Would I Make a good General?

Damn you Rick! You got to McClellan before I could!

That’s true, but if “we” didn’t win outright, the Germans still lost. I think it was the 101st Airborne (Screaming Eagles). But you get my point - defiance in the face of superior forces, unexpected responses (Nuts), etc. By rights, the German forces should have had an easy time of it.

Well, technically, I got to “McLellan,” who I guess is a general in Rick’s Imaginary Army. So you get to explain McClellan to ralph. :slight_smile:

I can think of other timid generals, too. Nagumo (an admiral, yeah) jumps to mind. Or Elphinstone. I cited Buller, but you could pick any number of Boer War generals. Or Crimean War generals - Christ, what a badly run war that was.

Yeah, 101st. 102st doesn’t make much sense, does it?

Historian John Toland has a quite complete story on the “Nuts” thing in his book Battle: The Story of The Bulge.

BGen. McAuliffe, the 101st’s Artillery commander, was in temporary command of the division during the absence of Maj. Gen. Maxwell Tayor who was in the US. During a rather hectic time an aide relayed to him that there was a German officer under a white flag with a message demanding surrender. “Oh nuts,” was McAuliffe’s response because he had many other things on his mind and didn’t have time for such interruptions. He then went back to other business and forgot about the matter.

Some time later, maybe a couple of hours, the aide came again and said the German officer demanded an answer. McAuliffe asked his staff what they thought a proper resonse would be. One of them replied that he thought McAuliffe’s first comment was pretty good. When asked what it was he replied that the General had said “Nuts.” So they sat down and composed a message which said, and I think I recall Toland’s reporting correctly: “FROM: The American Commander. TO: The German commander. Nuts.” The message was given to the envoy and he was returned to his lines.

At that time the division still had adequate supplies, the main German assault had moved on to the west several miles and the Germans had not yet decided that they had to get serious about taking Bastogne which was an important transportation hub in the area.

McAuliffe didn’t think it a big deal at the time but much was made of it as a morale booster during a time of a serious US setback at a time when many, including Eisenhower, had considered that effective German resistance in the west was over and done with.

I don’t think it’s such that McClellan et al were bad generals per se…more that their skills lead more towards barrack and garrison work rather than field and battle work.

Not all general-level offices require the same skills, after all. Some are organizers, some are leaders of men, etc.

Ralph, though, shows little of those skills as yet. Or if he has them he hasn’t demonstrated them in this thread.

Maybe I am a romantic of sorts. Even knowing the real story now, I somehow still prefer the “urban legend” version. My dad was at the Bulge, but as a staff sergeant (Indian head division), he had more immediate problems (like staying alive). He never talked much about that battle or the war; it seems most of the people were that way.

A surprising veteran of the Battle of the Bulge: Mel Brooks.

I agree that this guy was a disaster, by any measure. he did lose Malaya and Singapore, to a considerably inferior force.
What I don’t understand…he (Percival) was a competent staff officer…in 1927 he ever (correctly) predicted where the Japanese would land in Malaya (Khota Bharu). So whay was he such a disaster? He had:
-a larger, better equipped force
-the advantage of land-based lines of supply
-fleet support (from he Royal Navy’s newest and most powerfulbattleships-the REPULSE and PRICE oF WALES).
-and finally, time to anticipate the invading force’s intentions
Clearly, it would have been better had Percival remained a colonel. His promotion to general was a mstake. However, in fairness to him, his troops werea mix of British army, Indian army, and ANZAC forces. He had a great deal of trouble commanding this mixed force. Plus, he kept retreating 9in the hope that he could establish a defensive line).
Of course (and unlike most generals) he paid the price for his errors-he just about starved to death ina japanese prison camp.

As to his being a competent staff officer, well, he may have been. The thread’s about being a good GENERAL, which I am assuming means an officer in command of a battle formation at least as large as a brigade. Being a good staff officer doesn 't mean you’ll be a good general any more than being a good personal trainer means you can be a star NFL running back. They’re different skills.

Why was Percival a disaster?

In “The Psychology of Military Incompetence,” Dixon notes that Percival was shockingly unwilling to accept the severity of the situation; he refused to admit that things were not going well, refused to allow anything “alarmist” to be communicated, and refused to begin defensive preparations. There was no logical reason for any of this; he was just afraid to admit the problem was getting out of hand and that he was in trouble. This had three practical problems:

  1. The British were defensively unprepared, especially against tank assault and air raids,
  2. Nobody knew what the hell they were supposed to do, since Percival and his staff wouldn’t tell anyone what was going on, and
  3. Morale started to sink because it rapidly became apparent that GHQ was twisting in the wind.

Percival exhibited some of the critical traits of a bad general. He was a racist, or at least allowed his actions to be dominated by racist dogma, and so did not have the island prepared for aerial bombardment at night because he or his staff believed people with slanty eyes couldn’t fly planes at night (Yes, back then, a lot of white people honestly believed that.) He was timid, and psychologically unable to deal with the growing crisis by admitting the scope of the problems. He actually PREVENTED defensive preparations in a hopeless attempt to pretend things were not as bad as they were; his obstinacy bordered on temporary insanity. And he was obsessed not with winning battles, but with how people would think of him, with his endless refusals to do anything the civilians would find “Demoralizing,” though as others tried to explain to him, letting the Japanese walk through Singapore would be a lot more demoralizing than admitting they had to build defenses.

I’m picking on Percival because, really, his specific problem was his timidity; faced with an approaching enemy, he was frozen in terror and unable to react appropriately. Percival WAS intelligent, and I would presume he understood battle theory, but when the time came he was psychologically incapable of dealing with the situation. If you’re timid, maybe you’d do the same.

Nah. He’d just have them shot.

Another good/general/bad example is William S. Rosecranz. Solid fighter, capable organizer and good at leading men. He took Tennesee for the Union. Then, outside Chatanooga, he apparently had a nervous breakdown when the Confederates counter-attacked. Poor bugger never quite recovered. He was one of the Union’s best too , but I guess he let the stress get to him.

This is incorrect. First of all, neither forces nor commanders are never evenly matched. Second, the people who came up with the idea that winning five battles in a row made you great knew nothing. Grant never won five damned batles in a row - what made him great was that he won campaigns. And that involves organizing and directing men, choosing good subordinates, and gathering and parsing information all day every day. And that’s not something even 3% of the population does well, I think, at least not on the scale required.

Yes, this is victory. The Germans were attacking right them and MCAulife stopped them.

Right. What generals do, I think, is select military strategies to advance the political airms. Choose objectives and missions to advance those strategies. Collect military forces to carry out the missions and ensure that they are supplied. And, maybe most important, keep tabs on the situation so that adjustments can be made as required.

Well, no. The Germans rolled right on past Bastogne. That’s how the 101st Division got surrounded. The ultimate aim of the offensive was to take Antwerp and split the British and US forces into separate areas. Bastogne was on the sourthern edge of the salient and wasn’t considered too important at the onset of the offensive. The Germans didn’t decide to really try to take Bastogne until quite late in the campaign when they needed the transportation hub for logistic support of their forces which had been stopped in the area of Dinant, Belgium. From my reading the major battles in the Bastogne area occurred after the 101st’s siege was broken by the 4th Armored Division. Then both divisions were engaged in heavy fighting and suffered high casualties.

From this site: “But what about Bastogne? In popular thinking, the Battle of the Bulge is synonymous with the Battle of Bastogne. This is very unfortunate, since it ignores the real military keys (holding the northern shoulder and holding St. Vith) to the defeat of the Germans. Journalists hungry for some sign of American success at stopping the German onslaught played up the defense of Bastogne, where Gen. Anthony McAuliffe (101st Airborne Division) said “Nuts” to a German surrender demand and where the Third US Army (10th Armored Division) broke through the German Seventh Army’s buffer to reach the surrounded town on Day 3 of the Battle of the Bulge. This was truly heroic stuff. But from a military strategy point of view (and this can easily be seen on the map above), while Bastogne was a strategically important major road junction for sustaining the attack, it was on the periphery of the attack and well behind the initial front lines. The German plan was to have the panzers bypass Bastogne and let the later echelons of infantry and artillery units clean it out. And the panzers did succeed in bypassing Bastogne, so that their plan in that sector was on schedule. As a source for rallying U. S. spirits, the defense of Bastogne and McAuliffe’s “Nuts” were a success. But from a strategic perspective, the German fate had already been sealed at St. Vith, when they could not take that critical supply center on Day 2 - nor on Days 3, 4, 5, and most of 6. Bastogne did not become surrounded by forces intent on taking it until the night of December 21, Day 6 of the Battle of the Bulge. And the famous “Nuts” did not come until December 22, Day 7. Heroic as the deeds of the defenders of Bastogne were, the defense of Bastogne is a very important secondary element but not one of the true strategic keys to the German failure.”

Without getting into the various side tracks, I think if you really want to discuss this you need to take a step back and define some terms. What KIND of General are we talking about here? Staff General? Logistics? Combat? Tactical or strategic? What time period are we talking about here? Modern? Ancient?

To all these I’d say that the OP probably wouldn’t make a good General…because he doesn’t have the training to be either Staff or Logistics, and doesn’t seem to have the skills or temperment to be a combat general in todays military. In addition, I doubt he has the skills to be a fighting general from the past.

A person is rarely appointed ‘general’ from scratch with no real background in the military except for reading a few books. Usually they come up through the ranks and so learn all the different things needed to coordinate increasing numbers of men (or supplies, or whatever). Even in ancient times battle commanders rarely were simply appointed with no practical military experience…and when they were they were mostly disasters. The OP, granted a military generalship in todays military would be completely out of his/her depth and an unmitigated disaster. Granted a generalship in any ancient army would be a similar unmitigated disaster, reguardless of how many books he’s read…as would most of the rest of us. I’m fairly well read myself, have always been interested in matters military, was in the ROTC in college and served in the military, think of myself as a good armchair strategist and a perhaps better than average tactician on the tactical side…and I’d be a disaster in command too because I don’t have the background or training for higher command.

This is all easily solved though…we need to get an internet deathmatch going for Total War Rome, or if we are talking modern tactics than some other similar game. If we are talking strategy there are several strategic board games/computer internet games that could be played. :wink:

-XT

That’s an awfully good example. Grant is an interesting example of a person who, at least according to the experts, was psychologically a perfect candidate to be a successful general, and yet was NOT what popular opinion would hold to be a “military man.” He was a tremendous communicator - the way in which he wrote orders is a model for any commander to follow - was willing to try new things, sought accurate intelligence at all times, was totally disinterested in pomp and ceremony, and was morally brave and alacritous (and, incidentally, a physically brave man as well.)

Consider ignorance fought, but I’m disappointed that the urban legend I had heard isn’t true – I had heard that McAuliffe had actually said “Fuck You!” and that “Nuts!” was the cleaned-up version given to the American public.

It’s always tough to have our fondest illusions shattered.

The best people to run the military in peacetime are the worst to run it in wartime, and vice-versa. It’s a completely different mindset.

The Civil War is a particularly interesting case, because thousands of oficers joined the Union army (and, to a lesser degree, the Confederate) without any military experience at all. They raised companies in their home states, were appointed by the Governers, and then were given to the regular army command. While most of these eventually became competant in their role, it took at least two years for them to really become useful veterans. And only as handful of the top officers were useful.

The ones who were really useful throughout the war weren’t neccessarily the ones who were good at politics. Often, the ones who were not really very good at skileld manuver had a penchant for bold, gutsy moves, and pushing men to the utmost of what they could deliver. In short, they were leaders, regardless of skill. In the Civil War, gutsy leaders always outfought meek ones. It was only when two gutsy leaders came together that they usually got the major battles. Otherwise, the Union or Confeds would simply flee or fight half-heartedly when the opponent made a strong push.

I have expressed this view to professional naval officers on occasion and they all deny it. I think there might be a little substance in it but I don’t think its a slam dunk by any means.

The selection process for General Officer, or Flag Rank is quite severe and the pyramid of rank gets awfully steep at the top.

I’m quite certain that potential Generals and Admirals are spotted early on in their service, like by the end of the first year at one of the military acadamies or their first year in service as a reserve. After that their progress is watched and after graduation they are steered into the right jobs to gain the needed experience. Those who do well are continued in the process and those who don’t become rank and file officers.

So it looks to me like the selection for top jobs is an ongoing process that continues throughout an entire career. And I think at any point in time those who are doing the selecting are well aware of the requirements for a good military commander in either peace or war.

They screw up now and then, as does everyone, but on the whole they seem to do a pretty good job. It could be that the experience of the Civil War with Lincoln going through General after General until he finally found a group that really understood the job might be one institutional memory that took.

Ralph124c Bomber Harris used pretty much all of his assets to bomb Germany and was unable to force the desired outcome. If he’d had his way aircraft would not have been ‘wasted’ on such distractions as coastal command to combat the u-boat threat. On the other the transportation plan wreaked havoc with German logistics in a very rapid fashion - the only flaw being that the allies delayed until '44 to attack transportation because they misunderstood how effective it would be. Post war analyses - the strategic bombing survey, etc - did not come to the conclusion that using heavy bombers to slaughter more civilians (or even soldiers) would have shortened the war. Destroying/disabling a few key power plants, however, would have had disastrous effects on German war plants.

Perceval may not have been an inspired commander (or even adequate for that matter), but other than the “larger, better equipped force” (and thus more dependent on supply) the advantages you list are trivial or non existent. Where are the Commonwealth forces land based supply coming from? Up mediocre roads from . . . Singapore- an island not terribly close to any major supply centers. So there is no “land- based supply” on either side. Force Z should never have been sent without air cover, but times were desperate and the attached carrier had been damaged and put out of commission long before the force reached the theater. Air support for the far east had been siphoned off to support the Soviets and the mid-east, far higher priorities until (and even after) December '41.

There are times when wiping out your enemy’s army is the best or only way to win. But not always and certainly not against all foes.