What Rhodes also mentions is the discussions in an S-1 subcommittee of Conant, Arthur Compton and Urey that were taking place at the same time as those between Fermi, Oppenheimer and Teller. He correctly notes they concluded that the Germans were extremely unlikely to resort to radiological warfare and that the tactic would be ineffective if they did so. What Rhodes omits is their other recommendation that “if military authorities feel that the United States should be ready to use such weapons in case the enemy started to use it first, such studies should be initiated immediately” (as quoted by Hershberg in his Conant biography). Since I’m not aware of any such follow-up studies, never mind later active preparations, I presume that the military authorities decided this was indeed not an eventuality they had to prepare for.
The set of preparations that were adopted are given their own chapter by Groves in Now It Can Be Told: the measures to ensure that any German attempt to disrupt Overlord by dropping radioactive material on the beaches would be quickly, but discreetly detected. Under the codename Operation Peppermint, about a dozen Geiger counters were distributed and various orders (reprinted at length by Groves) were issued. Thus medical staff were told that a problem had occured in the manufacture of some X-ray film, with the effect that they looked foggy after being developed and that they should report instances of this. Similarly, they were told that there had been “a few cases of a mild disease of unknown etiology” with specific symptoms and, again, that further instances should be reported. Without saying so, the symptoms were those of radiation poisoning.
Nobody thought this was a likely outcome, merely an eventuality that had to be covered. This is particularly clear from the exchanges between Eisenhower and the British, particularly Ismay, in May 1944: it was a low priority issue and the minimal action taken by the Americans already had it covered. (See the summary of these letters in Vol. 3, pt.II of Hinsley’s British Intelligence in the Second World War.)
Over the years, Barton Bernstein has written a number of articles on US thinking about radiological warfare during WWII.
[QUOTE=Menocchio]
Also, the harmful effects of radiation were poorly understood at this stage. I don’t think anyone thought it would be good for you, but I also don’t know if people realized that radioactive material all by itself would be of any really effect at all.
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The subject was a lot better understood at the time, at least by the specialists, than most people nowadays realise. Particularly for the sort of exposures you’d be thinking about in this context.
[QUOTE=Bosda Di’Chi of Tricor]
In My Tank Is Fight! a text on the subject of never-completed WW2 secret weapons, German plans for a dirty bomb were made very plain. The transatlantic bomber being developed was intended to carry chemical, biological, radiological & (if available) nuclear weapons. Its payload was too small for conventionals.
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While I’m not familiar with that particular book, every other claim I’ve seen of it having been envisaged to use Nazi rockets or bombers to rain nuclear destruction down on the US has been pisspoor history. This seems entirely a postwar fantasy.