Dad and I are arguing the point. I say Germany would have, and even when they lost he war, their scientists would have been picked up somewhere and told to keep the faith alive. Nuc-u-lar power seems inevitable, to me.
Dad says it’s too expensive, and that sciences don’t communicate amongst themselves. “Making heavy water is too big a technique for most countries with limited budgets to mess with” he says.
Well, anyone got an answer? This gonna end up being a debate?
Yeah, it would’ve. The Soviets got the bomb in 1949, showing that had a huge motivation in getting a bomb of their own. The Germans had a bombmaking program during the war, but the US got there first. That was one of the main reasons the Manhattan project was so heavily funded, because it was to outrace Germany.
A lot of the Soviet program was based on information collected on the Manhattan Project by spies, though. If the U.S. hadn’t undertaken the Manhattan Project, it’s doubtful that the Soviets would have built a bomb before the 50s at the earliest.
I think that if we did not get if first, someone else would, there were a lot of other coutries working on it. If we had not, then my money would be on the Japanese being first, refining on German tech. Russia had nothing, and if we had not developed it would still have nothing. The Germans were close, but barking up the wrong tree, but would have goten there eventually. After the war Germany had nothing left to work with, while Japan (who had knowledge of German plans) had some superstructure left to work with. Pure conjecture of course, if you disagree I will not even try to defend this opinion, it is pure “What if”.
Germany would not have developed the bomb, and neither would have Japan. Both were crushed before they could ever develop the bomb, Germany completly without using nukes and Japan nearly so. Both were occupied after the war and had approved governments installed, so I don’t see either becomeing a post-war nuclear power.
The USSR had physicists who were actively working on fission until the war interrupted their work. However they might never have gotten approval for a bomb program if the US had not conclusively demonstrated that nukes were possible. As it was, Beria was deeply suspicious of his own bomb program, suspecting that the scientists were simply promising the sky just to fund basic research with no immediate application. Without the US program, I don’t see the USSR beginning a serious bomb program until the Khrushchev era.
Britain was too impoverished to develop the bomb on it’s own, with much higher priorities for it’s limited budget. France wouldn’t have bothered unless others already had nukes, ditto China, etc.
Without the US, I’d say the 1960s before you saw nukes.
The book “Bodyguard of Lies” tells how the allies got permission from the king of Norway (in exile) to sink a ferry carrying most of the heavy water the Germans had managed to make. The ferry was the security hole in the transport chain. A big roll of plastique was put in the hull of the ferry, and the whole thing went down in a very deep, very cold fjord.
According to the book, this was a third-rib dagger shot for the German nuclear bomb program.
Incidentally, I just came in here to say that. Something of a item of national pride amongst Norwegians, depicted in the semi-documentary Kampen om Tungtvannet* (The Battle of the Heavy Water, lit. transl.) As far as I am aware, the guides met and led the British operatives in the high mountains near Rjukan, in the Northern part of our country, down to the facility. The facility was sabotaged, but they discovered that the Germans had shipped off a shipment of the Heavy Water beforehand. As far as I had thought, the decision to sink the ferry was a field decision, but that’s just an impression I had.
The civilian casualties in the operation were divisive for the resistance fighters, several cells opining that the casualties were completely unnecessary and that the operation was a hoax to back up under the false rumours spread by the Allieds of a Nazist ‘superweapon,’ designed to keep the Allied civil population in line with fear. Fortunately the majority supported the view that we, today, recognize as the truth and were able to smuggle out the resistance fighters to safety, along with the British operatives.
Probably accurately portrayed, as three of four Norwegian Guides played themselves in the movie Norway needed heroes, I guess. Pardon my English.
I’ve read about this. Those men were astonishingly tough, living off almost no supplies and little more than their wits for weeks, and enduring hundreds of kilometres’ walk though the snowy mountains before successfully completing their mission. True heroes, and acknowleged as such here in Britain. Didn’t know about the sabotage of the shipment, though.
I’m very happy to hear that the operation and efforts has gained recognition outside of military corridors - makes me all tingly with national pride, y’know - but the glory of the operation truly should be ceded to the commandos, however enabling the efforts of the locals were.
Sadly, my search for a translated version hasn’t yielded any results, and as it’s a low-budget 1948 release with acting that could be, at best, called theatrical in nature, I sincerely doubt it was rereleased and subtitled. I do, however, know that it was released on DVD in Norwegian, as that’s how I saw it a few years ago, on the school bench. (Not as part of the curriculum; rather the artifact of an eccentric history / natural sciences professor who was on his last year before retirement and pretty much did as he damn well pleased. Ran away with a container of kalcium and tossed it on the sea at the New Year’s celebration down in the harbour . . . aah, memories)
So, if you’re very interested in the history, - or, like me, a cultural masochist (can’t stop watching, 'cause if you did, the piece of shit would win) - you could always proccure the Norwegian release DVD/VHS and infer the meaning by contest, as the acting is highly theatrical.
Researching further, a Biritsh survival expert and author called Ray Mears wrote a book called The Real Heroes of Telemark, and the BBC made a documentary based on this, with the same title.
There’s also a BBC radio documentary about it (which now I recall is where I heard the story - didn’t read it after all), and even better still, the documentary is still available as a streaming RealAudio presentation. Excellent.
Anyone who’s casually browsing this thread should give up a few minutes of their time to listen to it - it’s an astonishing story.
Excellent finds, Jjimm! Listening to that Radio Documentary right now - reluctant to install Real software as I am - and in my search to find a transcript of it, I was recommended another book by Knut Haukelid, the Race Against the Atom. I’m thinking about ordering it - thanks, again, for bringing the documentary to my attention!
The case that everybody in this thread seems to be vastly underestimating is the UK. It’s worth realising that ICI proposed during the war that they build one as a private company - albeit funded by the government on a cost basis. Now this proposal was both quickly rejected by Whitehall and, in hindsight, was distinctly optimistic, but it is an indication of how promising the prospect looked from a British perspective. Furthermore this British optimism was probably decisive in Vannevar Bush persuading Roosevelt to fund the US attempt to a build a nuclear weapon during the likely timescale of the war. Not only that, the British programme was an entirely serious attempt to independently build one while at war well into 1943. The only reason that this was abandoned as a go it alone project was because Churchill and Roosevelt then agreed that the British effort be absorbed into the American one.
Now the UK project clearly couldn’t have easily delivered a weapon in the 1940s. But the UK did successfully test its first nuclear weapon in 1952. This undoubtedly partially relied on knowledge gained during the wartime cooperation with the US after 1943, but it’d be a silly underestimation of the quality of the physicists involved to argue that the British success depended on these American insights.
Playing the counterfactuals, if the US programme had died at birth, there’s no technical reason why an independent British one wouldn’t have continued to a successful conclusion sometime during the 1950s. The only factors against this are political. For example, taking a minimal change to the actual timeline, it’s not clear that the incoming Labour government in 1945 would have committed to the project of building a purely British bomb without the example of wartime success (not to mention the goud of the insult of being cut out of postwar nuclear cooperation with the US).
The German case is far too messy and controversial to realistically construct a counterfactual. But a victorious Reich would have probably been able to find the resources to build one.
As for the Soviets, the decisive issue is possibly the timescale on which Stalin latches onto the issue. There’s the relatively convincing argument - due to the likes of David Holloway - that he didn’t realise the significance of a nuclear weapons programme until after Hiroshima. While the actual early development of Soviet nuclear weapons strongly utilized what their spies had gleaned from Britain and the US, there were capable nuclear physicists in the USSR who had begun to understand the implications of fission by themselves. Again the obstacles were fundamentally political rather than technical.
The story’s really quite well known in Britain and the US, not least due to the 1965 Hollywood film version The Heroes of Telemark.
If anything, I’d argue - without detracting from the courage of those involved - that the fame of the Norwegian angle has rather distorted perceptions of the German nuclear programmes. The attacks had a useful effect, but they weren’t decisive in the failure of the German efforts.
On 5 September 1945 ZEEP went critical. It was a test reactor at Chalk River in Ontario, and was the first reactor outside of the USA to succeed.
The Canadians had been working on nuclear development in Montreal since 1940, and the British had joined them in 1942.
In WWII in Canada, C.D. Howe was Minister of Munitions and Supply, following the war he was Minister of Trade and Commerce, and his engineering firm, the C.D. Howe Company, lead the nuclear industry, particulary in the mid-1950s and following, when from Montreal it designed the Chalk River NRU. His engineers went on to populate AECL and Ontraro Hydro.
I extect that if the USA had not involved itself in WWII, then work in Canada would have ben stepped up, resulting in the bomb. As it was, the USA did develop the bomb, and Canada has remained under its wing, permitting Canada to instead develop and export peaceful nuclear technology, such as CANDU.
I had always heard that the Norwegian heavy-water sabotage was the most brilliantly successful counter-intelligence effort in history. Heavy water isn’t actually all that useful in building a fisssion bomb (it’s crucial for a fusion bomb, but that’s some time later), and from what I’ve read, the Allies were aware of that at the time. But by attacking the German supplies of heavy water, we managed to convince them that it was important, thereby sending them down the wrong lines of research.
Back to the OP’s question, we can’t really extrapolate the success of the other Allied countries based on how much they actually did accomplish during the War. The American Manhattan Project drew on the expertise of pretty near all of the physicists available. Had they not been working on the American project, many of those physicists would likely have been working for Canada or the UK. The project itself probably wouldn’t have looked too different, just where it was being done, and who was funding it. The funding is really the only thing that would have any impact on the success, and even there, it’s a reasonably predictable effect. If, say, the British were only able to afford a tenth of the funding the Americans spent, they could still at worst develop the bomb in ten times the time it took the Americans, and probably much quicker than ten times the time (if still longer than the Americans took).
Here in the US, the PBS series Nova recently (November 2005) aired a 52-minute documentary titled Hitler’s Sunken Secret. Don’t be put off by the History Channelesque title: it was actually very well made. The DVD is available from Amazon.com or directly from PBS. The complete transcript is online here, and well worth reading for those who are interested (but not interested enough to pay $20 for the DVD!). Knut Lier Hansen (one of the Norwegian saboteurs involved) is interviewed, as are some of the civilian survivors of the sinking of the ferry Hydro.
In addition to giving the backstory of the German program to make a Bomb, and the history of the raids on the Vemork plant, the documentary followed recent efforts using a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) to find the Hydro, and its payload of heavy-water barrels, at the bottom of Lake Tinn. Apparently, there had been some concern that the Germans may have been using barrels filled with regular water as a decoy, in which case the civilian loss of life during the sinking of the Hydro would have been in vain.
The ROV team succeeds in salvaging one of the barrels in near-mint condition and found that:
it does, indeed, have heavy water still in it, in a concentration that matched the 1944 manifest.
The documentary claims that by 1944, the Germans were no longer putting effort into development of a nuclear weapon, but that the heavy water was destined for a research reactor in a cave in the Bavarian town of Haigerloch.
Did the saboteurs check with London before sinking the Hydro? From the transcript:
Bashta, velkommen to the SDMB, hope you decide to stay here, and your English is excellent!