Sure, something will happen, some official proclamation made, some shuffling of the org chart, that Rove will have Bush claim is substantive, just so he can use that as a campaign issue or prevent its absence from being used against him. But nothing will really change on the ground.
Yugoslavia looked peaceful and stable as long as Tito forcibly crushed all dissent, too, and it might have been a good prediction that it would stay that way after his death. There’s less reason to be optimistic about Iraq, though - gotta bring in the blue helmets, there’s no better, or even other, way in the medium term, and maybe the long term, too.
Interesting proposal by MMI, and similarly astute observations by others about both the history of Iraq as a nation and the interrelationships between its modern-day constituencies (Kurds, Shi’a, etc.).
What I find particularly interesting is that none of the historical or cultural context you folks are citing as integral to resolving the current conflict, nor any of the considered alternatives you propose, have been even remotely referred to in the publicly aired policy alternatives of the CPA and Bush administration. The administration instead seems fixated on a largely ceremonial and arbitrary deadline with little attention to relevant historical or cultural factors.
Is this an accurate perception? Is political perception Stateside having greater bearing on the creation of a new Middle Eastern state than the reality on the ground? Is there any evidence that there is a viable transition process ongoing under U.S./CPA supervision in Iraq?
Of course, I have to keep reminding myself that we Dopers have far greater access to both historical and current information on the situation, so we are better positioned to rationally discuss policy alternatives than the federal government, who, after all are severely limited in their resources and access to expert opinion, scholarship, and data.
Was that too facetious?