I’ve been trying to roughly model the reasons why the “blitzkrieg” actually worked. Rough model is this :
Two generals have roughly equivalent armies.
One basic doctrine of military science is that defense is usually superior to attack, as defenders can emplace their forces into prepared positions, with adequate stocks of ammo already brought in and all their weapons calibrated. (something you had to do with ww2 tech).
However, what I read the German military would do is they would create these pre-generated battle plans that explicitly planned out every stage of an assault. They would then rehearse these plans for months.
When the assault began, every single unit already has this pre-set plan, and all units execute the plans in parallel. Defending armies don’t know where the attack will come from, so while defense might be superior locally, the attackers can concentrate all their forces on just a few points on the defender’s lines. For instance, the Germans didn’t need to bypass the Maginot line, they could have simply focused sufficient forces on any given point on it to overwhelm that area of the line with locally superior firepower.
At this level of tech, the only method to pass information around was either noisy analog radios or messenger. Spotter airplanes would need to land and have their film developed before the images would be available. This creates enormous control lag. So while the attackers are executing a pre-set plan, the defending generals must react using information that is hours old. Also, only the headquarters units even know all of the information - there’s no practical way to keep local units informed about all the intel about enemy plans, which is one reason you had to keep control centralized.
France: we will build the Maginot Line which is the perfect defense
German Army: OK, in that case we will attack over here instead.
France: oh shit!
The Germans prepared for the next war, while France and the other countries kept preparing for the last war.
Once a breakthrough of the defenders lines occurred the fog of war tilts the scales I favor of the attackers who are better able to stick to their plan.
It depends on a lot of factors: how well known the likely attack points are, the ability of the attackers to sustain the attack, the terrain, etc.
The Battle of Kursk was a major defensive victory for the Soviets. While they had a general idea the region the Germans would attack, they still had to fortify in depth a very long front. It became a battle of attrition and the Soviets were good at those.
Even late in the war, the Battle of the Seelow Heights was a meatgrinder for Soviet troops. The Nazis knew the area of attack, had good defensive positions. A less depleted German Army would have held the ground.
The Battle of the Bulge was an example of good offense against poor defense, but was doomed due to the attack not being sustainable.
Okinawa is another example where the defenders did quite well due to the terrain and defensive positions making breakthrough offensives difficult.
German Army: OK, in that case we will attack over here instead
French: *Oh great. We will send our Army and the British into Belgium to face yours *
Germans: So we will attack through the Ardennes and turn to the coast after you have gone into Belgium and trap your best forces in Belgium and Northern France.
French: How do you say fucked in German.
WW2 was a war of manoeuvre. The Germans excelled at it and the W Allies got whipped every time they fought such a battle.
Another thing: WWII Blitzkrieg tactics depend on a concentration of force into a point. This tends to strip resources from other sectors of the line, leaving weak points that are susceptible to counter-attacks or spoiling attacks.
The King Hell of this is Stalingrad, but the flank counterattacks in the late phase of the Battle of the Bulge are also examples.
A Blitz attack is a huge commitment, which cannot be easily recalled. It’s a massive throw of the dice, which must win, as failure leaves the would-be attacker in a really shit-poor defensive position. WWII was merciless to salients.
Attackers tend to have the advantage, for the simple reason that if they don’t think they have the advantage, they generally don’t attack. That’s why most failed attacks are, more than anything else, a result of *intelligence *failure.
Grin! I like that! Also, taking the initiative provides a (small) advantage in itself. You get to choose where to attack.
The defender is stuck trying to hold every possible route of attack, or else trying to read the enemy’s mind to defend the most likely routes of attack. It tends to spread one thin.
I think you’ve got this backwards - the German army was one of the first to use Mission-type tactics rather than elaborate pre-planned battle plans. Sub commanders were given specific target to accomplish and left to improvise as to how they would achieve it with the resources available. While a few set-piece assaults (such as taking Eben-Emael and the Meuse crossing) were thoroughly pre-planned and trained for most of the Battle of France was a series of improvisations (and some downright insubordinations) by the field commanders.
Defense was better back in the days where troops had to walk everywhere. But change that around to a modern mechanized army which can maneuver and cross vast distances quickly and the defensive advantage is less.
So an army smashes thru and hits the enemy at their weakest points - from behind. Also they take out their supply depots.