

In the 1970s, China embarked on a program to domestically produce submarines of its own design. The first of these was the ‘Ming’ class (Type 035), produced from 1971 to 1979, with production resuming again in 1987. The Mings are not much better in capability than their Romeo predecessors, although they are of newer construction. Submarines of the Song (Type 039) follow-on class are slighter larger than the Ming and incorporate streamlined hull for better submerged performance. The first Song was commissioned in 1999, and two more are now under construction. Later models may incorporate design features from the Kilos. The Song class may be fitted with a version of the C-801 or C-802 anti-ship missile that is capable of submerged launch. In addition, China has purchased 4 Kilo class submarines from Russia. Additional purchases of Kilos or the newer ‘Amur’ class from Russia may depend on the progress of the Song class.

Like China’s effort with the Xia SSBN, China’s first attempt to domestically produce a nuclear-powered attack submarine produced disappointing results. The ‘Han’ class (Type 091) first entered service in 1974. Again, power plant problems plagued the class, and the next ship in the class was not commissioned until 1980. The fifth and final ship did not enter service until 1990. Despite their problems, which may have been fixed, and the long delays in construction, China seems committed to deploying the five subs built. The follow-on Type 093 class is expected to build on the experience from the Han class and on assistance from Russian submarine builders. The class will be similar in capability to the Russian Victor III, first deployed in 1978. The first Type 093 is scheduled to enter service in 2004.

Surface Warships: Since the 1972, the number of ships and overall tonnage of China’s surface combatants has increased at a steady rate. The increase is expected to continue for the next five years, but may decline after that if no new construction or acquisition programs are undertaken. (See Chart 4.)The most recent additions to the Chinese Navy are two Russian-built ‘Sovremenny’ class destroyers. These ships, the first of which was delivered in February 2000, are the largest and most powerful surface warships ever operated by the Chinese Navy. Their most formidable weapon is the SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic sea-skimming ASM, of which eight are carried. The Sovremenny is also armed with the SA-N-7 ‘Gadfly’, which will give China a limited naval air-defense capability. Up to now, China has possessed only short-ranged SAMs of French or domestic design.

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China operates 18 other destroyers of two principle classes. The 4,200 ton ‘Luhu’ class was the basis for the ‘Luhai’ class. Two ships were built, with commissioning dates in 1994 and 1996, respectively, although they were originally ordered in 1985. (Construction was delayed to allow for completion of a frigate order from the Thai Navy.) The Luhus are armed with 8 C-802 ASMs, a domestically built Crotale SAM launcher, which France provided copies of in the 1980s, ASW torpedoes and mortars, and many guns. They are also capable of carrying 2 Harbin Zhi-9A helicopters, which are used for ASW and anti-ship missions.

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Amphibious Assault Ships: China’s amphibious assault capabilities are very limited. As of 1 January 2000, China has only 49 amphibious assault ships with full displacements of 1,000 tons or more (with three more ships under construction). (See Chart 5.) Of these, 42 are under 2,000 tons, and none is larger than 4,800 tons. Many are quite old, including 3 ex-US Navy LSTs built between 1942 and 1945.

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This small fleet size excludes any possibility of China attempting to seize control of Taiwan by means of an amphibious assault. Moreover, there is no sign that China is building or planning to build the larger troop and cargo ships which would be necessary for a large-scale attack. Similarly, China’s small force of marines (about 5,000) indicates that an expansion of amphibious assault capabilities is not expected.

This last part is the key of course…their navy isn’t up to the task. Oh, they could die gloriously and take a lot of Taiwanese with them…but they would achieve nothing. Anyway, my post is too long as it is. Feel free to read through the cite at leasure. If anyone is interested I’ll see if I can dig up an OOB for Taiwan unless someone else wants to do it. Essentially what you’ll see (from memory) is that Taiwan will have F-16 or equivelent fighters, with full AWAC support, going against China’s Mig 21 knockoffs (with some Mig 27 knockoffs also), and perhaps some limited AWAC support of their own. It would be bloody but I don’t think China could gain full air superiority in the straight even if the US didn’t intervene (which we would)…it would essentially be a bloody stalemate IMO. Even if China COULD gain air superiority they don’t have the navy to bring over more than a token force…which the Taiwanese would wipe out in short order having all the advantages of defensive positions, superior numbers, close support, artillary support, and much easier logistics (as they live there after all).

-XT

[furt]

Just to add one more thing to Xtisme’s point: China’s pilots (the ones who would need to win air superiority) have far, far less flight training than the Taiwanese – something like 1/4 of the time. So it ain’t like they’re going to make up for their inferior equipment.